// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
 * AppArmor security module
 *
 * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks.
 *
 * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
 * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
 */

#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
#include <linux/zstd.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>

#include "include/af_unix.h"
#include "include/apparmor.h"
#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
#include "include/audit.h"
#include "include/capability.h"
#include "include/cred.h"
#include "include/crypto.h"
#include "include/file.h"
#include "include/ipc.h"
#include "include/net.h"
#include "include/path.h"
#include "include/label.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
#include "include/policy_ns.h"
#include "include/procattr.h"
#include "include/mount.h"
#include "include/secid.h"

/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
int apparmor_initialized;

union aa_buffer {
        struct list_head list;
        DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(char, buffer);
};

struct aa_local_cache {
        unsigned int hold;
        unsigned int count;
        struct list_head head;
};

#define RESERVE_COUNT 2
static int reserve_count = RESERVE_COUNT;
static int buffer_count;

static LIST_HEAD(aa_global_buffers);
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(aa_buffers_lock);
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_local_cache, aa_local_buffers);

/*
 * LSM hook functions
 */

/*
 * put the associated labels
 */
static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
        aa_put_label(cred_label(cred));
        set_cred_label(cred, NULL);
}

/*
 * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials
 */
static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
{
        set_cred_label(cred, NULL);
        return 0;
}

/*
 * prepare new cred label for modification by prepare_cred block
 */
static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
                                 gfp_t gfp)
{
        set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old)));
        return 0;
}

/*
 * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds
 */
static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
        set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old)));
}

static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
{

        aa_free_task_ctx(task_ctx(task));
}

static int apparmor_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
                               u64 clone_flags)
{
        struct aa_task_ctx *new = task_ctx(task);

        aa_dup_task_ctx(new, task_ctx(current));

        return 0;
}

static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
                                        unsigned int mode)
{
        struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
        const struct cred *cred;
        int error;
        bool needput;

        cred = get_task_cred(child);
        tracee = cred_label(cred);      /* ref count on cred */
        tracer = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
        error = aa_may_ptrace(current_cred(), tracer, cred, tracee,
                        (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) ? AA_PTRACE_READ
                                                  : AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
        __end_current_label_crit_section(tracer, needput);
        put_cred(cred);

        return error;
}

static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{
        struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
        const struct cred *cred;
        int error;
        bool needput;

        tracee = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
        cred = get_task_cred(parent);
        tracer = cred_label(cred);      /* ref count on cred */
        error = aa_may_ptrace(cred, tracer, current_cred(), tracee,
                              AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
        put_cred(cred);
        __end_current_label_crit_section(tracee, needput);

        return error;
}

/* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */
static int apparmor_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
                           kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
        struct aa_label *label;
        const struct cred *cred;

        rcu_read_lock();
        cred = __task_cred(target);
        label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);

        /*
         * cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will
         * initialize effective and permitted.
         */
        if (!unconfined(label)) {
                struct aa_profile *profile;
                struct label_it i;

                label_for_each_confined(i, label, profile) {
                        kernel_cap_t allowed;

                        allowed = aa_profile_capget(profile);
                        *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, allowed);
                        *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, allowed);
                }
        }
        rcu_read_unlock();
        aa_put_label(label);

        return 0;
}

static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
                            int cap, unsigned int opts)
{
        struct aa_label *label;
        int error = 0;

        label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
        if (!unconfined(label))
                error = aa_capable(cred, label, cap, opts);
        aa_put_label(label);

        return error;
}

/**
 * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths
 * @op: operation being checked
 * @path: path to check permission of  (NOT NULL)
 * @mask: requested permissions mask
 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request  (NOT NULL)
 *
 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
 */
static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask,
                       struct path_cond *cond)
{
        struct aa_label *label;
        int error = 0;
        bool needput;

        label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
        if (!unconfined(label))
                error = aa_path_perm(op, current_cred(), label, path, 0, mask,
                                     cond);
        __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);

        return error;
}

/**
 * common_perm_cond - common permission wrapper around inode cond
 * @op: operation being checked
 * @path: location to check (NOT NULL)
 * @mask: requested permissions mask
 *
 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
 */
static int common_perm_cond(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask)
{
        vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_idmap(path->mnt),
                                            d_backing_inode(path->dentry));
        struct path_cond cond = {
                vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid),
                d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode
        };

        if (!path_mediated_fs(path->dentry))
                return 0;

        return common_perm(op, path, mask, &cond);
}

/**
 * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
 * @op: operation being checked
 * @dir: directory of the dentry  (NOT NULL)
 * @dentry: dentry to check  (NOT NULL)
 * @mask: requested permissions mask
 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request  (NOT NULL)
 *
 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
 */
static int common_perm_dir_dentry(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
                                  struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
                                  struct path_cond *cond)
{
        struct path path = { .mnt = dir->mnt, .dentry = dentry };

        return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
}

/**
 * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm
 * @op: operation being checked
 * @dir: directory that the dentry is in  (NOT NULL)
 * @dentry: dentry being rm'd  (NOT NULL)
 * @mask: requested permission mask
 *
 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
 */
static int common_perm_rm(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
                          struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
{
        struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
        struct path_cond cond = { };
        vfsuid_t vfsuid;

        if (!inode || !path_mediated_fs(dentry))
                return 0;

        vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_idmap(dir->mnt), inode);
        cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
        cond.mode = inode->i_mode;

        return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
}

/**
 * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create
 * @op: operation being checked
 * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in  (NOT NULL)
 * @dentry: dentry to create   (NOT NULL)
 * @mask: request permission mask
 * @mode: created file mode
 *
 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
 */
static int common_perm_create(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
                              struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, umode_t mode)
{
        struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };

        if (!path_mediated_fs(dir->dentry))
                return 0;

        return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
}

static int apparmor_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
        return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
}

static int apparmor_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
                               umode_t mode)
{
        return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
                                  S_IFDIR);
}

static int apparmor_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
        return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
}

static int apparmor_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
                               umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
{
        return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode);
}

static int apparmor_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
{
        return common_perm_cond(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR);
}

static int apparmor_file_truncate(struct file *file)
{
        return apparmor_path_truncate(&file->f_path);
}

static int apparmor_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
                                 const char *old_name)
{
        return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
                                  S_IFLNK);
}

static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
                              struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
        struct aa_label *label;
        int error = 0;

        if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry))
                return 0;

        label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
        if (!unconfined(label))
                error = aa_path_link(current_cred(), label, old_dentry, new_dir,
                                     new_dentry);
        end_current_label_crit_section(label);

        return error;
}

static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
                                const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
                                const unsigned int flags)
{
        struct aa_label *label;
        int error = 0;

        if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry))
                return 0;
        if ((flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && !path_mediated_fs(new_dentry))
                return 0;

        label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
        if (!unconfined(label)) {
                struct mnt_idmap *idmap = mnt_idmap(old_dir->mnt);
                vfsuid_t vfsuid;
                struct path old_path = { .mnt = old_dir->mnt,
                                         .dentry = old_dentry };
                struct path new_path = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt,
                                         .dentry = new_dentry };
                struct path_cond cond = {
                        .mode = d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode
                };
                vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
                cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);

                if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
                        struct path_cond cond_exchange = {
                                .mode = d_backing_inode(new_dentry)->i_mode,
                        };
                        vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
                        cond_exchange.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);

                        error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, current_cred(),
                                             label, &new_path, 0,
                                             MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE |
                                             AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE,
                                             &cond_exchange);
                        if (!error)
                                error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, current_cred(),
                                                     label, &old_path,
                                                     0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR |
                                                     AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond_exchange);
                }

                if (!error)
                        error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, current_cred(),
                                             label, &old_path, 0,
                                             MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE |
                                             AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE,
                                             &cond);
                if (!error)
                        error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, current_cred(),
                                             label, &new_path,
                                             0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR |
                                             AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);

        }
        end_current_label_crit_section(label);

        return error;
}

static int apparmor_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
{
        return common_perm_cond(OP_CHMOD, path, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
}

static int apparmor_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
{
        return common_perm_cond(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN);
}

static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
{
        return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_GETATTR);
}

static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file)
{
        struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file_ctx(file);
        struct aa_label *label;
        int error = 0;
        bool needput;

        if (!path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry))
                return 0;

        /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
         * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
         * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
         * actually execute the image.
         *
         * Illogically, FMODE_EXEC is in f_flags, not f_mode.
         */
        if (file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC) {
                fctx->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
                return 0;
        }

        label = aa_get_newest_cred_label_condref(file->f_cred, &needput);
        if (!unconfined(label)) {
                struct mnt_idmap *idmap = file_mnt_idmap(file);
                struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
                vfsuid_t vfsuid;
                struct path_cond cond = {
                        .mode = inode->i_mode,
                };
                vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode);
                cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);

                error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, file->f_cred,
                                     label, &file->f_path, 0,
                                     aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
                /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
                fctx->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
        }
        aa_put_label_condref(label, needput);

        return error;
}

static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
{
        struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file);
        struct aa_label *label = begin_current_label_crit_section();

        spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock);
        rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label));
        end_current_label_crit_section(label);
        return 0;
}

static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
{
        struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file);

        if (ctx)
                aa_put_label(rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label));
}

static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
{
        struct aa_label *label;
        int error = 0;

        label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
        error = aa_file_perm(op, current_cred(), label, file, mask, false);
        end_current_label_crit_section(label);

        return error;
}

static int apparmor_file_receive(struct file *file)
{
        return common_file_perm(OP_FRECEIVE, file, aa_map_file_to_perms(file));
}

static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
        return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask);
}

static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
{
        u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK;

        if (cmd == F_WRLCK)
                mask |= MAY_WRITE;

        return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask);
}

static int common_mmap(const char *op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
                       unsigned long flags)
{
        int mask = 0;

        if (!file || !file_ctx(file))
                return 0;

        if (prot & PROT_READ)
                mask |= MAY_READ;
        /*
         * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
         * write back to the files
         */
        if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
                mask |= MAY_WRITE;
        if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
                mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;

        return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
}

static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
                              unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
{
        return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
}

static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
                                  unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
{
        return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot,
                           !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
}

#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
static const char *audit_uring_mask(u32 mask)
{
        if (mask & AA_MAY_CREATE_SQPOLL)
                return "sqpoll";
        if (mask & AA_MAY_OVERRIDE_CRED)
                return "override_creds";
        return "";
}

static void audit_uring_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
{
        struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad_of_va(va);

        if (ad->request & AA_URING_PERM_MASK) {
                audit_log_format(ab, " requested=\"%s\"",
                                 audit_uring_mask(ad->request));
                if (ad->denied & AA_URING_PERM_MASK) {
                        audit_log_format(ab, " denied=\"%s\"",
                                         audit_uring_mask(ad->denied));
                }
        }
        if (ad->uring.target) {
                audit_log_format(ab, " tcontext=");
                aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label),
                                ad->uring.target,
                                FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
        }
}

static int profile_uring(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request,
                         struct aa_label *new, int cap,
                         struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
{
        unsigned int state;
        struct aa_ruleset *rules;
        int error = 0;

        AA_BUG(!profile);

        rules = profile->label.rules[0];
        state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_IO_URING);
        if (state) {
                struct aa_perms perms = { };

                if (new) {
                        aa_label_match(profile, rules, new, state,
                                       false, request, &perms);
                } else {
                        perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
                }
                aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
                error = aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad,
                                       audit_uring_cb);
        }

        return error;
}

/**
 * apparmor_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override
 * @new: the target creds
 *
 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
 * to service an io_uring operation.
 */
static int apparmor_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
{
        struct aa_profile *profile;
        struct aa_label *label;
        int error;
        bool needput;
        DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_IO_URING,
                          OP_URING_OVERRIDE);

        ad.uring.target = cred_label(new);
        label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
        error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
                        profile_uring(profile, AA_MAY_OVERRIDE_CRED,
                                      cred_label(new), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &ad));
        __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);

        return error;
}

/**
 * apparmor_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
 *
 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
 * kernel polling thread.
 */
static int apparmor_uring_sqpoll(void)
{
        struct aa_profile *profile;
        struct aa_label *label;
        int error;
        bool needput;
        DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_IO_URING,
                          OP_URING_SQPOLL);

        label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
        error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
                        profile_uring(profile, AA_MAY_CREATE_SQPOLL,
                                      NULL, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &ad));
        __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);

        return error;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */

static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
                             const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
{
        struct aa_label *label;
        int error = 0;
        bool needput;

        /* Discard magic */
        if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
                flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;

        flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;

        label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
        if (!unconfined(label)) {
                if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
                        error = aa_remount(current_cred(), label, path, flags,
                                           data);
                else if (flags & MS_BIND)
                        error = aa_bind_mount(current_cred(), label, path,
                                              dev_name, flags);
                else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
                                  MS_UNBINDABLE))
                        error = aa_mount_change_type(current_cred(), label,
                                                     path, flags);
                else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
                        error = aa_move_mount_old(current_cred(), label, path,
                                                  dev_name);
                else
                        error = aa_new_mount(current_cred(), label, dev_name,
                                             path, type, flags, data);
        }
        __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);

        return error;
}

static int apparmor_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
                               const struct path *to_path)
{
        struct aa_label *label;
        int error = 0;
        bool needput;

        label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
        if (!unconfined(label))
                error = aa_move_mount(current_cred(), label, from_path,
                                      to_path);
        __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);

        return error;
}

static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
{
        struct aa_label *label;
        int error = 0;
        bool needput;

        label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
        if (!unconfined(label))
                error = aa_umount(current_cred(), label, mnt, flags);
        __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);

        return error;
}

static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
                                 const struct path *new_path)
{
        struct aa_label *label;
        int error = 0;

        label = aa_get_current_label();
        if (!unconfined(label))
                error = aa_pivotroot(current_cred(), label, old_path, new_path);
        aa_put_label(label);

        return error;
}

static int apparmor_getselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *lx,
                                u32 *size, u32 flags)
{
        int error = -ENOENT;
        struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
        struct aa_label *label = NULL;
        char *value = NULL;

        switch (attr) {
        case LSM_ATTR_CURRENT:
                label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(current_cred()));
                break;
        case LSM_ATTR_PREV:
                if (ctx->previous)
                        label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
                break;
        case LSM_ATTR_EXEC:
                if (ctx->onexec)
                        label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
                break;
        default:
                error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
                break;
        }

        if (label) {
                error = aa_getprocattr(label, &value, false);
                if (error > 0)
                        error = lsm_fill_user_ctx(lx, size, value, error,
                                                  LSM_ID_APPARMOR, 0);
                kfree(value);
        }

        aa_put_label(label);

        if (error < 0)
                return error;
        return 1;
}

static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, const char *name,
                                char **value)
{
        int error = -ENOENT;
        /* released below */
        const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
        struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
        struct aa_label *label = NULL;

        if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
                label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
        else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0  && ctx->previous)
                label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
        else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
                label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
        else
                error = -EINVAL;

        if (label)
                error = aa_getprocattr(label, value, true);

        aa_put_label(label);
        put_cred(cred);

        return error;
}

static int do_setattr(u64 attr, void *value, size_t size)
{
        char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value;
        size_t arg_size;
        int error;
        DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE,
                          OP_SETPROCATTR);

        if (size == 0)
                return -EINVAL;

        /* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
        if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
                /* null terminate */
                largs = args = kmalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
                if (!args)
                        return -ENOMEM;
                memcpy(args, value, size);
                args[size] = '\0';
        }

        error = -EINVAL;
        args = strim(args);
        command = strsep(&args, " ");
        if (!args)
                goto out;
        args = skip_spaces(args);
        if (!*args)
                goto out;

        arg_size = size - (args - (largs ? largs : (char *) value));
        if (attr == LSM_ATTR_CURRENT) {
                if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
                        error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
                                                         AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS);
                } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
                        error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
                                                         AA_CHANGE_TEST);
                } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
                        error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS);
                } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
                        error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_TEST);
                } else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0) {
                        error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_STACK);
                } else
                        goto fail;
        } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_EXEC) {
                if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
                        error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC);
                else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0)
                        error = aa_change_profile(args, (AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC |
                                                         AA_CHANGE_STACK));
                else
                        goto fail;
        } else
                /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
                goto fail;

        if (!error)
                error = size;
out:
        kfree(largs);
        return error;

fail:
        ad.subj_label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
        if (attr == LSM_ATTR_CURRENT)
                ad.info = "current";
        else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_EXEC)
                ad.info = "exec";
        else
                ad.info = "invalid";
        ad.error = error = -EINVAL;
        aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &ad, NULL);
        end_current_label_crit_section(ad.subj_label);
        goto out;
}

static int apparmor_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx *ctx,
                                u32 size, u32 flags)
{
        int rc;

        if (attr != LSM_ATTR_CURRENT && attr != LSM_ATTR_EXEC)
                return -EOPNOTSUPP;

        rc = do_setattr(attr, ctx->ctx, ctx->ctx_len);
        if (rc > 0)
                return 0;
        return rc;
}

static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
                                size_t size)
{
        int attr = lsm_name_to_attr(name);

        if (attr)
                return do_setattr(attr, value, size);
        return -EINVAL;
}

/**
 * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds
 * @bprm: binprm for the exec  (NOT NULL)
 */
static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
        struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
        struct aa_label *new_label = cred_label(bprm->cred);

        /* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */
        if ((new_label->proxy == label->proxy) ||
            (unconfined(new_label)))
                return;

        aa_inherit_files(bprm->cred, current->files);

        current->pdeath_signal = 0;

        /* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new label */
        __aa_transition_rlimits(label, new_label);
}

/**
 * apparmor_bprm_committed_creds() - do cleanup after new creds committed
 * @bprm: binprm for the exec  (NOT NULL)
 */
static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
        /* clear out temporary/transitional state from the context */
        aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(task_ctx(current));

        return;
}

static void apparmor_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
{
        struct aa_label *label;
        bool needput;

        label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
        prop->apparmor.label = label;
        __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);
}

static void apparmor_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
                                          struct lsm_prop *prop)
{
        struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(p);

        prop->apparmor.label = label;
        aa_put_label(label);
}

static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
                unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
{
        struct aa_label *label;
        int error = 0;
        bool needput;

        label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);

        if (!unconfined(label))
                error = aa_task_setrlimit(current_cred(), label, task,
                                          resource, new_rlim);
        __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);

        return error;
}

static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
                              int sig, const struct cred *cred)
{
        const struct cred *tc;
        struct aa_label *cl, *tl;
        int error;
        bool needput;

        tc = get_task_cred(target);
        tl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(tc);
        if (cred) {
                /*
                 * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior
                 */
                cl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
                error = aa_may_signal(cred, cl, tc, tl, sig);
                aa_put_label(cl);
        } else {
                cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
                error = aa_may_signal(current_cred(), cl, tc, tl, sig);
                __end_current_label_crit_section(cl, needput);
        }
        aa_put_label(tl);
        put_cred(tc);

        return error;
}

static int apparmor_userns_create(const struct cred *cred)
{
        struct aa_label *label;
        struct aa_profile *profile;
        int error = 0;
        DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK, AA_CLASS_NS,
                          OP_USERNS_CREATE);

        ad.subj_cred = current_cred();

        label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
        if (!unconfined(label)) {
                error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
                                    aa_profile_ns_perm(profile, &ad,
                                                       AA_USERNS_CREATE));
        }
        end_current_label_crit_section(label);

        return error;
}

static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp)
{
        struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
        struct aa_label *label;
        bool needput;

        label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
        //spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock);
        rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label));
        rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer, NULL);
        rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate, NULL);
        __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);
        return 0;
}

static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
        struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);

        /* dead these won't be updated any more */
        aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->label, true));
        aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->peer, true));
        aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->peer_lastupdate, true));
}

/**
 * apparmor_sk_clone_security - clone the sk_security field
 * @sk: sock to have security cloned
 * @newsk: sock getting clone
 */
static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
                                       struct sock *newsk)
{
        struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
        struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(newsk);

        /* not actually in use yet */
        if (rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label) != rcu_access_pointer(new->label)) {
                aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(new->label, true));
                rcu_assign_pointer(new->label, aa_get_label_rcu(&ctx->label));
        }

        if (rcu_access_pointer(ctx->peer) != rcu_access_pointer(new->peer)) {
                aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(new->peer, true));
                rcu_assign_pointer(new->peer, aa_get_label_rcu(&ctx->peer));
        }

        if (rcu_access_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate) != rcu_access_pointer(new->peer_lastupdate)) {
                aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(new->peer_lastupdate, true));
                rcu_assign_pointer(new->peer_lastupdate,
                                   aa_get_label_rcu(&ctx->peer_lastupdate));
        }
}

static int unix_connect_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct aa_label *label,
                             struct sock *sk, struct sock *peer_sk)
{
        struct aa_sk_ctx *peer_ctx = aa_sock(peer_sk);
        int error;

        error = aa_unix_peer_perm(cred, label, OP_CONNECT,
                                (AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE),
                                  sk, peer_sk,
                                  rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label,
                                     lockdep_is_held(&unix_sk(peer_sk)->lock)));
        if (!is_unix_fs(peer_sk)) {
                last_error(error,
                           aa_unix_peer_perm(cred,
                                rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label,
                                     lockdep_is_held(&unix_sk(peer_sk)->lock)),
                                OP_CONNECT,
                                (AA_MAY_ACCEPT | AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE),
                                                          peer_sk, sk, label));
        }

        return error;
}

/* lockdep check in unix_connect_perm - push sks here to check */
static void unix_connect_peers(struct aa_sk_ctx *sk_ctx,
                               struct aa_sk_ctx *peer_ctx)
{
        /* Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC */
        struct aa_label *label = rcu_dereference_protected(sk_ctx->label, true);

        aa_get_label(label);
        aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->peer,
                                             true));
        rcu_assign_pointer(peer_ctx->peer, label);      /* transfer cnt */

        label = aa_get_label(rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label,
                                             true));
        //spin_unlock(&peer_ctx->lock);

        //spin_lock(&sk_ctx->lock);
        aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(sk_ctx->peer,
                                               true));
        aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(sk_ctx->peer_lastupdate,
                                               true));

        rcu_assign_pointer(sk_ctx->peer, aa_get_label(label));
        rcu_assign_pointer(sk_ctx->peer_lastupdate, label);     /* transfer cnt */
        //spin_unlock(&sk_ctx->lock);
}

/**
 * apparmor_unix_stream_connect - check perms before making unix domain conn
 * @sk: sk attempting to connect
 * @peer_sk: sk that is accepting the connection
 * @newsk: new sk created for this connection
 * peer is locked when this hook is called
 *
 * Return:
 *   0 if connection is permitted
 *   error code on denial or failure
 */
static int apparmor_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sock *peer_sk,
                                        struct sock *newsk)
{
        struct aa_sk_ctx *sk_ctx = aa_sock(sk);
        struct aa_sk_ctx *peer_ctx = aa_sock(peer_sk);
        struct aa_sk_ctx *new_ctx = aa_sock(newsk);
        struct aa_label *label;
        int error;
        bool needput;

        label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
        error = unix_connect_perm(current_cred(), label, sk, peer_sk);
        __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);

        if (error)
                return error;

        /* newsk doesn't go through post_create, but does go through
         * security_sk_alloc()
         */
        rcu_assign_pointer(new_ctx->label,
                           aa_get_label(rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label,
                                                                  true)));

        /* Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC */
        unix_connect_peers(sk_ctx, new_ctx);

        return 0;
}

/**
 * apparmor_unix_may_send - check perms before conn or sending unix dgrams
 * @sock: socket sending the message
 * @peer: socket message is being send to
 *
 * Performs bidirectional permission checks for Unix domain socket communication:
 * 1. Verifies sender has AA_MAY_SEND to target socket
 * 2. Verifies receiver has AA_MAY_RECEIVE from source socket
 *
 * sock and peer are locked when this hook is called
 * called by: dgram_connect peer setup but path not copied to newsk
 *
 * Return:
 *   0 if transmission is permitted
 *   error code on denial or failure
 */
static int apparmor_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *peer)
{
        struct aa_sk_ctx *peer_ctx = aa_sock(peer->sk);
        struct aa_label *label;
        int error;
        bool needput;

        label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput);
        error = xcheck(aa_unix_peer_perm(current_cred(),
                                label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
                                sock->sk, peer->sk,
                                rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label,
                                                          true)),
                       aa_unix_peer_perm(peer->file ? peer->file->f_cred : NULL,
                                rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label,
                                                          true),
                                OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, peer->sk,
                                sock->sk, label));
        __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput);

        return error;
}

static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
{
        struct aa_label *label;
        int error = 0;

        AA_BUG(in_interrupt());

        if (kern)
                return 0;

        label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
        if (!unconfined(label)) {
                if (family == PF_UNIX)
                        error = aa_unix_create_perm(label, family, type,
                                                    protocol);
                else
                        error = aa_af_perm(current_cred(), label, OP_CREATE,
                                           AA_MAY_CREATE, family, type,
                                           protocol);
        }
        end_current_label_crit_section(label);

        return error;
}

/**
 * apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct
 * @sock: socket that is being setup
 * @family: family of socket being created
 * @type: type of the socket
 * @protocol: protocol of the socket
 * @kern: socket is a special kernel socket
 *
 * Note:
 * -   kernel sockets labeled kernel_t used to use unconfined
 * -   socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or
 *     sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in
 *     sock_graft.
 */
static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
                                       int type, int protocol, int kern)
{
        struct aa_label *label;

        if (kern) {
                label = aa_get_label(kernel_t);
        } else
                label = aa_get_current_label();

        if (sock->sk) {
                struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk);

                /* still not live */
                aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->label, true));
                rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label));
        }
        aa_put_label(label);

        return 0;
}

static int apparmor_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
                                      struct socket *sockb)
{
        struct aa_sk_ctx *a_ctx = aa_sock(socka->sk);
        struct aa_sk_ctx *b_ctx = aa_sock(sockb->sk);
        struct aa_label *label;

        /* socks not live yet - initial values set in sk_alloc */
        label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
        if (rcu_access_pointer(a_ctx->label) != label) {
                AA_BUG("a_ctx != label");
                aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(a_ctx->label, true));
                rcu_assign_pointer(a_ctx->label, aa_get_label(label));
        }
        if (rcu_access_pointer(b_ctx->label) != label) {
                AA_BUG("b_ctx != label");
                aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(b_ctx->label, true));
                rcu_assign_pointer(b_ctx->label, aa_get_label(label));
        }

        if (socka->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) {
                /* unix socket pairs by-pass unix_stream_connect */
                unix_connect_peers(a_ctx, b_ctx);
        }
        end_current_label_crit_section(label);

        return 0;
}

/**
 * apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket
 * @sock: socket to bind the address to (must be non-NULL)
 * @address: address that is being bound (must be non-NULL)
 * @addrlen: length of @address
 *
 * Performs security checks before allowing a socket to bind to an address.
 * Handles Unix domain sockets specially through aa_unix_bind_perm().
 * For other socket families, uses generic permission check via aa_sk_perm().
 *
 * Return:
 *   0 if binding is permitted
 *   error code on denial or invalid parameters
 */
static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
                                struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
        AA_BUG(!sock);
        AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
        AA_BUG(!address);
        AA_BUG(in_interrupt());

        if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
                return aa_unix_bind_perm(sock, address, addrlen);
        return aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk);
}

static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
                                   struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
        AA_BUG(!sock);
        AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
        AA_BUG(!address);
        AA_BUG(in_interrupt());

        /* PF_UNIX goes through unix_stream_connect && unix_may_send */
        if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
                return 0;
        return aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk);
}

static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
{
        AA_BUG(!sock);
        AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
        AA_BUG(in_interrupt());

        if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
                return aa_unix_listen_perm(sock, backlog);
        return aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk);
}

/*
 * Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept
 *       has not been done.
 */
static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
{
        AA_BUG(!sock);
        AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
        AA_BUG(!newsock);
        AA_BUG(in_interrupt());

        if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
                return aa_unix_accept_perm(sock, newsock);
        return aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk);
}

static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
                            struct msghdr *msg, int size)
{
        AA_BUG(!sock);
        AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
        AA_BUG(!msg);
        AA_BUG(in_interrupt());

        /* PF_UNIX goes through unix_may_send */
        if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
                return 0;
        return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk);
}

static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
                                   struct msghdr *msg, int size)
{
        return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size);
}

static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
                                   struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
{
        return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size);
}

/* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */
static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
{
        AA_BUG(!sock);
        AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
        AA_BUG(in_interrupt());

        if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
                return aa_unix_sock_perm(op, request, sock);
        return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk);
}

static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
{
        return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
}

static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
{
        return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
}

/* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */
static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
                            int level, int optname)
{
        AA_BUG(!sock);
        AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
        AA_BUG(in_interrupt());

        if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
                return aa_unix_opt_perm(op, request, sock, level, optname);
        return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk);
}

static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
                                      int optname)
{
        return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock,
                                level, optname);
}

static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
                                      int optname)
{
        return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock,
                                level, optname);
}

static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
{
        return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock);
}

#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
/**
 * apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk
 * @sk: sk to associate @skb with
 * @skb: skb to check for perms
 *
 * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held
 *
 * dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram()
 * to deny an incoming connection  socket_sock_rcv_skb()
 */
static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
        struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
        int error;

        if (!skb->secmark)
                return 0;

        /*
         * If reach here before socket_post_create hook is called, in which
         * case label is null, drop the packet.
         */
        if (!rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label))
                return -EACCES;

        rcu_read_lock();
        error = apparmor_secmark_check(rcu_dereference(ctx->label), OP_RECVMSG,
                                       AA_MAY_RECEIVE, skb->secmark, sk);
        rcu_read_unlock();

        return error;
}
#endif


static struct aa_label *sk_peer_get_label(struct sock *sk)
{
        struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
        struct aa_label *label = ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT);

        if (rcu_access_pointer(ctx->peer))
                return aa_get_label_rcu(&ctx->peer);

        if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX)
                return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT);

        return label;
}

/**
 * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer
 * @sock: socket that we are trying to get the peer context of
 * @optval: output - buffer to copy peer name to
 * @optlen: output - size of copied name in @optval
 * @len: size of @optval buffer
 * Returns: 0 on success, -errno of failure
 *
 * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan
 */
static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
                                             sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen,
                                             unsigned int len)
{
        char *name = NULL;
        int slen, error = 0;
        struct aa_label *label;
        struct aa_label *peer;

        peer = sk_peer_get_label(sock->sk);
        if (IS_ERR(peer)) {
                error = PTR_ERR(peer);
                goto done;
        }
        label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
        slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer,
                                 FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
                                 FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL);
        /* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */
        if (slen < 0) {
                error = -ENOMEM;
                goto done_put;
        }
        if (slen > len) {
                error = -ERANGE;
                goto done_len;
        }

        if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, name, slen))
                error = -EFAULT;
done_len:
        if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &slen, sizeof(slen)))
                error = -EFAULT;

done_put:
        end_current_label_crit_section(label);
        aa_put_label(peer);
done:
        kfree(name);
        return error;
}

/**
 * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
 * @sock: the peer socket
 * @skb: packet data
 * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
 *
 * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
 */
static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
                                            struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)

{
        /* TODO: requires secid support */
        return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}

/**
 * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
 * @sk: child sock
 * @parent: parent socket
 *
 * Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can
 *       just set sk security information off of current creating process label
 *       Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based
 *       instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled
 *       socket is shared by different tasks.
 */
static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
        struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);

        /* setup - not live */
        if (!rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label))
                rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_current_label());
}

#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
                                      struct request_sock *req)
{
        struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
        int error;

        if (!skb->secmark)
                return 0;

        rcu_read_lock();
        error = apparmor_secmark_check(rcu_dereference(ctx->label), OP_CONNECT,
                                       AA_MAY_CONNECT, skb->secmark, sk);
        rcu_read_unlock();

        return error;
}
#endif

/*
 * The cred blob is a pointer to, not an instance of, an aa_label.
 */
struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
        .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_label *),
        .lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
        .lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
        .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
};

static const struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid = {
        .name = "apparmor",
        .id = LSM_ID_APPARMOR,
};

static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),

        LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, apparmor_move_mount),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot),

        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr),

        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, apparmor_file_receive),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_truncate, apparmor_file_truncate),

        LSM_HOOK_INIT(getselfattr, apparmor_getselfattr),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(setselfattr, apparmor_setselfattr),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),

        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),

        LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, apparmor_unix_stream_connect),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, apparmor_unix_may_send),

        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, apparmor_socket_socketpair),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
#endif
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
                      apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
                      apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
#endif

        LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer),

        LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds),

        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj,
                      apparmor_current_getlsmprop_subj),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, apparmor_task_getlsmprop_obj),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, apparmor_userns_create),

#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, aa_audit_rule_init),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, aa_audit_rule_known),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, aa_audit_rule_match),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, aa_audit_rule_free),
#endif

        LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, apparmor_secid_to_secctx),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(lsmprop_to_secctx, apparmor_lsmprop_to_secctx),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, apparmor_secctx_to_secid),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, apparmor_release_secctx),

#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, apparmor_uring_override_creds),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, apparmor_uring_sqpoll),
#endif
};

/*
 * AppArmor sysfs module parameters
 */

static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
#define param_check_aabool param_check_bool
static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
        .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
        .set = param_set_aabool,
        .get = param_get_aabool
};

static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
#define param_check_aauint param_check_uint
static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
        .set = param_set_aauint,
        .get = param_get_aauint
};

static int param_set_aacompressionlevel(const char *val,
                                        const struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_get_aacompressionlevel(char *buffer,
                                        const struct kernel_param *kp);
#define param_check_aacompressionlevel param_check_int
static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aacompressionlevel = {
        .set = param_set_aacompressionlevel,
        .get = param_get_aacompressionlevel
};

static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
#define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool
static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
        .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
        .set = param_set_aalockpolicy,
        .get = param_get_aalockpolicy
};

static int param_set_debug(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_get_debug(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);

static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);

static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);

/* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
 * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
 */

/* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
                  &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);

/* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */
bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
#endif

/* whether policy exactly as loaded is retained for debug and checkpointing */
bool aa_g_export_binary = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
module_param_named(export_binary, aa_g_export_binary, aabool, 0600);
#endif

/* policy loaddata compression level */
int aa_g_rawdata_compression_level = AA_DEFAULT_CLEVEL;
module_param_named(rawdata_compression_level, aa_g_rawdata_compression_level,
                   aacompressionlevel, 0400);

/* Debug mode */
int aa_g_debug;
module_param_call(debug, param_set_debug, param_get_debug,
                  &aa_g_debug, 0600);

/* Audit mode */
enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
                  &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);

/* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages.  This
 * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
 */
bool aa_g_audit_header = true;
module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
                   S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);

/* lock out loading/removal of policy
 * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
 *       load policy, if lock_policy is set
 */
bool aa_g_lock_policy;
module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
                   S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);

/* Syscall logging mode */
bool aa_g_logsyscall;
module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);

/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR);

/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
 * on the loaded policy is done.
 * DEPRECATED: read only as strict checking of load is always done now
 * that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy.
 */
bool aa_g_paranoid_load = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_PARANOID_LOAD);
module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO);

static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_set_aaintbool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
#define param_check_aaintbool param_check_int
static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aaintbool = {
        .set = param_set_aaintbool,
        .get = param_get_aaintbool
};
/* Boot time disable flag */
static int apparmor_enabled __ro_after_init = 1;
module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aaintbool, 0444);

static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
{
        unsigned long enabled;
        int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
        if (!error)
                apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
        return 1;
}

__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);

/* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
        if (!apparmor_enabled)
                return -EINVAL;
        if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
                return -EPERM;
        return param_set_bool(val, kp);
}

static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
        if (!apparmor_enabled)
                return -EINVAL;
        if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
                return -EPERM;
        return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
}

static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
        if (!apparmor_enabled)
                return -EINVAL;
        if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
                return -EPERM;
        return param_set_bool(val, kp);
}

static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
        if (!apparmor_enabled)
                return -EINVAL;
        if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
                return -EPERM;
        return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
}

static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
        int error;

        if (!apparmor_enabled)
                return -EINVAL;
        /* file is ro but enforce 2nd line check */
        if (apparmor_initialized)
                return -EPERM;

        error = param_set_uint(val, kp);
        aa_g_path_max = max_t(uint32_t, aa_g_path_max, sizeof(union aa_buffer));
        pr_info("AppArmor: buffer size set to %d bytes\n", aa_g_path_max);

        return error;
}

static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
        if (!apparmor_enabled)
                return -EINVAL;
        if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
                return -EPERM;
        return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
}

/* Can only be set before AppArmor is initialized (i.e. on boot cmdline). */
static int param_set_aaintbool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
        struct kernel_param kp_local;
        bool value;
        int error;

        if (apparmor_initialized)
                return -EPERM;

        /* Create local copy, with arg pointing to bool type. */
        value = !!*((int *)kp->arg);
        memcpy(&kp_local, kp, sizeof(kp_local));
        kp_local.arg = &value;

        error = param_set_bool(val, &kp_local);
        if (!error)
                *((int *)kp->arg) = *((bool *)kp_local.arg);
        return error;
}

/*
 * To avoid changing /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled from Y/N to
 * 1/0, this converts the "int that is actually bool" back to bool for
 * display in the /sys filesystem, while keeping it "int" for the LSM
 * infrastructure.
 */
static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
        struct kernel_param kp_local;
        bool value;

        /* Create local copy, with arg pointing to bool type. */
        value = !!*((int *)kp->arg);
        memcpy(&kp_local, kp, sizeof(kp_local));
        kp_local.arg = &value;

        return param_get_bool(buffer, &kp_local);
}

static int param_set_aacompressionlevel(const char *val,
                                        const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
        int error;

        if (!apparmor_enabled)
                return -EINVAL;
        if (apparmor_initialized)
                return -EPERM;

        error = param_set_int(val, kp);

        aa_g_rawdata_compression_level = clamp(aa_g_rawdata_compression_level,
                                               AA_MIN_CLEVEL, AA_MAX_CLEVEL);
        pr_info("AppArmor: policy rawdata compression level set to %d\n",
                aa_g_rawdata_compression_level);

        return error;
}

static int param_get_aacompressionlevel(char *buffer,
                                        const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
        if (!apparmor_enabled)
                return -EINVAL;
        if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
                return -EPERM;
        return param_get_int(buffer, kp);
}

static int param_get_debug(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
        if (!apparmor_enabled)
                return -EINVAL;
        if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
                return -EPERM;
        return aa_print_debug_params(buffer);
}

static int param_set_debug(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
        int i;

        if (!apparmor_enabled)
                return -EINVAL;
        if (!val)
                return -EINVAL;
        if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
                return -EPERM;

        i = aa_parse_debug_params(val);
        if (i == DEBUG_PARSE_ERROR)
                return -EINVAL;

        aa_g_debug = i;
        return 0;
}

static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
        if (!apparmor_enabled)
                return -EINVAL;
        if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
                return -EPERM;
        return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]);
}

static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
        int i;

        if (!apparmor_enabled)
                return -EINVAL;
        if (!val)
                return -EINVAL;
        if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
                return -EPERM;

        i = match_string(audit_mode_names, AUDIT_MAX_INDEX, val);
        if (i < 0)
                return -EINVAL;

        aa_g_audit = i;
        return 0;
}

static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
        if (!apparmor_enabled)
                return -EINVAL;
        if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
                return -EPERM;

        return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]);
}

static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
        int i;

        if (!apparmor_enabled)
                return -EINVAL;
        if (!val)
                return -EINVAL;
        if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
                return -EPERM;

        i = match_string(aa_profile_mode_names, APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX,
                         val);
        if (i < 0)
                return -EINVAL;

        aa_g_profile_mode = i;
        return 0;
}

/* arbitrary cap on how long to hold buffer because contention was
 * encountered before trying to put it back into the global pool
 */
#define MAX_HOLD_COUNT 64

/* the hold count is a heuristic for lock contention, and can be
 * incremented async to actual buffer alloc/free.  Because buffers
 * may be put back onto a percpu cache different than the ->hold was
 * added to the counts can be out of sync. Guard against underflow
 * and overflow
 */
static void cache_hold_inc(unsigned int *hold)
{
        if (*hold > MAX_HOLD_COUNT)
                (*hold)++;
}

char *aa_get_buffer(bool in_atomic)
{
        union aa_buffer *aa_buf;
        struct aa_local_cache *cache;
        bool try_again = true;
        gfp_t flags = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL | __GFP_NOWARN);

        /* use per cpu cached buffers first */
        cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
        if (!list_empty(&cache->head)) {
                aa_buf = list_first_entry(&cache->head, union aa_buffer, list);
                list_del(&aa_buf->list);
                if (cache->hold)
                        cache->hold--;
                cache->count--;
                put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
                return &aa_buf->buffer[0];
        }
        /* exit percpu as spinlocks may sleep on realtime kernels */
        put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);

        if (!spin_trylock(&aa_buffers_lock)) {
                /* had contention on lock so increase hold count. Doesn't
                 * really matter if recorded before or after the spin lock
                 * as there is no way to guarantee the buffer will be put
                 * back on the same percpu cache. Instead rely on holds
                 * roughly averaging out over time.
                 */
                cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
                cache_hold_inc(&cache->hold);
                put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
                spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock);
        }
retry:
        if (buffer_count > reserve_count ||
            (in_atomic && !list_empty(&aa_global_buffers))) {
                aa_buf = list_first_entry(&aa_global_buffers, union aa_buffer,
                                          list);
                list_del(&aa_buf->list);
                buffer_count--;
                spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock);
                return aa_buf->buffer;
        }
        if (in_atomic) {
                /*
                 * out of reserve buffers and in atomic context so increase
                 * how many buffers to keep in reserve
                 */
                reserve_count++;
                flags = GFP_ATOMIC;
        }
        spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock);

        if (!in_atomic)
                might_sleep();
        aa_buf = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, flags);
        if (!aa_buf) {
                if (try_again) {
                        try_again = false;
                        spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock);
                        goto retry;
                }
                pr_warn_once("AppArmor: Failed to allocate a memory buffer.\n");
                return NULL;
        }
        return aa_buf->buffer;
}

void aa_put_buffer(char *buf)
{
        union aa_buffer *aa_buf;
        struct aa_local_cache *cache;

        if (!buf)
                return;
        aa_buf = container_of(buf, union aa_buffer, buffer[0]);

        cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
        if (!cache->hold) {
                put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);

                if (spin_trylock(&aa_buffers_lock)) {
                        /* put back on global list */
                        list_add(&aa_buf->list, &aa_global_buffers);
                        buffer_count++;
                        spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock);
                        return;
                }
                /* contention on global list, fallback to percpu */
                cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
                cache_hold_inc(&cache->hold);
        }

        /* cache in percpu list */
        list_add(&aa_buf->list, &cache->head);
        cache->count++;
        put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
}

/*
 * AppArmor init functions
 */

/**
 * set_init_ctx - set a task context and profile on the first task.
 *
 * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined
 */
static int __init set_init_ctx(void)
{
        struct cred *cred = (__force struct cred *)current->real_cred;

        set_cred_label(cred, aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns)));

        return 0;
}

static void destroy_buffers(void)
{
        union aa_buffer *aa_buf;

        spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock);
        while (!list_empty(&aa_global_buffers)) {
                aa_buf = list_first_entry(&aa_global_buffers, union aa_buffer,
                                         list);
                list_del(&aa_buf->list);
                spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock);
                kfree(aa_buf);
                spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock);
        }
        spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock);
}

static int __init alloc_buffers(void)
{
        union aa_buffer *aa_buf;
        int i, num;

        /*
         * per cpu set of cached allocated buffers used to help reduce
         * lock contention
         */
        for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
                per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).hold = 0;
                per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).count = 0;
                INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).head);
        }
        /*
         * A function may require two buffers at once. Usually the buffers are
         * used for a short period of time and are shared. On UP kernel buffers
         * two should be enough, with more CPUs it is possible that more
         * buffers will be used simultaneously. The preallocated pool may grow.
         * This preallocation has also the side-effect that AppArmor will be
         * disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremely high.
         */
        if (num_online_cpus() > 1)
                num = 4 + RESERVE_COUNT;
        else
                num = 2 + RESERVE_COUNT;

        for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {

                aa_buf = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL |
                                 __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL | __GFP_NOWARN);
                if (!aa_buf) {
                        destroy_buffers();
                        return -ENOMEM;
                }
                aa_put_buffer(aa_buf->buffer);
        }
        return 0;
}

#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
static int apparmor_dointvec(const struct ctl_table *table, int write,
                             void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
        if (!aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
                return -EPERM;
        if (!apparmor_enabled)
                return -EINVAL;

        return proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
}

static const struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
        {
                .procname       = "unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy",
                .data           = &unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy,
                .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
                .mode           = 0600,
                .proc_handler   = apparmor_dointvec,
        },
#endif /* CONFIG_USER_NS */
        {
                .procname       = "apparmor_display_secid_mode",
                .data           = &apparmor_display_secid_mode,
                .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
                .mode           = 0600,
                .proc_handler   = apparmor_dointvec,
        },
        {
                .procname       = "apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_unconfined",
                .data           = &aa_unprivileged_unconfined_restricted,
                .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
                .mode           = 0600,
                .proc_handler   = apparmor_dointvec,
        },
};

static int __init apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
{
        return register_sysctl("kernel", apparmor_sysctl_table) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
}
#else
static inline int apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
{
        return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */

#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) && defined(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
                                          struct sk_buff *skb,
                                          const struct nf_hook_state *state)
{
        struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
        struct sock *sk;
        int error;

        if (!skb->secmark)
                return NF_ACCEPT;

        sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
        if (sk == NULL)
                return NF_ACCEPT;

        ctx = aa_sock(sk);
        rcu_read_lock();
        error = apparmor_secmark_check(rcu_dereference(ctx->label), OP_SENDMSG,
                                       AA_MAY_SEND, skb->secmark, sk);
        rcu_read_unlock();
        if (!error)
                return NF_ACCEPT;

        return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);

}

static const struct nf_hook_ops apparmor_nf_ops[] = {
        {
                .hook =         apparmor_ip_postroute,
                .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV4,
                .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
                .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
        },
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
        {
                .hook =         apparmor_ip_postroute,
                .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV6,
                .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
                .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
        },
#endif
};

static int __net_init apparmor_nf_register(struct net *net)
{
        return nf_register_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops,
                                    ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops));
}

static void __net_exit apparmor_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
{
        nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops,
                                ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops));
}

static struct pernet_operations apparmor_net_ops = {
        .init = apparmor_nf_register,
        .exit = apparmor_nf_unregister,
};

static int __init apparmor_nf_ip_init(void)
{
        int err;

        if (!apparmor_enabled)
                return 0;

        err = register_pernet_subsys(&apparmor_net_ops);
        if (err)
                panic("Apparmor: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);

        return 0;
}
#endif

static char nulldfa_src[] __aligned(8) = {
        #include "nulldfa.in"
};
static struct aa_dfa *nulldfa;

static char stacksplitdfa_src[] __aligned(8) = {
        #include "stacksplitdfa.in"
};
struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa;
struct aa_policydb *nullpdb;

static int __init aa_setup_dfa_engine(void)
{
        int error = -ENOMEM;

        nullpdb = aa_alloc_pdb(GFP_KERNEL);
        if (!nullpdb)
                return -ENOMEM;

        nulldfa = aa_dfa_unpack(nulldfa_src, sizeof(nulldfa_src),
                            TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) |
                            TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32));
        if (IS_ERR(nulldfa)) {
                error = PTR_ERR(nulldfa);
                goto fail;
        }
        nullpdb->dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
        nullpdb->perms = kzalloc_objs(struct aa_perms, 2);
        if (!nullpdb->perms)
                goto fail;
        nullpdb->size = 2;

        stacksplitdfa = aa_dfa_unpack(stacksplitdfa_src,
                                      sizeof(stacksplitdfa_src),
                                      TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) |
                                      TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32));
        if (IS_ERR(stacksplitdfa)) {
                error = PTR_ERR(stacksplitdfa);
                goto fail;
        }

        return 0;

fail:
        aa_put_pdb(nullpdb);
        aa_put_dfa(nulldfa);
        nullpdb = NULL;
        nulldfa = NULL;
        stacksplitdfa = NULL;

        return error;
}

static void __init aa_teardown_dfa_engine(void)
{
        aa_put_dfa(stacksplitdfa);
        aa_put_dfa(nulldfa);
        aa_put_pdb(nullpdb);
        nullpdb = NULL;
        stacksplitdfa = NULL;
        nulldfa = NULL;
}

static int __init apparmor_init(void)
{
        int error;

        error = aa_setup_dfa_engine();
        if (error) {
                AA_ERROR("Unable to setup dfa engine\n");
                goto alloc_out;
        }

        error = aa_alloc_root_ns();
        if (error) {
                AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
                goto alloc_out;
        }

        error = apparmor_init_sysctl();
        if (error) {
                AA_ERROR("Unable to register sysctls\n");
                goto alloc_out;

        }

        error = alloc_buffers();
        if (error) {
                AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate work buffers\n");
                goto alloc_out;
        }

        error = set_init_ctx();
        if (error) {
                AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
                aa_free_root_ns();
                goto buffers_out;
        }
        security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
                                &apparmor_lsmid);

        /* Inform the audit system that secctx is used */
        audit_cfg_lsm(&apparmor_lsmid, AUDIT_CFG_LSM_SECCTX_SUBJECT);

        /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
        apparmor_initialized = 1;
        if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
                aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled");
        else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL)
                aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled");
        else
                aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized");

        return error;

buffers_out:
        destroy_buffers();
alloc_out:
        aa_destroy_aafs();
        aa_teardown_dfa_engine();

        apparmor_enabled = false;
        return error;
}

DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
        .id = &apparmor_lsmid,
        .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
        .enabled = &apparmor_enabled,
        .blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes,
        .init = apparmor_init,
        .initcall_fs = aa_create_aafs,
#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) && defined(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
        .initcall_device = apparmor_nf_ip_init,
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
        .initcall_late = init_profile_hash,
#endif
};