// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/* cpu_feature_enabled() cannot be used this early */
#define USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5

#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/kvm_types.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <linux/sched/clock.h>
#include <linux/sched/task.h>
#include <linux/sched/smt.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kprobes.h>
#include <linux/kgdb.h>
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
#include <linux/stackprotector.h>
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>

#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/cmdline.h>
#include <asm/cpuid/api.h>
#include <asm/perf_event.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/doublefault.h>
#include <asm/archrandom.h>
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
#include <asm/vsyscall.h>
#include <linux/topology.h>
#include <linux/cpumask.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <asm/proto.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
#include <asm/mtrr.h>
#include <asm/hwcap2.h>
#include <linux/numa.h>
#include <asm/numa.h>
#include <asm/asm.h>
#include <asm/bugs.h>
#include <asm/cpu.h>
#include <asm/mce.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/cacheinfo.h>
#include <asm/memtype.h>
#include <asm/microcode.h>
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
#include <asm/fred.h>
#include <asm/uv/uv.h>
#include <asm/ia32.h>
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/sev.h>
#include <asm/tdx.h>
#include <asm/posted_intr.h>
#include <asm/runtime-const.h>

#include "cpu.h"

DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct cpuinfo_x86, cpu_info);
EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(cpu_info);

/* Used for modules: built-in code uses runtime constants */
unsigned long USER_PTR_MAX;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(USER_PTR_MAX);

u32 elf_hwcap2 __read_mostly;

/* Number of siblings per CPU package */
unsigned int __max_threads_per_core __ro_after_init = 1;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__max_threads_per_core);

unsigned int __max_dies_per_package __ro_after_init = 1;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__max_dies_per_package);

unsigned int __max_logical_packages __ro_after_init = 1;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__max_logical_packages);

unsigned int __num_nodes_per_package __ro_after_init = 1;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__num_nodes_per_package);

unsigned int __num_cores_per_package __ro_after_init = 1;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__num_cores_per_package);

unsigned int __num_threads_per_package __ro_after_init = 1;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__num_threads_per_package);

static struct ppin_info {
        int     feature;
        int     msr_ppin_ctl;
        int     msr_ppin;
} ppin_info[] = {
        [X86_VENDOR_INTEL] = {
                .feature = X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN,
                .msr_ppin_ctl = MSR_PPIN_CTL,
                .msr_ppin = MSR_PPIN
        },
        [X86_VENDOR_AMD] = {
                .feature = X86_FEATURE_AMD_PPIN,
                .msr_ppin_ctl = MSR_AMD_PPIN_CTL,
                .msr_ppin = MSR_AMD_PPIN
        },
};

static const struct x86_cpu_id ppin_cpuids[] = {
        X86_MATCH_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_AMD_PPIN, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_AMD]),
        X86_MATCH_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]),

        /* Legacy models without CPUID enumeration */
        X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_IVYBRIDGE_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]),
        X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_HASWELL_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]),
        X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_BROADWELL_D, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]),
        X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_BROADWELL_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]),
        X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]),
        X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_ICELAKE_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]),
        X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_ICELAKE_D, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]),
        X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]),
        X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_EMERALDRAPIDS_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]),
        X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_XEON_PHI_KNL, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]),
        X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_XEON_PHI_KNM, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]),

        {}
};

static void ppin_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        const struct x86_cpu_id *id;
        unsigned long long val;
        struct ppin_info *info;

        id = x86_match_cpu(ppin_cpuids);
        if (!id)
                return;

        /*
         * Testing the presence of the MSR is not enough. Need to check
         * that the PPIN_CTL allows reading of the PPIN.
         */
        info = (struct ppin_info *)id->driver_data;

        if (rdmsrq_safe(info->msr_ppin_ctl, &val))
                goto clear_ppin;

        if ((val & 3UL) == 1UL) {
                /* PPIN locked in disabled mode */
                goto clear_ppin;
        }

        /* If PPIN is disabled, try to enable */
        if (!(val & 2UL)) {
                wrmsrq_safe(info->msr_ppin_ctl,  val | 2UL);
                rdmsrq_safe(info->msr_ppin_ctl, &val);
        }

        /* Is the enable bit set? */
        if (val & 2UL) {
                c->ppin = native_rdmsrq(info->msr_ppin);
                set_cpu_cap(c, info->feature);
                return;
        }

clear_ppin:
        setup_clear_cpu_cap(info->feature);
}

static void default_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
        cpu_detect_cache_sizes(c);
#else
        /* Not much we can do here... */
        /* Check if at least it has cpuid */
        if (c->cpuid_level == -1) {
                /* No cpuid. It must be an ancient CPU */
                if (c->x86 == 4)
                        strcpy(c->x86_model_id, "486");
                else if (c->x86 == 3)
                        strcpy(c->x86_model_id, "386");
        }
#endif
}

static const struct cpu_dev default_cpu = {
        .c_init         = default_init,
        .c_vendor       = "Unknown",
        .c_x86_vendor   = X86_VENDOR_UNKNOWN,
};

static const struct cpu_dev *this_cpu = &default_cpu;

DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct gdt_page, gdt_page) = { .gdt = {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
        /*
         * We need valid kernel segments for data and code in long mode too
         * IRET will check the segment types  kkeil 2000/10/28
         * Also sysret mandates a special GDT layout
         *
         * TLS descriptors are currently at a different place compared to i386.
         * Hopefully nobody expects them at a fixed place (Wine?)
         */
        [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL32_CS]         = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE32, 0, 0xfffff),
        [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS]           = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE64, 0, 0xfffff),
        [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_DS]           = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA64, 0, 0xfffff),
        [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER32_CS]   = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE32 | DESC_USER, 0, 0xfffff),
        [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_DS]     = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA64 | DESC_USER, 0, 0xfffff),
        [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS]     = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE64 | DESC_USER, 0, 0xfffff),
#else
        [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS]           = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE32, 0, 0xfffff),
        [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_DS]           = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA32, 0, 0xfffff),
        [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS]     = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE32 | DESC_USER, 0, 0xfffff),
        [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_DS]     = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA32 | DESC_USER, 0, 0xfffff),
        /*
         * Segments used for calling PnP BIOS have byte granularity.
         * They code segments and data segments have fixed 64k limits,
         * the transfer segment sizes are set at run time.
         */
        [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_CS32]        = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE32_BIOS, 0, 0xffff),
        [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_CS16]        = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE16, 0, 0xffff),
        [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_DS]          = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA16, 0, 0xffff),
        [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_TS1]         = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA16, 0, 0),
        [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_TS2]         = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA16, 0, 0),
        /*
         * The APM segments have byte granularity and their bases
         * are set at run time.  All have 64k limits.
         */
        [GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE]        = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE32_BIOS, 0, 0xffff),
        [GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE+1]      = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE16, 0, 0xffff),
        [GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE+2]      = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA32_BIOS, 0, 0xffff),

        [GDT_ENTRY_ESPFIX_SS]           = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA32, 0, 0xfffff),
        [GDT_ENTRY_PERCPU]              = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA32, 0, 0xfffff),
#endif
} };
EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(gdt_page);
SYM_PIC_ALIAS(gdt_page);

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
static int __init x86_nopcid_setup(char *s)
{
        /* nopcid doesn't accept parameters */
        if (s)
                return -EINVAL;

        /* do not emit a message if the feature is not present */
        if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID))
                return 0;

        setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PCID);
        pr_info("nopcid: PCID feature disabled\n");
        return 0;
}
early_param("nopcid", x86_nopcid_setup);
#endif

static int __init x86_noinvpcid_setup(char *s)
{
        /* noinvpcid doesn't accept parameters */
        if (s)
                return -EINVAL;

        /* do not emit a message if the feature is not present */
        if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID))
                return 0;

        setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID);
        pr_info("noinvpcid: INVPCID feature disabled\n");
        return 0;
}
early_param("noinvpcid", x86_noinvpcid_setup);

/* Standard macro to see if a specific flag is changeable */
static inline bool flag_is_changeable_p(unsigned long flag)
{
        unsigned long f1, f2;

        if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
                return true;

        /*
         * Cyrix and IDT cpus allow disabling of CPUID
         * so the code below may return different results
         * when it is executed before and after enabling
         * the CPUID. Add "volatile" to not allow gcc to
         * optimize the subsequent calls to this function.
         */
        asm volatile ("pushfl           \n\t"
                      "pushfl           \n\t"
                      "popl %0          \n\t"
                      "movl %0, %1      \n\t"
                      "xorl %2, %0      \n\t"
                      "pushl %0         \n\t"
                      "popfl            \n\t"
                      "pushfl           \n\t"
                      "popl %0          \n\t"
                      "popfl            \n\t"

                      : "=&r" (f1), "=&r" (f2)
                      : "ir" (flag));

        return (f1 ^ f2) & flag;
}

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
static int cachesize_override = -1;
static int disable_x86_serial_nr = 1;

static int __init cachesize_setup(char *str)
{
        get_option(&str, &cachesize_override);
        return 1;
}
__setup("cachesize=", cachesize_setup);

/* Probe for the CPUID instruction */
bool cpuid_feature(void)
{
        return flag_is_changeable_p(X86_EFLAGS_ID);
}

static void squash_the_stupid_serial_number(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        unsigned long lo, hi;

        if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PN) || !disable_x86_serial_nr)
                return;

        /* Disable processor serial number: */

        rdmsr(MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL, lo, hi);
        lo |= 0x200000;
        wrmsr(MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL, lo, hi);

        pr_notice("CPU serial number disabled.\n");
        clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_PN);

        /* Disabling the serial number may affect the cpuid level */
        c->cpuid_level = cpuid_eax(0);
}

static int __init x86_serial_nr_setup(char *s)
{
        disable_x86_serial_nr = 0;
        return 1;
}
__setup("serialnumber", x86_serial_nr_setup);
#else
static inline void squash_the_stupid_serial_number(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
}
#endif

static __always_inline void setup_smep(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SMEP))
                cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_SMEP);
}

static __always_inline void setup_smap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        unsigned long eflags = native_save_fl();

        /* This should have been cleared long ago */
        BUG_ON(eflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC);

        if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SMAP))
                cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_SMAP);
}

static __always_inline void setup_umip(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        /* Check the boot processor, plus build option for UMIP. */
        if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_UMIP))
                goto out;

        /* Check the current processor's cpuid bits. */
        if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_UMIP))
                goto out;

        cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_UMIP);

        pr_info_once("x86/cpu: User Mode Instruction Prevention (UMIP) activated\n");

        return;

out:
        /*
         * Make sure UMIP is disabled in case it was enabled in a
         * previous boot (e.g., via kexec).
         */
        cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_UMIP);
}

static __always_inline void setup_lass(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LASS))
                return;

        /*
         * Legacy vsyscall page access causes a #GP when LASS is active.
         * Disable LASS because the #GP handler doesn't support vsyscall
         * emulation.
         *
         * Also disable LASS when running under EFI, as some runtime and
         * boot services rely on 1:1 mappings in the lower half.
         */
        if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION) ||
            IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI)) {
                setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_LASS);
                return;
        }

        cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_LASS);
}

/* These bits should not change their value after CPU init is finished. */
static const unsigned long cr4_pinned_mask = X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_UMIP |
                                             X86_CR4_FSGSBASE | X86_CR4_CET;

/*
 * The CR pinning protects against ROP on the 'mov %reg, %CRn' instruction(s).
 * Since you can ROP directly to these instructions (barring shadow stack),
 * any protection must follow immediately and unconditionally after that.
 *
 * Specifically, the CR[04] write functions below will have the value
 * validation controlled by the @cr_pinning static_branch which is
 * __ro_after_init, just like the cr4_pinned_bits value.
 *
 * Once set, an attacker will have to defeat page-tables to get around these
 * restrictions. Which is a much bigger ask than 'simple' ROP.
 */
static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(cr_pinning);
static unsigned long cr4_pinned_bits __ro_after_init;

void native_write_cr0(unsigned long val)
{
        unsigned long bits_missing = 0;

set_register:
        asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr0": "+r" (val) : : "memory");

        if (static_branch_likely(&cr_pinning)) {
                if (unlikely((val & X86_CR0_WP) != X86_CR0_WP)) {
                        bits_missing = X86_CR0_WP;
                        val |= bits_missing;
                        goto set_register;
                }
                /* Warn after we've set the missing bits. */
                WARN_ONCE(bits_missing, "CR0 WP bit went missing!?\n");
        }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(native_write_cr0);

void __no_profile native_write_cr4(unsigned long val)
{
        unsigned long bits_changed = 0;

set_register:
        asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr4": "+r" (val) : : "memory");

        if (static_branch_likely(&cr_pinning)) {
                if (unlikely((val & cr4_pinned_mask) != cr4_pinned_bits)) {
                        bits_changed = (val & cr4_pinned_mask) ^ cr4_pinned_bits;
                        val = (val & ~cr4_pinned_mask) | cr4_pinned_bits;
                        goto set_register;
                }
                /* Warn after we've corrected the changed bits. */
                WARN_ONCE(bits_changed, "pinned CR4 bits changed: 0x%lx!?\n",
                          bits_changed);
        }
}
#if IS_MODULE(CONFIG_LKDTM)
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(native_write_cr4);
#endif

void cr4_update_irqsoff(unsigned long set, unsigned long clear)
{
        unsigned long newval, cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);

        lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();

        newval = (cr4 & ~clear) | set;
        if (newval != cr4) {
                this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.cr4, newval);
                __write_cr4(newval);
        }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(cr4_update_irqsoff);

/* Read the CR4 shadow. */
unsigned long cr4_read_shadow(void)
{
        return this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(cr4_read_shadow);

void cr4_init(void)
{
        unsigned long cr4 = __read_cr4();

        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID))
                cr4 |= X86_CR4_PCIDE;
        if (static_branch_likely(&cr_pinning))
                cr4 = (cr4 & ~cr4_pinned_mask) | cr4_pinned_bits;

        __write_cr4(cr4);

        /* Initialize cr4 shadow for this CPU. */
        this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.cr4, cr4);
}

/*
 * Once CPU feature detection is finished (and boot params have been
 * parsed), record any of the sensitive CR bits that are set, and
 * enable CR pinning.
 */
static void __init setup_cr_pinning(void)
{
        cr4_pinned_bits = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4) & cr4_pinned_mask;
        static_key_enable(&cr_pinning.key);
}

static __init int x86_nofsgsbase_setup(char *arg)
{
        /* Require an exact match without trailing characters. */
        if (strlen(arg))
                return 0;

        /* Do not emit a message if the feature is not present. */
        if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE))
                return 1;

        setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE);
        pr_info("FSGSBASE disabled via kernel command line\n");
        return 1;
}
__setup("nofsgsbase", x86_nofsgsbase_setup);

/*
 * Protection Keys are not available in 32-bit mode.
 */
static bool pku_disabled;

static __always_inline void setup_pku(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        if (c == &boot_cpu_data) {
                if (pku_disabled || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PKU))
                        return;
                /*
                 * Setting CR4.PKE will cause the X86_FEATURE_OSPKE cpuid
                 * bit to be set.  Enforce it.
                 */
                setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE);

        } else if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) {
                return;
        }

        cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_PKE);
        /* Load the default PKRU value */
        pkru_write_default();
}

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
static __init int setup_disable_pku(char *arg)
{
        /*
         * Do not clear the X86_FEATURE_PKU bit.  All of the
         * runtime checks are against OSPKE so clearing the
         * bit does nothing.
         *
         * This way, we will see "pku" in cpuinfo, but not
         * "ospke", which is exactly what we want.  It shows
         * that the CPU has PKU, but the OS has not enabled it.
         * This happens to be exactly how a system would look
         * if we disabled the config option.
         */
        pr_info("x86: 'nopku' specified, disabling Memory Protection Keys\n");
        pku_disabled = true;
        return 1;
}
__setup("nopku", setup_disable_pku);
#endif

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT

__noendbr u64 ibt_save(bool disable)
{
        u64 msr = 0;

        if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
                rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr);
                if (disable)
                        wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr & ~CET_ENDBR_EN);
        }

        return msr;
}

__noendbr void ibt_restore(u64 save)
{
        u64 msr;

        if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
                rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr);
                msr &= ~CET_ENDBR_EN;
                msr |= (save & CET_ENDBR_EN);
                wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr);
        }
}

#endif

static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        bool user_shstk, kernel_ibt;

        if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_CET))
                return;

        kernel_ibt = HAS_KERNEL_IBT && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
        user_shstk = cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
                     IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK);

        if (!kernel_ibt && !user_shstk)
                return;

        if (user_shstk)
                set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK);

        if (kernel_ibt)
                wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_S_CET, CET_ENDBR_EN);
        else
                wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_S_CET, 0);

        cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_CET);

        if (kernel_ibt && ibt_selftest()) {
                pr_err("IBT selftest: Failed!\n");
                wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_S_CET, 0);
                setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
        }
}

__noendbr void cet_disable(void)
{
        if (!(cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT) ||
              cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)))
                return;

        wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_S_CET, 0);
        wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_U_CET, 0);
}

/*
 * Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always
 * be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization
 * software.  Add those features to this table to auto-disable them.
 */
struct cpuid_dependent_feature {
        u32 feature;
        u32 level;
};

static const struct cpuid_dependent_feature
cpuid_dependent_features[] = {
        { X86_FEATURE_MWAIT,            CPUID_LEAF_MWAIT },
        { X86_FEATURE_DCA,              CPUID_LEAF_DCA },
        { X86_FEATURE_XSAVE,            CPUID_LEAF_XSTATE },
        { 0, 0 }
};

static void filter_cpuid_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, bool warn)
{
        const struct cpuid_dependent_feature *df;

        for (df = cpuid_dependent_features; df->feature; df++) {

                if (!cpu_has(c, df->feature))
                        continue;
                /*
                 * Note: cpuid_level is set to -1 if unavailable, but
                 * extended_extended_level is set to 0 if unavailable
                 * and the legitimate extended levels are all negative
                 * when signed; hence the weird messing around with
                 * signs here...
                 */
                if (!((s32)df->level < 0 ?
                     (u32)df->level > (u32)c->extended_cpuid_level :
                     (s32)df->level > (s32)c->cpuid_level))
                        continue;

                clear_cpu_cap(c, df->feature);
                if (!warn)
                        continue;

                pr_warn("CPU: CPU feature %s disabled, no CPUID level 0x%x\n",
                        x86_cap_flags[df->feature], df->level);
        }
}

/*
 * Naming convention should be: <Name> [(<Codename>)]
 * This table only is used unless init_<vendor>() below doesn't set it;
 * in particular, if CPUID levels 0x80000002..4 are supported, this
 * isn't used
 */

/* Look up CPU names by table lookup. */
static const char *table_lookup_model(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
        const struct legacy_cpu_model_info *info;

        if (c->x86_model >= 16)
                return NULL;    /* Range check */

        if (!this_cpu)
                return NULL;

        info = this_cpu->legacy_models;

        while (info->family) {
                if (info->family == c->x86)
                        return info->model_names[c->x86_model];
                info++;
        }
#endif
        return NULL;            /* Not found */
}

/* Aligned to unsigned long to avoid split lock in atomic bitmap ops */
__u32 cpu_caps_cleared[NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS] __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long));
__u32 cpu_caps_set[NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS] __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long));

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/* The 32-bit entry code needs to find cpu_entry_area. */
DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct cpu_entry_area *, cpu_entry_area);
#endif

/* Load the original GDT from the per-cpu structure */
void load_direct_gdt(int cpu)
{
        struct desc_ptr gdt_descr;

        gdt_descr.address = (long)get_cpu_gdt_rw(cpu);
        gdt_descr.size = GDT_SIZE - 1;
        load_gdt(&gdt_descr);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(load_direct_gdt);

/* Load a fixmap remapping of the per-cpu GDT */
void load_fixmap_gdt(int cpu)
{
        struct desc_ptr gdt_descr;

        gdt_descr.address = (long)get_cpu_gdt_ro(cpu);
        gdt_descr.size = GDT_SIZE - 1;
        load_gdt(&gdt_descr);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(load_fixmap_gdt);

/**
 * switch_gdt_and_percpu_base - Switch to direct GDT and runtime per CPU base
 * @cpu:        The CPU number for which this is invoked
 *
 * Invoked during early boot to switch from early GDT and early per CPU to
 * the direct GDT and the runtime per CPU area. On 32-bit the percpu base
 * switch is implicit by loading the direct GDT. On 64bit this requires
 * to update GSBASE.
 */
void __init switch_gdt_and_percpu_base(int cpu)
{
        load_direct_gdt(cpu);

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
        /*
         * No need to load %gs. It is already correct.
         *
         * Writing %gs on 64bit would zero GSBASE which would make any per
         * CPU operation up to the point of the wrmsrq() fault.
         *
         * Set GSBASE to the new offset. Until the wrmsrq() happens the
         * early mapping is still valid. That means the GSBASE update will
         * lose any prior per CPU data which was not copied over in
         * setup_per_cpu_areas().
         *
         * This works even with stackprotector enabled because the
         * per CPU stack canary is 0 in both per CPU areas.
         */
        wrmsrq(MSR_GS_BASE, cpu_kernelmode_gs_base(cpu));
#else
        /*
         * %fs is already set to __KERNEL_PERCPU, but after switching GDT
         * it is required to load FS again so that the 'hidden' part is
         * updated from the new GDT. Up to this point the early per CPU
         * translation is active. Any content of the early per CPU data
         * which was not copied over in setup_per_cpu_areas() is lost.
         */
        loadsegment(fs, __KERNEL_PERCPU);
#endif
}

static const struct cpu_dev *cpu_devs[X86_VENDOR_NUM] = {};

static void get_model_name(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        unsigned int *v;
        char *p, *q, *s;

        if (c->extended_cpuid_level < 0x80000004)
                return;

        v = (unsigned int *)c->x86_model_id;
        cpuid(0x80000002, &v[0], &v[1], &v[2], &v[3]);
        cpuid(0x80000003, &v[4], &v[5], &v[6], &v[7]);
        cpuid(0x80000004, &v[8], &v[9], &v[10], &v[11]);
        c->x86_model_id[48] = 0;

        /* Trim whitespace */
        p = q = s = &c->x86_model_id[0];

        while (*p == ' ')
                p++;

        while (*p) {
                /* Note the last non-whitespace index */
                if (!isspace(*p))
                        s = q;

                *q++ = *p++;
        }

        *(s + 1) = '\0';
}

void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        unsigned int n, dummy, ebx, ecx, edx, l2size;

        n = c->extended_cpuid_level;

        if (n >= 0x80000005) {
                cpuid(0x80000005, &dummy, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
                c->x86_cache_size = (ecx>>24) + (edx>>24);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
                /* On K8 L1 TLB is inclusive, so don't count it */
                c->x86_tlbsize = 0;
#endif
        }

        if (n < 0x80000006)     /* Some chips just has a large L1. */
                return;

        cpuid(0x80000006, &dummy, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
        l2size = ecx >> 16;

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
        c->x86_tlbsize += ((ebx >> 16) & 0xfff) + (ebx & 0xfff);
#else
        /* do processor-specific cache resizing */
        if (this_cpu->legacy_cache_size)
                l2size = this_cpu->legacy_cache_size(c, l2size);

        /* Allow user to override all this if necessary. */
        if (cachesize_override != -1)
                l2size = cachesize_override;

        if (l2size == 0)
                return;         /* Again, no L2 cache is possible */
#endif

        c->x86_cache_size = l2size;
}

u16 __read_mostly tlb_lli_4k;
u16 __read_mostly tlb_lli_2m;
u16 __read_mostly tlb_lli_4m;
u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_4k;
u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_2m;
u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_4m;
u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_1g;

static void cpu_detect_tlb(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        if (this_cpu->c_detect_tlb)
                this_cpu->c_detect_tlb(c);

        pr_info("Last level iTLB entries: 4KB %d, 2MB %d, 4MB %d\n",
                tlb_lli_4k, tlb_lli_2m, tlb_lli_4m);

        pr_info("Last level dTLB entries: 4KB %d, 2MB %d, 4MB %d, 1GB %d\n",
                tlb_lld_4k, tlb_lld_2m, tlb_lld_4m, tlb_lld_1g);
}

void get_cpu_vendor(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        char *v = c->x86_vendor_id;
        int i;

        for (i = 0; i < X86_VENDOR_NUM; i++) {
                if (!cpu_devs[i])
                        break;

                if (!strcmp(v, cpu_devs[i]->c_ident[0]) ||
                    (cpu_devs[i]->c_ident[1] &&
                     !strcmp(v, cpu_devs[i]->c_ident[1]))) {

                        this_cpu = cpu_devs[i];
                        c->x86_vendor = this_cpu->c_x86_vendor;
                        return;
                }
        }

        pr_err_once("CPU: vendor_id '%s' unknown, using generic init.\n" \
                    "CPU: Your system may be unstable.\n", v);

        c->x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_UNKNOWN;
        this_cpu = &default_cpu;
}

void cpu_detect(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        /* Get vendor name */
        cpuid(0x00000000, (unsigned int *)&c->cpuid_level,
              (unsigned int *)&c->x86_vendor_id[0],
              (unsigned int *)&c->x86_vendor_id[8],
              (unsigned int *)&c->x86_vendor_id[4]);

        c->x86 = 4;
        /* Intel-defined flags: level 0x00000001 */
        if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x00000001) {
                u32 junk, tfms, cap0, misc;

                cpuid(0x00000001, &tfms, &misc, &junk, &cap0);
                c->x86          = x86_family(tfms);
                c->x86_model    = x86_model(tfms);
                c->x86_stepping = x86_stepping(tfms);

                if (cap0 & (1<<19)) {
                        c->x86_clflush_size = ((misc >> 8) & 0xff) * 8;
                        c->x86_cache_alignment = c->x86_clflush_size;
                }
        }
}

static void apply_forced_caps(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        int i;

        for (i = 0; i < NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS; i++) {
                c->x86_capability[i] &= ~cpu_caps_cleared[i];
                c->x86_capability[i] |= cpu_caps_set[i];
        }
}

static void init_speculation_control(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        /*
         * The Intel SPEC_CTRL CPUID bit implies IBRS and IBPB support,
         * and they also have a different bit for STIBP support. Also,
         * a hypervisor might have set the individual AMD bits even on
         * Intel CPUs, for finer-grained selection of what's available.
         */
        if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) {
                set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
                set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
                set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
        }

        if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP))
                set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);

        if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
            cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
                set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SSBD);

        if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS)) {
                set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
                set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
        }

        if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB))
                set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB);

        if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) {
                set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
                set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
        }

        if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
                set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
                set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
                clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD);
        }
}

void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;

        /* Intel-defined flags: level 0x00000001 */
        if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x00000001) {
                cpuid(0x00000001, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);

                c->x86_capability[CPUID_1_ECX] = ecx;
                c->x86_capability[CPUID_1_EDX] = edx;
        }

        /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf: level 0x00000006 (eax) */
        if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x00000006)
                c->x86_capability[CPUID_6_EAX] = cpuid_eax(0x00000006);

        /* Additional Intel-defined flags: level 0x00000007 */
        if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x00000007) {
                cpuid_count(0x00000007, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
                c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_0_EBX] = ebx;
                c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_ECX] = ecx;
                c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_EDX] = edx;

                /* Check valid sub-leaf index before accessing it */
                if (eax >= 1) {
                        cpuid_count(0x00000007, 1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
                        c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_1_EAX] = eax;
                }
        }

        /* Extended state features: level 0x0000000d */
        if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x0000000d) {
                cpuid_count(0x0000000d, 1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);

                c->x86_capability[CPUID_D_1_EAX] = eax;
        }

        /*
         * Check if extended CPUID leaves are implemented: Max extended
         * CPUID leaf must be in the 0x80000001-0x8000ffff range.
         */
        eax = cpuid_eax(0x80000000);
        c->extended_cpuid_level = ((eax & 0xffff0000) == 0x80000000) ? eax : 0;

        if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000001) {
                cpuid(0x80000001, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);

                c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0001_ECX] = ecx;
                c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0001_EDX] = edx;
        }

        if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000007)
                c->x86_power = cpuid_edx(0x80000007);

        if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000008) {
                cpuid(0x80000008, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
                c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0008_EBX] = ebx;
        }

        if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000000a)
                c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = cpuid_edx(0x8000000a);

        if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000001f)
                c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = cpuid_eax(0x8000001f);

        if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000021)
                c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX] = cpuid_eax(0x80000021);

        init_scattered_cpuid_features(c);
        init_speculation_control(c);

        if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SEP))
                set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SYSFAST32);

        /*
         * Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, after probe.
         * This needs to happen each time we re-probe, which may happen
         * several times during CPU initialization.
         */
        apply_forced_caps(c);
}

void get_cpu_address_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;

        if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CPUID) ||
            (c->extended_cpuid_level < 0x80000008)) {
                if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) {
                        c->x86_clflush_size = 64;
                        c->x86_phys_bits = 36;
                        c->x86_virt_bits = 48;
                } else {
                        c->x86_clflush_size = 32;
                        c->x86_virt_bits = 32;
                        c->x86_phys_bits = 32;

                        if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PAE) ||
                            cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PSE36))
                                c->x86_phys_bits = 36;
                }
        } else {
                cpuid(0x80000008, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);

                c->x86_virt_bits = (eax >> 8) & 0xff;
                c->x86_phys_bits = eax & 0xff;

                /* Provide a sane default if not enumerated: */
                if (!c->x86_clflush_size)
                        c->x86_clflush_size = 32;
        }

        c->x86_cache_bits = c->x86_phys_bits;
        c->x86_cache_alignment = c->x86_clflush_size;
}

static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        int i;

        /*
         * First of all, decide if this is a 486 or higher
         * It's a 486 if we can modify the AC flag
         */
        if (flag_is_changeable_p(X86_EFLAGS_AC))
                c->x86 = 4;
        else
                c->x86 = 3;

        for (i = 0; i < X86_VENDOR_NUM; i++)
                if (cpu_devs[i] && cpu_devs[i]->c_identify) {
                        c->x86_vendor_id[0] = 0;
                        cpu_devs[i]->c_identify(c);
                        if (c->x86_vendor_id[0]) {
                                get_cpu_vendor(c);
                                break;
                        }
                }
}

#define NO_SPECULATION          BIT(0)
#define NO_MELTDOWN             BIT(1)
#define NO_SSB                  BIT(2)
#define NO_L1TF                 BIT(3)
#define NO_MDS                  BIT(4)
#define MSBDS_ONLY              BIT(5)
#define NO_SWAPGS               BIT(6)
#define NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT        BIT(7)
#define NO_SPECTRE_V2           BIT(8)
#define NO_MMIO                 BIT(9)
#define NO_EIBRS_PBRSB          BIT(10)
#define NO_BHI                  BIT(11)

#define VULNWL(vendor, family, model, whitelist)        \
        X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, whitelist)

#define VULNWL_INTEL(vfm, whitelist)            \
        X86_MATCH_VFM(vfm, whitelist)

#define VULNWL_AMD(family, whitelist)           \
        VULNWL(AMD, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, whitelist)

#define VULNWL_HYGON(family, whitelist)         \
        VULNWL(HYGON, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, whitelist)

static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
        VULNWL(ANY,     4, X86_MODEL_ANY,       NO_SPECULATION),
        VULNWL(CENTAUR, 5, X86_MODEL_ANY,       NO_SPECULATION),
        VULNWL(INTEL,   5, X86_MODEL_ANY,       NO_SPECULATION),
        VULNWL(NSC,     5, X86_MODEL_ANY,       NO_SPECULATION),
        VULNWL(VORTEX,  5, X86_MODEL_ANY,       NO_SPECULATION),
        VULNWL(VORTEX,  6, X86_MODEL_ANY,       NO_SPECULATION),

        /* Intel Family 6 */
        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_TIGERLAKE,           NO_MMIO),
        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_TIGERLAKE_L,         NO_MMIO),
        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ALDERLAKE,           NO_MMIO),
        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ALDERLAKE_L,         NO_MMIO),

        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_SALTWELL,       NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_SALTWELL_MID,   NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_BONNELL,        NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_BONNELL_MID,    NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),

        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_SILVERMONT,     NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_SILVERMONT_D,   NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_AIRMONT,        NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_XEON_PHI_KNL,        NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_XEON_PHI_KNM,        NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),

        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_CORE_YONAH,          NO_SSB),

        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID2,NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | MSBDS_ONLY),
        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_AIRMONT_NP,     NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),

        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT,       NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT_D,     NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS,  NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),

        /*
         * Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously
         * being documented as such in the APM).  But according to AMD, %gs is
         * updated non-speculatively, and the issuing of %gs-relative memory
         * operands will be blocked until the %gs update completes, which is
         * good enough for our purposes.
         */

        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_TREMONT,        NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_TREMONT_L,      NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
        VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_TREMONT_D,      NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),

        /* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
        VULNWL_AMD(0x0f,        NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),
        VULNWL_AMD(0x10,        NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),
        VULNWL_AMD(0x11,        NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),
        VULNWL_AMD(0x12,        NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),

        /* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
        VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,      NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB | NO_BHI),
        VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY,    NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB | NO_BHI),

        /* Zhaoxin Family 7 */
        VULNWL(CENTAUR, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY,       NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),
        VULNWL(ZHAOXIN, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY,       NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),
        {}
};

#define VULNBL(vendor, family, model, blacklist)        \
        X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, blacklist)

#define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(vfm, max_stepping, issues)              \
        X86_MATCH_VFM_STEPS(vfm, X86_STEP_MIN, max_stepping, issues)

#define VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(vfm, cpu_type, issues)        \
        X86_MATCH_VFM_CPU_TYPE(vfm, INTEL_CPU_TYPE_##cpu_type, issues)

#define VULNBL_AMD(family, blacklist)           \
        VULNBL(AMD, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist)

#define VULNBL_HYGON(family, blacklist)         \
        VULNBL(HYGON, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist)

#define SRBDS           BIT(0)
/* CPU is affected by X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
#define MMIO            BIT(1)
/* CPU is affected by Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), a variant of X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
#define MMIO_SBDS       BIT(2)
/* CPU is affected by RETbleed, speculating where you would not expect it */
#define RETBLEED        BIT(3)
/* CPU is affected by SMT (cross-thread) return predictions */
#define SMT_RSB         BIT(4)
/* CPU is affected by SRSO */
#define SRSO            BIT(5)
/* CPU is affected by GDS */
#define GDS             BIT(6)
/* CPU is affected by Register File Data Sampling */
#define RFDS            BIT(7)
/* CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection */
#define ITS             BIT(8)
/* CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection, but guest-host isolation is not affected */
#define ITS_NATIVE_ONLY BIT(9)
/* CPU is affected by Transient Scheduler Attacks */
#define TSA             BIT(10)
/* CPU is affected by VMSCAPE */
#define VMSCAPE         BIT(11)

static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SANDYBRIDGE_X,      X86_STEP_MAX,      VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SANDYBRIDGE,        X86_STEP_MAX,      VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_IVYBRIDGE_X,        X86_STEP_MAX,      VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_IVYBRIDGE,          X86_STEP_MAX,      SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_HASWELL,            X86_STEP_MAX,      SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_HASWELL_L,          X86_STEP_MAX,      SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_HASWELL_G,          X86_STEP_MAX,      SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_HASWELL_X,          X86_STEP_MAX,      MMIO | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL_D,        X86_STEP_MAX,      MMIO | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL_X,        X86_STEP_MAX,      MMIO | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL_G,        X86_STEP_MAX,      SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL,          X86_STEP_MAX,      SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X,                   0x5,      MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X,          X86_STEP_MAX,      MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_L,          X86_STEP_MAX,      MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE,            X86_STEP_MAX,      MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE_L,                  0xb,      MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE_L,         X86_STEP_MAX,      MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE,                    0xc,      MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE,           X86_STEP_MAX,      MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_CANNONLAKE_L,       X86_STEP_MAX,      RETBLEED | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_L,          X86_STEP_MAX,      MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_D,          X86_STEP_MAX,      MMIO | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_X,          X86_STEP_MAX,      MMIO | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE,          X86_STEP_MAX,      MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L,                 0x0,      MMIO | RETBLEED | ITS | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L,        X86_STEP_MAX,      MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE_L,        X86_STEP_MAX,      GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE,          X86_STEP_MAX,      GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_LAKEFIELD,          X86_STEP_MAX,      MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ROCKETLAKE,         X86_STEP_MAX,      MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
        VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(INTEL_ALDERLAKE,                   ATOM,      RFDS | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ALDERLAKE,          X86_STEP_MAX,      VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ALDERLAKE_L,        X86_STEP_MAX,      RFDS | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE,                  ATOM,      RFDS | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE,         X86_STEP_MAX,      VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE_P,       X86_STEP_MAX,      RFDS | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE_S,       X86_STEP_MAX,      RFDS | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_METEORLAKE_L,       X86_STEP_MAX,      VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ARROWLAKE_H,        X86_STEP_MAX,      VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ARROWLAKE,          X86_STEP_MAX,      VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ARROWLAKE_U,        X86_STEP_MAX,      VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_LUNARLAKE_M,        X86_STEP_MAX,      VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X,   X86_STEP_MAX,      VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_GRANITERAPIDS_X,    X86_STEP_MAX,      VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_EMERALDRAPIDS_X,    X86_STEP_MAX,      VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_GRACEMONT,     X86_STEP_MAX,      RFDS | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_TREMONT,       X86_STEP_MAX,      MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RFDS),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_TREMONT_D,     X86_STEP_MAX,      MMIO | RFDS),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_TREMONT_L,     X86_STEP_MAX,      MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RFDS),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT,      X86_STEP_MAX,      RFDS),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT_D,    X86_STEP_MAX,      RFDS),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, X86_STEP_MAX,      RFDS),
        VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_CRESTMONT_X,   X86_STEP_MAX,      VMSCAPE),

        VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED),
        VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED),
        VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_AMD(0x19, SRSO | TSA | VMSCAPE),
        VULNBL_AMD(0x1a, SRSO | VMSCAPE),
        {}
};

static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which)
{
        const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);

        return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
}

u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void)
{
        u64 x86_arch_cap_msr = 0;

        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
                rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, x86_arch_cap_msr);

        return x86_arch_cap_msr;
}

static bool arch_cap_mmio_immune(u64 x86_arch_cap_msr)
{
        return (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO &&
                x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO &&
                x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO);
}

static bool __init vulnerable_to_rfds(u64 x86_arch_cap_msr)
{
        /* The "immunity" bit trumps everything else: */
        if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO)
                return false;

        /*
         * VMMs set ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR for processors not in the blacklist to
         * indicate that mitigation is needed because guest is running on a
         * vulnerable hardware or may migrate to such hardware:
         */
        if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR)
                return true;

        /* Only consult the blacklist when there is no enumeration: */
        return cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RFDS);
}

static bool __init vulnerable_to_its(u64 x86_arch_cap_msr)
{
        /* The "immunity" bit trumps everything else: */
        if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_ITS_NO)
                return false;
        if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
                return false;

        /* None of the affected CPUs have BHI_CTRL */
        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL))
                return false;

        /*
         * If a VMM did not expose ITS_NO, assume that a guest could
         * be running on a vulnerable hardware or may migrate to such
         * hardware.
         */
        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
                return true;

        if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, ITS))
                return true;

        return false;
}

static struct x86_cpu_id cpu_latest_microcode[] = {
#include "microcode/intel-ucode-defs.h"
        {}
};

static bool __init cpu_has_old_microcode(void)
{
        const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_latest_microcode);

        /* Give unknown CPUs a pass: */
        if (!m) {
                /* Intel CPUs should be in the list. Warn if not: */
                if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
                        pr_info("x86/CPU: Model not found in latest microcode list\n");
                return false;
        }

        /*
         * Hosts usually lie to guests with a super high microcode
         * version. Just ignore what hosts tell guests:
         */
        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
                return false;

        /* Consider all debug microcode to be old: */
        if (boot_cpu_data.microcode & BIT(31))
                return true;

        /* Give new microcode a pass: */
        if (boot_cpu_data.microcode >= m->driver_data)
                return false;

        /* Uh oh, too old: */
        return true;
}

static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        u64 x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();

        if (cpu_has_old_microcode()) {
                pr_warn("x86/CPU: Running old microcode\n");
                setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_OLD_MICROCODE);
                add_taint(TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
        }

        /* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
        if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) &&
            !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
                setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);

        if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECULATION))
                return;

        setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);

        if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECTRE_V2)) {
                setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
                setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2_USER);
        }

        if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SSB) &&
            !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
           !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
                setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);

        /*
         * AMD's AutoIBRS is equivalent to Intel's eIBRS - use the Intel feature
         * flag and protect from vendor-specific bugs via the whitelist.
         *
         * Don't use AutoIBRS when SNP is enabled because it degrades host
         * userspace indirect branch performance.
         */
        if ((x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) ||
            (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS) &&
             !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))) {
                setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
                if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) &&
                    !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
                        setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB);
        }

        if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) &&
            !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
                setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
                if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, MSBDS_ONLY))
                        setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
        }

        if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SWAPGS))
                setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);

        /*
         * When the CPU is not mitigated for TAA (TAA_NO=0) set TAA bug when:
         *      - TSX is supported or
         *      - TSX_CTRL is present
         *
         * TSX_CTRL check is needed for cases when TSX could be disabled before
         * the kernel boot e.g. kexec.
         * TSX_CTRL check alone is not sufficient for cases when the microcode
         * update is not present or running as guest that don't get TSX_CTRL.
         */
        if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO) &&
            (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RTM) ||
             (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
                setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);

        /*
         * SRBDS affects CPUs which support RDRAND or RDSEED and are listed
         * in the vulnerability blacklist.
         *
         * Some of the implications and mitigation of Shared Buffers Data
         * Sampling (SBDS) are similar to SRBDS. Give SBDS same treatment as
         * SRBDS.
         */
        if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ||
             cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)) &&
            cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS | MMIO_SBDS))
                    setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS);

        /*
         * Processor MMIO Stale Data bug enumeration
         *
         * Affected CPU list is generally enough to enumerate the vulnerability,
         * but for virtualization case check for ARCH_CAP MSR bits also, VMM may
         * not want the guest to enumerate the bug.
         */
        if (!arch_cap_mmio_immune(x86_arch_cap_msr)) {
                if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO))
                        setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
        }

        if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) {
                if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RSBA))
                        setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
        }

        if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SMT_RSB))
                setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SMT_RSB);

        if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO)) {
                if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRSO))
                        setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO);
        }

        /*
         * Check if CPU is vulnerable to GDS. If running in a virtual machine on
         * an affected processor, the VMM may have disabled the use of GATHER by
         * disabling AVX2. The only way to do this in HW is to clear XCR0[2],
         * which means that AVX will be disabled.
         */
        if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, GDS) && !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO) &&
            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX))
                setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_GDS);

        if (vulnerable_to_rfds(x86_arch_cap_msr))
                setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS);

        /*
         * Intel parts with eIBRS are vulnerable to BHI attacks. Parts with
         * BHI_NO still need to use the BHI mitigation to prevent Intra-mode
         * attacks.  When virtualized, eIBRS could be hidden, assume vulnerable.
         */
        if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_BHI) &&
            (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) ||
             boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)))
                setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_BHI);

        if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET))
                setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET);

        if (vulnerable_to_its(x86_arch_cap_msr)) {
                setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITS);
                if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, ITS_NATIVE_ONLY))
                        setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITS_NATIVE_ONLY);
        }

        if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
                if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO) ||
                    !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO)) {
                        if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, TSA) ||
                            /* Enable bug on Zen guests to allow for live migration. */
                            (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN)))
                                setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TSA);
                }
        }

        /*
         * Set the bug only on bare-metal. A nested hypervisor should already be
         * deploying IBPB to isolate itself from nested guests.
         */
        if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, VMSCAPE) &&
            !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
                setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_VMSCAPE);

        if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
                return;

        /* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
        if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO)
                return;

        setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);

        if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_L1TF))
                return;

        setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
}

/*
 * The NOPL instruction is supposed to exist on all CPUs of family >= 6;
 * unfortunately, that's not true in practice because of early VIA
 * chips and (more importantly) broken virtualizers that are not easy
 * to detect. In the latter case it doesn't even *fail* reliably, so
 * probing for it doesn't even work. Disable it completely on 32-bit
 * unless we can find a reliable way to detect all the broken cases.
 * Enable it explicitly on 64-bit for non-constant inputs of cpu_has().
 */
static void detect_nopl(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
        setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_NOPL);
#else
        setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_NOPL);
#endif
}

static inline bool parse_set_clear_cpuid(char *arg, bool set)
{
        char *opt;
        int taint = 0;

        while (arg) {
                bool found __maybe_unused = false;
                unsigned int bit;

                opt = strsep(&arg, ",");

                /*
                 * Handle naked numbers first for feature flags which don't
                 * have names. It doesn't make sense for a bug not to have a
                 * name so don't handle bug flags here.
                 */
                if (!kstrtouint(opt, 10, &bit)) {
                        if (bit < NCAPINTS * 32) {

                                if (set) {
                                        pr_warn("setcpuid: force-enabling CPU feature flag:");
                                        setup_force_cpu_cap(bit);
                                } else {
                                        pr_warn("clearcpuid: force-disabling CPU feature flag:");
                                        setup_clear_cpu_cap(bit);
                                }
                                /* empty-string, i.e., ""-defined feature flags */
                                if (!x86_cap_flags[bit])
                                        pr_cont(" %d:%d\n", bit >> 5, bit & 31);
                                else
                                        pr_cont(" %s\n", x86_cap_flags[bit]);

                                taint++;
                        }
                        /*
                         * The assumption is that there are no feature names with only
                         * numbers in the name thus go to the next argument.
                         */
                        continue;
                }

                for (bit = 0; bit < 32 * (NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS); bit++) {
                        const char *flag;
                        const char *kind;

                        if (bit < 32 * NCAPINTS) {
                                flag = x86_cap_flags[bit];
                                kind = "feature";
                        } else {
                                kind = "bug";
                                flag = x86_bug_flags[bit - (32 * NCAPINTS)];
                        }

                        if (!flag)
                                continue;

                        if (strcmp(flag, opt))
                                continue;

                        if (set) {
                                pr_warn("setcpuid: force-enabling CPU %s flag: %s\n",
                                        kind, flag);
                                setup_force_cpu_cap(bit);
                        } else {
                                pr_warn("clearcpuid: force-disabling CPU %s flag: %s\n",
                                        kind, flag);
                                setup_clear_cpu_cap(bit);
                        }
                        taint++;
                        found = true;
                        break;
                }

                if (!found)
                        pr_warn("%s: unknown CPU flag: %s", set ? "setcpuid" : "clearcpuid", opt);
        }

        return taint;
}


/*
 * We parse cpu parameters early because fpu__init_system() is executed
 * before parse_early_param().
 */
static void __init cpu_parse_early_param(void)
{
        bool cpuid_taint = false;
        char arg[128];
        int arglen;

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
        if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "no387"))
#ifdef CONFIG_MATH_EMULATION
                setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FPU);
#else
                pr_err("Option 'no387' required CONFIG_MATH_EMULATION enabled.\n");
#endif

        if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nofxsr"))
                setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FXSR);
#endif

        if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "noxsave"))
                setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE);

        if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "noxsaveopt"))
                setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVEOPT);

        if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "noxsaves"))
                setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);

        if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nousershstk"))
                setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK);

        /* Minimize the gap between FRED is available and available but disabled. */
        arglen = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "fred", arg, sizeof(arg));
        if (arglen != 2 || strncmp(arg, "on", 2))
                setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FRED);

        arglen = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "clearcpuid", arg, sizeof(arg));
        if (arglen > 0)
                cpuid_taint |= parse_set_clear_cpuid(arg, false);

        arglen = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "setcpuid", arg, sizeof(arg));
        if (arglen > 0)
                cpuid_taint |= parse_set_clear_cpuid(arg, true);

        if (cpuid_taint) {
                pr_warn("!!! setcpuid=/clearcpuid= in use, this is for TESTING ONLY, may break things horribly. Tainting kernel.\n");
                add_taint(TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
        }
}

/*
 * Do minimum CPU detection early.
 * Fields really needed: vendor, cpuid_level, family, model, mask,
 * cache alignment.
 * The others are not touched to avoid unwanted side effects.
 *
 * WARNING: this function is only called on the boot CPU.  Don't add code
 * here that is supposed to run on all CPUs.
 */
static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        memset(&c->x86_capability, 0, sizeof(c->x86_capability));
        c->extended_cpuid_level = 0;

        if (!cpuid_feature())
                identify_cpu_without_cpuid(c);

        /* cyrix could have cpuid enabled via c_identify()*/
        if (cpuid_feature()) {
                cpu_detect(c);
                get_cpu_vendor(c);
                intel_unlock_cpuid_leafs(c);
                get_cpu_cap(c);
                setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CPUID);
                get_cpu_address_sizes(c);
                cpu_parse_early_param();

                cpu_init_topology(c);

                if (this_cpu->c_early_init)
                        this_cpu->c_early_init(c);

                c->cpu_index = 0;
                filter_cpuid_features(c, false);
                check_cpufeature_deps(c);

                if (this_cpu->c_bsp_init)
                        this_cpu->c_bsp_init(c);
        } else {
                setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CPUID);
                get_cpu_address_sizes(c);
                cpu_init_topology(c);
        }

        setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);

        cpu_set_bug_bits(c);

        sld_setup(c);

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
        /*
         * Regardless of whether PCID is enumerated, the SDM says
         * that it can't be enabled in 32-bit mode.
         */
        setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PCID);

        /*
         * Never use SYSCALL on a 32-bit kernel
         */
        setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32);
#endif

        /*
         * Later in the boot process pgtable_l5_enabled() relies on
         * cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LA57). If 5-level paging is not
         * enabled by this point we need to clear the feature bit to avoid
         * false-positives at the later stage.
         *
         * pgtable_l5_enabled() can be false here for several reasons:
         *  - 5-level paging is disabled compile-time;
         *  - it's 32-bit kernel;
         *  - machine doesn't support 5-level paging;
         *  - user specified 'no5lvl' in kernel command line.
         */
        if (!pgtable_l5_enabled())
                setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_LA57);

        detect_nopl();
        mca_bsp_init(c);
}

void __init init_cpu_devs(void)
{
        const struct cpu_dev *const *cdev;
        int count = 0;

        for (cdev = __x86_cpu_dev_start; cdev < __x86_cpu_dev_end; cdev++) {
                const struct cpu_dev *cpudev = *cdev;

                if (count >= X86_VENDOR_NUM)
                        break;
                cpu_devs[count] = cpudev;
                count++;
        }
}

void __init early_cpu_init(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PROCESSOR_SELECT
        unsigned int i, j;

        pr_info("KERNEL supported cpus:\n");
#endif

        init_cpu_devs();

#ifdef CONFIG_PROCESSOR_SELECT
        for (i = 0; i < X86_VENDOR_NUM && cpu_devs[i]; i++) {
                for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
                        if (!cpu_devs[i]->c_ident[j])
                                continue;
                        pr_info("  %s %s\n", cpu_devs[i]->c_vendor,
                                cpu_devs[i]->c_ident[j]);
                }
        }
#endif

        early_identify_cpu(&boot_cpu_data);
}

static bool detect_null_seg_behavior(void)
{
        /*
         * Empirically, writing zero to a segment selector on AMD does
         * not clear the base, whereas writing zero to a segment
         * selector on Intel does clear the base.  Intel's behavior
         * allows slightly faster context switches in the common case
         * where GS is unused by the prev and next threads.
         *
         * Since neither vendor documents this anywhere that I can see,
         * detect it directly instead of hard-coding the choice by
         * vendor.
         *
         * I've designated AMD's behavior as the "bug" because it's
         * counterintuitive and less friendly.
         */

        unsigned long old_base, tmp;
        rdmsrq(MSR_FS_BASE, old_base);
        wrmsrq(MSR_FS_BASE, 1);
        loadsegment(fs, 0);
        rdmsrq(MSR_FS_BASE, tmp);
        wrmsrq(MSR_FS_BASE, old_base);
        return tmp == 0;
}

void check_null_seg_clears_base(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        /* BUG_NULL_SEG is only relevant with 64bit userspace */
        if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
                return;

        if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE))
                return;

        /*
         * CPUID bit above wasn't set. If this kernel is still running
         * as a HV guest, then the HV has decided not to advertize
         * that CPUID bit for whatever reason.  For example, one
         * member of the migration pool might be vulnerable.  Which
         * means, the bug is present: set the BUG flag and return.
         */
        if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
                set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_NULL_SEG);
                return;
        }

        /*
         * Zen2 CPUs also have this behaviour, but no CPUID bit.
         * 0x18 is the respective family for Hygon.
         */
        if ((c->x86 == 0x17 || c->x86 == 0x18) &&
            detect_null_seg_behavior())
                return;

        /* All the remaining ones are affected */
        set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_NULL_SEG);
}

static void generic_identify(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        c->extended_cpuid_level = 0;

        if (!cpuid_feature())
                identify_cpu_without_cpuid(c);

        /* cyrix could have cpuid enabled via c_identify()*/
        if (!cpuid_feature())
                return;

        cpu_detect(c);

        get_cpu_vendor(c);
        intel_unlock_cpuid_leafs(c);
        get_cpu_cap(c);

        get_cpu_address_sizes(c);

        get_model_name(c); /* Default name */

        /*
         * ESPFIX is a strange bug.  All real CPUs have it.  Paravirt
         * systems that run Linux at CPL > 0 may or may not have the
         * issue, but, even if they have the issue, there's absolutely
         * nothing we can do about it because we can't use the real IRET
         * instruction.
         *
         * NB: For the time being, only 32-bit kernels support
         * X86_BUG_ESPFIX as such.  64-bit kernels directly choose
         * whether to apply espfix using paravirt hooks.  If any
         * non-paravirt system ever shows up that does *not* have the
         * ESPFIX issue, we can change this.
         */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
        set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_ESPFIX);
#endif
}

/*
 * This does the hard work of actually picking apart the CPU stuff...
 */
static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        int i;

        c->loops_per_jiffy = loops_per_jiffy;
        c->x86_cache_size = 0;
        c->x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_UNKNOWN;
        c->x86_model = c->x86_stepping = 0;     /* So far unknown... */
        c->x86_vendor_id[0] = '\0'; /* Unset */
        c->x86_model_id[0] = '\0';  /* Unset */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
        c->x86_clflush_size = 64;
        c->x86_phys_bits = 36;
        c->x86_virt_bits = 48;
#else
        c->cpuid_level = -1;    /* CPUID not detected */
        c->x86_clflush_size = 32;
        c->x86_phys_bits = 32;
        c->x86_virt_bits = 32;
#endif
        c->x86_cache_alignment = c->x86_clflush_size;
        memset(&c->x86_capability, 0, sizeof(c->x86_capability));
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES
        memset(&c->vmx_capability, 0, sizeof(c->vmx_capability));
#endif

        generic_identify(c);

        cpu_parse_topology(c);

        if (this_cpu->c_identify)
                this_cpu->c_identify(c);

        /* Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, after probe */
        apply_forced_caps(c);

        /*
         * Set default APIC and TSC_DEADLINE MSR fencing flag. AMD and
         * Hygon will clear it in ->c_init() below.
         */
        set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_APIC_MSRS_FENCE);

        /*
         * Vendor-specific initialization.  In this section we
         * canonicalize the feature flags, meaning if there are
         * features a certain CPU supports which CPUID doesn't
         * tell us, CPUID claiming incorrect flags, or other bugs,
         * we handle them here.
         *
         * At the end of this section, c->x86_capability better
         * indicate the features this CPU genuinely supports!
         */
        if (this_cpu->c_init)
                this_cpu->c_init(c);

        bus_lock_init();

        /* Disable the PN if appropriate */
        squash_the_stupid_serial_number(c);

        setup_smep(c);
        setup_smap(c);
        setup_umip(c);
        setup_lass(c);

        /*
         * The vendor-specific functions might have changed features.
         * Now we do "generic changes."
         */

        /* Filter out anything that depends on CPUID levels we don't have */
        filter_cpuid_features(c, true);

        /* Check for unmet dependencies based on the CPUID dependency table */
        check_cpufeature_deps(c);

        /* If the model name is still unset, do table lookup. */
        if (!c->x86_model_id[0]) {
                const char *p;
                p = table_lookup_model(c);
                if (p)
                        strcpy(c->x86_model_id, p);
                else
                        /* Last resort... */
                        sprintf(c->x86_model_id, "%02x/%02x",
                                c->x86, c->x86_model);
        }

        x86_init_rdrand(c);
        setup_pku(c);
        setup_cet(c);

        /*
         * Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, need do it
         * before following smp all cpus cap AND.
         */
        apply_forced_caps(c);

        /*
         * On SMP, boot_cpu_data holds the common feature set between
         * all CPUs; so make sure that we indicate which features are
         * common between the CPUs.  The first time this routine gets
         * executed, c == &boot_cpu_data.
         */
        if (c != &boot_cpu_data) {
                /* AND the already accumulated flags with these */
                for (i = 0; i < NCAPINTS; i++)
                        boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[i] &= c->x86_capability[i];

                /* OR, i.e. replicate the bug flags */
                for (i = NCAPINTS; i < NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS; i++)
                        c->x86_capability[i] |= boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[i];
        }

        ppin_init(c);

        /* Init Machine Check Exception if available. */
        mcheck_cpu_init(c);

        numa_add_cpu(smp_processor_id());
}

/*
 * Set up the CPU state needed to execute SYSENTER/SYSEXIT instructions
 * on 32-bit kernels:
 */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
void enable_sep_cpu(void)
{
        struct tss_struct *tss;
        int cpu;

        if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEP))
                return;

        cpu = get_cpu();
        tss = &per_cpu(cpu_tss_rw, cpu);

        /*
         * We cache MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS's value in the TSS's ss1 field --
         * see the big comment in struct x86_hw_tss's definition.
         */

        tss->x86_tss.ss1 = __KERNEL_CS;
        wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, tss->x86_tss.ss1);
        wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, (unsigned long)(cpu_entry_stack(cpu) + 1));
        wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, (unsigned long)entry_SYSENTER_32);

        put_cpu();
}
#endif

static __init void identify_boot_cpu(void)
{
        identify_cpu(&boot_cpu_data);
        if (HAS_KERNEL_IBT && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
                pr_info("CET detected: Indirect Branch Tracking enabled\n");
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
        enable_sep_cpu();
#endif
        cpu_detect_tlb(&boot_cpu_data);
        setup_cr_pinning();

        tsx_init();
        tdx_init();
        lkgs_init();
}

void identify_secondary_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
{
        struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu);

        /* Copy boot_cpu_data only on the first bringup */
        if (!c->initialized)
                *c = boot_cpu_data;
        c->cpu_index = cpu;

        identify_cpu(c);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
        enable_sep_cpu();
#endif
        x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap();
        update_srbds_msr();
        if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS))
                update_gds_msr();

        tsx_ap_init();
        c->initialized = true;
}

void print_cpu_info(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        const char *vendor = NULL;

        if (c->x86_vendor < X86_VENDOR_NUM) {
                vendor = this_cpu->c_vendor;
        } else {
                if (c->cpuid_level >= 0)
                        vendor = c->x86_vendor_id;
        }

        if (vendor && !strstr(c->x86_model_id, vendor))
                pr_cont("%s ", vendor);

        if (c->x86_model_id[0])
                pr_cont("%s", c->x86_model_id);
        else
                pr_cont("%d86", c->x86);

        pr_cont(" (family: 0x%x, model: 0x%x", c->x86, c->x86_model);

        if (c->x86_stepping || c->cpuid_level >= 0)
                pr_cont(", stepping: 0x%x)\n", c->x86_stepping);
        else
                pr_cont(")\n");
}

/*
 * clearcpuid= and setcpuid= were already parsed in cpu_parse_early_param().
 * These dummy functions prevent them from becoming an environment variable for
 * init.
 */

static __init int setup_clearcpuid(char *arg)
{
        return 1;
}
__setup("clearcpuid=", setup_clearcpuid);

static __init int setup_setcpuid(char *arg)
{
        return 1;
}
__setup("setcpuid=", setup_setcpuid);

DEFINE_PER_CPU_CACHE_HOT(struct task_struct *, current_task) = &init_task;
EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(current_task);
EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(const_current_task);

DEFINE_PER_CPU_CACHE_HOT(int, __preempt_count) = INIT_PREEMPT_COUNT;
EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(__preempt_count);

DEFINE_PER_CPU_CACHE_HOT(unsigned long, cpu_current_top_of_stack) = TOP_OF_INIT_STACK;

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
 * Note: Do not make this dependant on CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
 * so that this space is reserved in the hot cache section even when the
 * mitigation is disabled.
 */
DEFINE_PER_CPU_CACHE_HOT(u64, __x86_call_depth);
EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(__x86_call_depth);

static void wrmsrq_cstar(unsigned long val)
{
        /*
         * Intel CPUs do not support 32-bit SYSCALL. Writing to MSR_CSTAR
         * is so far ignored by the CPU, but raises a #VE trap in a TDX
         * guest. Avoid the pointless write on all Intel CPUs.
         */
        if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
                wrmsrq(MSR_CSTAR, val);
}

static inline void idt_syscall_init(void)
{
        wrmsrq(MSR_LSTAR, (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_64);

        if (ia32_enabled()) {
                wrmsrq_cstar((unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_compat);
                /*
                 * This only works on Intel CPUs.
                 * On AMD CPUs these MSRs are 32-bit, CPU truncates MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP.
                 * This does not cause SYSENTER to jump to the wrong location, because
                 * AMD doesn't allow SYSENTER in long mode (either 32- or 64-bit).
                 */
                wrmsrq_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, (u64)__KERNEL_CS);
                wrmsrq_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP,
                            (unsigned long)(cpu_entry_stack(smp_processor_id()) + 1));
                wrmsrq_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, (u64)entry_SYSENTER_compat);
        } else {
                wrmsrq_cstar((unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL32_ignore);
                wrmsrq_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, (u64)GDT_ENTRY_INVALID_SEG);
                wrmsrq_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, 0ULL);
                wrmsrq_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, 0ULL);
        }

        /*
         * Flags to clear on syscall; clear as much as possible
         * to minimize user space-kernel interference.
         */
        wrmsrq(MSR_SYSCALL_MASK,
               X86_EFLAGS_CF|X86_EFLAGS_PF|X86_EFLAGS_AF|
               X86_EFLAGS_ZF|X86_EFLAGS_SF|X86_EFLAGS_TF|
               X86_EFLAGS_IF|X86_EFLAGS_DF|X86_EFLAGS_OF|
               X86_EFLAGS_IOPL|X86_EFLAGS_NT|X86_EFLAGS_RF|
               X86_EFLAGS_AC|X86_EFLAGS_ID);
}

/* May not be marked __init: used by software suspend */
void syscall_init(void)
{
        /* The default user and kernel segments */
        wrmsr(MSR_STAR, 0, (__USER32_CS << 16) | __KERNEL_CS);

        /*
         * Except the IA32_STAR MSR, there is NO need to setup SYSCALL and
         * SYSENTER MSRs for FRED, because FRED uses the ring 3 FRED
         * entrypoint for SYSCALL and SYSENTER, and ERETU is the only legit
         * instruction to return to ring 3 (both sysexit and sysret cause
         * #UD when FRED is enabled).
         */
        if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED))
                idt_syscall_init();
}
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */

#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR
DEFINE_PER_CPU_CACHE_HOT(unsigned long, __stack_chk_guard);
#ifndef CONFIG_SMP
EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_guard);
#endif
#endif

static void initialize_debug_regs(void)
{
        /* Control register first -- to make sure everything is disabled. */
        set_debugreg(DR7_FIXED_1, 7);
        set_debugreg(DR6_RESERVED, 6);
        /* dr5 and dr4 don't exist */
        set_debugreg(0, 3);
        set_debugreg(0, 2);
        set_debugreg(0, 1);
        set_debugreg(0, 0);
}

#ifdef CONFIG_KGDB
/*
 * Restore debug regs if using kgdbwait and you have a kernel debugger
 * connection established.
 */
static void dbg_restore_debug_regs(void)
{
        if (unlikely(kgdb_connected && arch_kgdb_ops.correct_hw_break))
                arch_kgdb_ops.correct_hw_break();
}
#else /* ! CONFIG_KGDB */
#define dbg_restore_debug_regs()
#endif /* ! CONFIG_KGDB */

static inline void setup_getcpu(int cpu)
{
        unsigned long cpudata = vdso_encode_cpunode(cpu, early_cpu_to_node(cpu));
        struct desc_struct d = { };

        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDPID))
                wrmsrq(MSR_TSC_AUX, cpudata);

        /* Store CPU and node number in limit. */
        d.limit0 = cpudata;
        d.limit1 = cpudata >> 16;

        d.type = 5;             /* RO data, expand down, accessed */
        d.dpl = 3;              /* Visible to user code */
        d.s = 1;                /* Not a system segment */
        d.p = 1;                /* Present */
        d.d = 1;                /* 32-bit */

        write_gdt_entry(get_cpu_gdt_rw(cpu), GDT_ENTRY_CPUNODE, &d, DESCTYPE_S);
}

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
static inline void tss_setup_ist(struct tss_struct *tss)
{
        /* Set up the per-CPU TSS IST stacks */
        tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_DF] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(DF);
        tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_NMI] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(NMI);
        tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_DB] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(DB);
        tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_MCE] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(MCE);
        /* Only mapped when SEV-ES is active */
        tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC);
}
#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
static inline void tss_setup_ist(struct tss_struct *tss) { }
#endif /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */

static inline void tss_setup_io_bitmap(struct tss_struct *tss)
{
        tss->x86_tss.io_bitmap_base = IO_BITMAP_OFFSET_INVALID;

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_IOPL_IOPERM
        tss->io_bitmap.prev_max = 0;
        tss->io_bitmap.prev_sequence = 0;
        memset(tss->io_bitmap.bitmap, 0xff, sizeof(tss->io_bitmap.bitmap));
        /*
         * Invalidate the extra array entry past the end of the all
         * permission bitmap as required by the hardware.
         */
        tss->io_bitmap.mapall[IO_BITMAP_LONGS] = ~0UL;
#endif
}

/*
 * Setup everything needed to handle exceptions from the IDT, including the IST
 * exceptions which use paranoid_entry().
 */
void cpu_init_exception_handling(bool boot_cpu)
{
        struct tss_struct *tss = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_tss_rw);
        int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();

        /* paranoid_entry() gets the CPU number from the GDT */
        setup_getcpu(cpu);

        /* For IDT mode, IST vectors need to be set in TSS. */
        if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED))
                tss_setup_ist(tss);
        tss_setup_io_bitmap(tss);
        set_tss_desc(cpu, &get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->tss.x86_tss);

        load_TR_desc();

        /* GHCB needs to be setup to handle #VC. */
        setup_ghcb();

        /*
         * On CPUs with FSGSBASE support, paranoid_entry() uses
         * ALTERNATIVE-patched RDGSBASE/WRGSBASE instructions. Secondary CPUs
         * boot after alternatives are patched globally, so early exceptions
         * execute patched code that depends on FSGSBASE. Enable the feature
         * before any exceptions occur.
         */
        if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE)) {
                cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE);
                elf_hwcap2 |= HWCAP2_FSGSBASE;
        }

        if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {
                /* The boot CPU has enabled FRED during early boot */
                if (!boot_cpu)
                        cpu_init_fred_exceptions();

                cpu_init_fred_rsps();
        } else {
                load_current_idt();
        }
}

void __init cpu_init_replace_early_idt(void)
{
        if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED))
                cpu_init_fred_exceptions();
        else
                idt_setup_early_pf();
}

/*
 * cpu_init() initializes state that is per-CPU. Some data is already
 * initialized (naturally) in the bootstrap process, such as the GDT.  We
 * reload it nevertheless, this function acts as a 'CPU state barrier',
 * nothing should get across.
 */
void cpu_init(void)
{
        struct task_struct *cur = current;
        int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();

#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
        if (this_cpu_read(numa_node) == 0 &&
            early_cpu_to_node(cpu) != NUMA_NO_NODE)
                set_numa_node(early_cpu_to_node(cpu));
#endif
        pr_debug("Initializing CPU#%d\n", cpu);

        if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) || cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_VME) ||
            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DE))
                cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_VME|X86_CR4_PVI|X86_CR4_TSD|X86_CR4_DE);

        if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) {
                loadsegment(fs, 0);
                memset(cur->thread.tls_array, 0, GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES * 8);
                syscall_init();

                wrmsrq(MSR_FS_BASE, 0);
                wrmsrq(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, 0);
                barrier();

                x2apic_setup();

                intel_posted_msi_init();
        }

        mmgrab(&init_mm);
        cur->active_mm = &init_mm;
        BUG_ON(cur->mm);
        initialize_tlbstate_and_flush();
        enter_lazy_tlb(&init_mm, cur);

        /*
         * sp0 points to the entry trampoline stack regardless of what task
         * is running.
         */
        load_sp0((unsigned long)(cpu_entry_stack(cpu) + 1));

        load_mm_ldt(&init_mm);

        initialize_debug_regs();
        dbg_restore_debug_regs();

        doublefault_init_cpu_tss();

        if (is_uv_system())
                uv_cpu_init();

        load_fixmap_gdt(cpu);
}

#ifdef CONFIG_MICROCODE_LATE_LOADING
/**
 * store_cpu_caps() - Store a snapshot of CPU capabilities
 * @curr_info: Pointer where to store it
 *
 * Returns: None
 */
void store_cpu_caps(struct cpuinfo_x86 *curr_info)
{
        /* Reload CPUID max function as it might've changed. */
        curr_info->cpuid_level = cpuid_eax(0);

        /* Copy all capability leafs and pick up the synthetic ones. */
        memcpy(&curr_info->x86_capability, &boot_cpu_data.x86_capability,
               sizeof(curr_info->x86_capability));

        /* Get the hardware CPUID leafs */
        get_cpu_cap(curr_info);
}

/**
 * microcode_check() - Check if any CPU capabilities changed after an update.
 * @prev_info:  CPU capabilities stored before an update.
 *
 * The microcode loader calls this upon late microcode load to recheck features,
 * only when microcode has been updated. Caller holds and CPU hotplug lock.
 *
 * Return: None
 */
void microcode_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *prev_info)
{
        struct cpuinfo_x86 curr_info;

        perf_check_microcode();

        amd_check_microcode();

        store_cpu_caps(&curr_info);

        if (!memcmp(&prev_info->x86_capability, &curr_info.x86_capability,
                    sizeof(prev_info->x86_capability)))
                return;

        pr_warn("x86/CPU: CPU features have changed after loading microcode, but might not take effect.\n");
        pr_warn("x86/CPU: Please consider either early loading through initrd/built-in or a potential BIOS update.\n");
}
#endif

/*
 * Invoked from core CPU hotplug code after hotplug operations
 */
void arch_smt_update(void)
{
        /* Handle the speculative execution misfeatures */
        cpu_bugs_smt_update();
        /* Check whether IPI broadcasting can be enabled */
        apic_smt_update();
}

void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void)
{
        struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_info);

        identify_boot_cpu();

        select_idle_routine();

        /*
         * identify_boot_cpu() initialized SMT support information, let the
         * core code know.
         */
        cpu_smt_set_num_threads(__max_threads_per_core, __max_threads_per_core);

        if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) {
                pr_info("CPU: ");
                print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
        }

        cpu_select_mitigations();

        arch_smt_update();

        if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32)) {
                /*
                 * Check whether this is a real i386 which is not longer
                 * supported and fixup the utsname.
                 */
                if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 4)
                        panic("Kernel requires i486+ for 'invlpg' and other features");

                init_utsname()->machine[1] =
                        '0' + (boot_cpu_data.x86 > 6 ? 6 : boot_cpu_data.x86);
        }

        /*
         * Must be before alternatives because it might set or clear
         * feature bits.
         */
        fpu__init_system();
        fpu__init_cpu();

        /*
         * This needs to follow the FPU initializtion, since EFI depends on it.
         */
        if (efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES))
                efi_enter_virtual_mode();

        /*
         * Ensure that access to the per CPU representation has the initial
         * boot CPU configuration.
         */
        *c = boot_cpu_data;
        c->initialized = true;

        alternative_instructions();

        if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) {
                USER_PTR_MAX = TASK_SIZE_MAX;

                /*
                 * Enable this when LAM is gated on LASS support
                if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LAM))
                        USER_PTR_MAX = (1ul << 63) - PAGE_SIZE;
                 */
                runtime_const_init(ptr, USER_PTR_MAX);

                /*
                 * Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages
                 * There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping
                 * MTRRs into large pages causes slow downs.
                 *
                 * Right now we don't do that with gbpages because there seems
                 * very little benefit for that case.
                 */
                if (!direct_gbpages)
                        set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1);
        } else {
                fpu__init_check_bugs();
        }

        /*
         * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA
         * operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will
         * mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will
         * not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed. It
         * must be called after late_time_init() so that Hyper-V x86/x64
         * hypercalls work when the SWIOTLB bounce buffers are decrypted.
         */
        mem_encrypt_init();
}