// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
 * Landlock - Filesystem management and hooks
 *
 * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
 * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
 * Copyright © 2021-2025 Microsoft Corporation
 * Copyright © 2022 Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
 * Copyright © 2023-2024 Google LLC
 */

#include <asm/ioctls.h>
#include <kunit/test.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/bits.h>
#include <linux/compiler_types.h>
#include <linux/dcache.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/falloc.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/limits.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/path.h>
#include <linux/pid.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/stat.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/wait_bit.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <uapi/linux/fiemap.h>
#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>

#include "access.h"
#include "audit.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "cred.h"
#include "domain.h"
#include "fs.h"
#include "limits.h"
#include "object.h"
#include "ruleset.h"
#include "setup.h"

/* Underlying object management */

static void release_inode(struct landlock_object *const object)
        __releases(object->lock)
{
        struct inode *const inode = object->underobj;
        struct super_block *sb;

        if (!inode) {
                spin_unlock(&object->lock);
                return;
        }

        /*
         * Protects against concurrent use by hook_sb_delete() of the reference
         * to the underlying inode.
         */
        object->underobj = NULL;
        /*
         * Makes sure that if the filesystem is concurrently unmounted,
         * hook_sb_delete() will wait for us to finish iput().
         */
        sb = inode->i_sb;
        atomic_long_inc(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs);
        spin_unlock(&object->lock);
        /*
         * Because object->underobj was not NULL, hook_sb_delete() and
         * get_inode_object() guarantee that it is safe to reset
         * landlock_inode(inode)->object while it is not NULL.  It is therefore
         * not necessary to lock inode->i_lock.
         */
        rcu_assign_pointer(landlock_inode(inode)->object, NULL);
        /*
         * Now, new rules can safely be tied to @inode with get_inode_object().
         */

        iput(inode);
        if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs))
                wake_up_var(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs);
}

static const struct landlock_object_underops landlock_fs_underops = {
        .release = release_inode
};

/* IOCTL helpers */

/**
 * is_masked_device_ioctl - Determine whether an IOCTL command is always
 * permitted with Landlock for device files.  These commands can not be
 * restricted on device files by enforcing a Landlock policy.
 *
 * @cmd: The IOCTL command that is supposed to be run.
 *
 * By default, any IOCTL on a device file requires the
 * LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV right.  However, we blanket-permit some
 * commands, if:
 *
 * 1. The command is implemented in fs/ioctl.c's do_vfs_ioctl(),
 *    not in f_ops->unlocked_ioctl() or f_ops->compat_ioctl().
 *
 * 2. The command is harmless when invoked on devices.
 *
 * We also permit commands that do not make sense for devices, but where the
 * do_vfs_ioctl() implementation returns a more conventional error code.
 *
 * Any new IOCTL commands that are implemented in fs/ioctl.c's do_vfs_ioctl()
 * should be considered for inclusion here.
 *
 * Returns: true if the IOCTL @cmd can not be restricted with Landlock for
 * device files.
 */
static __attribute_const__ bool is_masked_device_ioctl(const unsigned int cmd)
{
        switch (cmd) {
        /*
         * FIOCLEX, FIONCLEX, FIONBIO and FIOASYNC manipulate the FD's
         * close-on-exec and the file's buffered-IO and async flags.  These
         * operations are also available through fcntl(2), and are
         * unconditionally permitted in Landlock.
         */
        case FIOCLEX:
        case FIONCLEX:
        case FIONBIO:
        case FIOASYNC:
        /*
         * FIOQSIZE queries the size of a regular file, directory, or link.
         *
         * We still permit it, because it always returns -ENOTTY for
         * other file types.
         */
        case FIOQSIZE:
        /*
         * FIFREEZE and FITHAW freeze and thaw the file system which the
         * given file belongs to.  Requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
         *
         * These commands operate on the file system's superblock rather
         * than on the file itself.  The same operations can also be
         * done through any other file or directory on the same file
         * system, so it is safe to permit these.
         */
        case FIFREEZE:
        case FITHAW:
        /*
         * FS_IOC_FIEMAP queries information about the allocation of
         * blocks within a file.
         *
         * This IOCTL command only makes sense for regular files and is
         * not implemented by devices. It is harmless to permit.
         */
        case FS_IOC_FIEMAP:
        /*
         * FIGETBSZ queries the file system's block size for a file or
         * directory.
         *
         * This command operates on the file system's superblock rather
         * than on the file itself.  The same operation can also be done
         * through any other file or directory on the same file system,
         * so it is safe to permit it.
         */
        case FIGETBSZ:
        /*
         * FICLONE, FICLONERANGE and FIDEDUPERANGE make files share
         * their underlying storage ("reflink") between source and
         * destination FDs, on file systems which support that.
         *
         * These IOCTL commands only apply to regular files
         * and are harmless to permit for device files.
         */
        case FICLONE:
        case FICLONERANGE:
        case FIDEDUPERANGE:
        /*
         * FS_IOC_GETFSUUID and FS_IOC_GETFSSYSFSPATH both operate on
         * the file system superblock, not on the specific file, so
         * these operations are available through any other file on the
         * same file system as well.
         */
        case FS_IOC_GETFSUUID:
        case FS_IOC_GETFSSYSFSPATH:
                return true;

        /*
         * FIONREAD, FS_IOC_GETFLAGS, FS_IOC_SETFLAGS, FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR and
         * FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR are forwarded to device implementations.
         */

        /*
         * file_ioctl() commands (FIBMAP, FS_IOC_RESVSP, FS_IOC_RESVSP64,
         * FS_IOC_UNRESVSP, FS_IOC_UNRESVSP64 and FS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE) are
         * forwarded to device implementations, so not permitted.
         */

        /* Other commands are guarded by the access right. */
        default:
                return false;
        }
}

/*
 * is_masked_device_ioctl_compat - same as the helper above, but checking the
 * "compat" IOCTL commands.
 *
 * The IOCTL commands with special handling in compat-mode should behave the
 * same as their non-compat counterparts.
 */
static __attribute_const__ bool
is_masked_device_ioctl_compat(const unsigned int cmd)
{
        switch (cmd) {
        /* FICLONE is permitted, same as in the non-compat variant. */
        case FICLONE:
                return true;

#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
        /*
         * FS_IOC_RESVSP_32, FS_IOC_RESVSP64_32, FS_IOC_UNRESVSP_32,
         * FS_IOC_UNRESVSP64_32, FS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE_32: not blanket-permitted,
         * for consistency with their non-compat variants.
         */
        case FS_IOC_RESVSP_32:
        case FS_IOC_RESVSP64_32:
        case FS_IOC_UNRESVSP_32:
        case FS_IOC_UNRESVSP64_32:
        case FS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE_32:
#endif

        /*
         * FS_IOC32_GETFLAGS, FS_IOC32_SETFLAGS are forwarded to their device
         * implementations.
         */
        case FS_IOC32_GETFLAGS:
        case FS_IOC32_SETFLAGS:
                return false;
        default:
                return is_masked_device_ioctl(cmd);
        }
}

/* Ruleset management */

static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode)
{
        struct landlock_object *object, *new_object;
        struct landlock_inode_security *inode_sec = landlock_inode(inode);

        rcu_read_lock();
retry:
        object = rcu_dereference(inode_sec->object);
        if (object) {
                if (likely(refcount_inc_not_zero(&object->usage))) {
                        rcu_read_unlock();
                        return object;
                }
                /*
                 * We are racing with release_inode(), the object is going
                 * away.  Wait for release_inode(), then retry.
                 */
                spin_lock(&object->lock);
                spin_unlock(&object->lock);
                goto retry;
        }
        rcu_read_unlock();

        /*
         * If there is no object tied to @inode, then create a new one (without
         * holding any locks).
         */
        new_object = landlock_create_object(&landlock_fs_underops, inode);
        if (IS_ERR(new_object))
                return new_object;

        /*
         * Protects against concurrent calls to get_inode_object() or
         * hook_sb_delete().
         */
        spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
        if (unlikely(rcu_access_pointer(inode_sec->object))) {
                /* Someone else just created the object, bail out and retry. */
                spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
                kfree(new_object);

                rcu_read_lock();
                goto retry;
        }

        /*
         * @inode will be released by hook_sb_delete() on its superblock
         * shutdown, or by release_inode() when no more ruleset references the
         * related object.
         */
        ihold(inode);
        rcu_assign_pointer(inode_sec->object, new_object);
        spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
        return new_object;
}

/* All access rights that can be tied to files. */
/* clang-format off */
#define ACCESS_FILE ( \
        LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
        LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
        LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
        LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | \
        LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)
/* clang-format on */

/*
 * @path: Should have been checked by get_path_from_fd().
 */
int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
                            const struct path *const path,
                            access_mask_t access_rights)
{
        int err;
        struct landlock_id id = {
                .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE,
        };

        /* Files only get access rights that make sense. */
        if (!d_is_dir(path->dentry) &&
            !access_mask_subset(access_rights, ACCESS_FILE))
                return -EINVAL;
        if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ruleset->num_layers != 1))
                return -EINVAL;

        /* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */
        access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS &
                         ~landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
        id.key.object = get_inode_object(d_backing_inode(path->dentry));
        if (IS_ERR(id.key.object))
                return PTR_ERR(id.key.object);
        mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock);
        err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, id, access_rights);
        mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock);
        /*
         * No need to check for an error because landlock_insert_rule()
         * increments the refcount for the new object if needed.
         */
        landlock_put_object(id.key.object);
        return err;
}

/* Access-control management */

/*
 * The lifetime of the returned rule is tied to @domain.
 *
 * Returns NULL if no rule is found or if @dentry is negative.
 */
static const struct landlock_rule *
find_rule(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
          const struct dentry *const dentry)
{
        const struct landlock_rule *rule;
        const struct inode *inode;
        struct landlock_id id = {
                .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE,
        };

        /* Ignores nonexistent leafs. */
        if (d_is_negative(dentry))
                return NULL;

        inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
        rcu_read_lock();
        id.key.object = rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object);
        rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id);
        rcu_read_unlock();
        return rule;
}

/*
 * Allows access to pseudo filesystems that will never be mountable (e.g.
 * sockfs, pipefs), but can still be reachable through
 * /proc/<pid>/fd/<file-descriptor>
 */
static bool is_nouser_or_private(const struct dentry *dentry)
{
        return (dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) ||
               (d_is_positive(dentry) &&
                unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))));
}

static const struct access_masks any_fs = {
        .fs = ~0,
};

/*
 * Returns true iff the child file with the given src_child access rights under
 * src_parent would result in having the same or fewer access rights if it were
 * moved under new_parent.
 */
static bool may_refer(const struct layer_access_masks *const src_parent,
                      const struct layer_access_masks *const src_child,
                      const struct layer_access_masks *const new_parent,
                      const bool child_is_dir)
{
        for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(new_parent->access); i++) {
                access_mask_t child_access = src_parent->access[i] &
                                             src_child->access[i];
                access_mask_t parent_access = new_parent->access[i];

                if (!child_is_dir) {
                        child_access &= ACCESS_FILE;
                        parent_access &= ACCESS_FILE;
                }

                if (!access_mask_subset(child_access, parent_access))
                        return false;
        }
        return true;
}

/*
 * Check that a destination file hierarchy has more restrictions than a source
 * file hierarchy.  This is only used for link and rename actions.
 *
 * Returns: true if child1 may be moved from parent1 to parent2 without
 * increasing its access rights.  If child2 is set, an additional condition is
 * that child2 may be used from parent2 to parent1 without increasing its access
 * rights.
 */
static bool no_more_access(const struct layer_access_masks *const parent1,
                           const struct layer_access_masks *const child1,
                           const bool child1_is_dir,
                           const struct layer_access_masks *const parent2,
                           const struct layer_access_masks *const child2,
                           const bool child2_is_dir)
{
        if (!may_refer(parent1, child1, parent2, child1_is_dir))
                return false;

        if (!child2)
                return true;

        return may_refer(parent2, child2, parent1, child2_is_dir);
}

#define NMA_TRUE(...) KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, no_more_access(__VA_ARGS__))
#define NMA_FALSE(...) KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, no_more_access(__VA_ARGS__))

#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST

static void test_no_more_access(struct kunit *const test)
{
        const struct layer_access_masks rx0 = {
                .access[0] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE |
                             LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
        };
        const struct layer_access_masks mx0 = {
                .access[0] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE |
                             LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG,
        };
        const struct layer_access_masks x0 = {
                .access[0] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
        };
        const struct layer_access_masks x1 = {
                .access[1] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
        };
        const struct layer_access_masks x01 = {
                .access[0] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
                .access[1] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
        };
        const struct layer_access_masks allows_all = {};

        /* Checks without restriction. */
        NMA_TRUE(&x0, &allows_all, false, &allows_all, NULL, false);
        NMA_TRUE(&allows_all, &x0, false, &allows_all, NULL, false);
        NMA_FALSE(&x0, &x0, false, &allows_all, NULL, false);

        /*
         * Checks that we can only refer a file if no more access could be
         * inherited.
         */
        NMA_TRUE(&x0, &x0, false, &rx0, NULL, false);
        NMA_TRUE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &rx0, NULL, false);
        NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &x0, NULL, false);
        NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &x1, NULL, false);

        /* Checks allowed referring with different nested domains. */
        NMA_TRUE(&x0, &x1, false, &x0, NULL, false);
        NMA_TRUE(&x1, &x0, false, &x0, NULL, false);
        NMA_TRUE(&x0, &x01, false, &x0, NULL, false);
        NMA_TRUE(&x0, &x01, false, &rx0, NULL, false);
        NMA_TRUE(&x01, &x0, false, &x0, NULL, false);
        NMA_TRUE(&x01, &x0, false, &rx0, NULL, false);
        NMA_FALSE(&x01, &x01, false, &x0, NULL, false);

        /* Checks that file access rights are also enforced for a directory. */
        NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, true, &x0, NULL, false);

        /* Checks that directory access rights don't impact file referring... */
        NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, false, &x0, NULL, false);
        /* ...but only directory referring. */
        NMA_FALSE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &x0, NULL, false);

        /* Checks directory exchange. */
        NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &mx0, &mx0, true);
        NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &mx0, &x0, true);
        NMA_FALSE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &x0, &mx0, true);
        NMA_FALSE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &x0, &x0, true);
        NMA_FALSE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &x1, &x1, true);

        /* Checks file exchange with directory access rights... */
        NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, false, &mx0, &mx0, false);
        NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, false, &mx0, &x0, false);
        NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, false, &x0, &mx0, false);
        NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, false, &x0, &x0, false);
        /* ...and with file access rights. */
        NMA_TRUE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &rx0, &rx0, false);
        NMA_TRUE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &rx0, &x0, false);
        NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &x0, &rx0, false);
        NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &x0, &x0, false);
        NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &x1, &x1, false);

        /*
         * Allowing the following requests should not be a security risk
         * because domain 0 denies execute access, and domain 1 is always
         * nested with domain 0.  However, adding an exception for this case
         * would mean to check all nested domains to make sure none can get
         * more privileges (e.g. processes only sandboxed by domain 0).
         * Moreover, this behavior (i.e. composition of N domains) could then
         * be inconsistent compared to domain 1's ruleset alone (e.g. it might
         * be denied to link/rename with domain 1's ruleset, whereas it would
         * be allowed if nested on top of domain 0).  Another drawback would be
         * to create a cover channel that could enable sandboxed processes to
         * infer most of the filesystem restrictions from their domain.  To
         * make it simple, efficient, safe, and more consistent, this case is
         * always denied.
         */
        NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &x0, NULL, false);
        NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &rx0, NULL, false);
        NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, true, &x0, NULL, false);
        NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, true, &rx0, NULL, false);

        /* Checks the same case of exclusive domains with a file... */
        NMA_TRUE(&x1, &x1, false, &x01, NULL, false);
        NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &x01, &x0, false);
        NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &x01, &x01, false);
        NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &x0, &x0, false);
        /* ...and with a directory. */
        NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &x0, &x0, true);
        NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, true, &x0, &x0, false);
        NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, true, &x0, &x0, true);
}

#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */

#undef NMA_TRUE
#undef NMA_FALSE

static bool is_layer_masks_allowed(const struct layer_access_masks *masks)
{
        return !memchr_inv(&masks->access, 0, sizeof(masks->access));
}

/*
 * Removes @masks accesses that are not requested.
 *
 * Returns true if the request is allowed, false otherwise.
 */
static bool scope_to_request(const access_mask_t access_request,
                             struct layer_access_masks *masks)
{
        bool saw_unfulfilled_access = false;

        if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!masks))
                return true;

        for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(masks->access); i++) {
                masks->access[i] &= access_request;
                if (masks->access[i])
                        saw_unfulfilled_access = true;
        }
        return !saw_unfulfilled_access;
}

#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST

static void test_scope_to_request_with_exec_none(struct kunit *const test)
{
        /* Allows everything. */
        struct layer_access_masks masks = {};

        /* Checks and scopes with execute. */
        KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test,
                          scope_to_request(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE, &masks));
        KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0, masks.access[0]);
}

static void test_scope_to_request_with_exec_some(struct kunit *const test)
{
        /* Denies execute and write. */
        struct layer_access_masks masks = {
                .access[0] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
                .access[1] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
        };

        /* Checks and scopes with execute. */
        KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, scope_to_request(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
                                                  &masks));
        KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE, masks.access[0]);
        KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0, masks.access[1]);
}

static void test_scope_to_request_without_access(struct kunit *const test)
{
        /* Denies execute and write. */
        struct layer_access_masks masks = {
                .access[0] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
                .access[1] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
        };

        /* Checks and scopes without access request. */
        KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, scope_to_request(0, &masks));
        KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0, masks.access[0]);
        KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0, masks.access[1]);
}

#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */

/*
 * Returns true if there is at least one access right different than
 * LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER.
 */
static bool is_eacces(const struct layer_access_masks *masks,
                      const access_mask_t access_request)
{
        if (!masks)
                return false;

        for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(masks->access); i++) {
                /* LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER alone must return -EXDEV. */
                if (masks->access[i] & access_request &
                    ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER)
                        return true;
        }
        return false;
}

#define IE_TRUE(...) KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, is_eacces(__VA_ARGS__))
#define IE_FALSE(...) KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, is_eacces(__VA_ARGS__))

#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST

static void test_is_eacces_with_none(struct kunit *const test)
{
        const struct layer_access_masks masks = {};

        IE_FALSE(&masks, 0);
        IE_FALSE(&masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER);
        IE_FALSE(&masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE);
        IE_FALSE(&masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE);
}

static void test_is_eacces_with_refer(struct kunit *const test)
{
        const struct layer_access_masks masks = {
                .access[0] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER,
        };

        IE_FALSE(&masks, 0);
        IE_FALSE(&masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER);
        IE_FALSE(&masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE);
        IE_FALSE(&masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE);
}

static void test_is_eacces_with_write(struct kunit *const test)
{
        const struct layer_access_masks masks = {
                .access[0] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
        };

        IE_FALSE(&masks, 0);
        IE_FALSE(&masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER);
        IE_FALSE(&masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE);

        IE_TRUE(&masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE);
}

#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */

#undef IE_TRUE
#undef IE_FALSE

/**
 * is_access_to_paths_allowed - Check accesses for requests with a common path
 *
 * @domain: Domain to check against.
 * @path: File hierarchy to walk through.  For refer checks, this would be
 *     the common mountpoint.
 * @access_request_parent1: Accesses to check, once @layer_masks_parent1 is
 *     equal to @layer_masks_parent2 (if any).  This is tied to the unique
 *     requested path for most actions, or the source in case of a refer action
 *     (i.e. rename or link), or the source and destination in case of
 *     RENAME_EXCHANGE.
 * @layer_masks_parent1: Pointer to a matrix of layer masks per access
 *     masks, identifying the layers that forbid a specific access.  Bits from
 *     this matrix can be unset according to the @path walk.  An empty matrix
 *     means that @domain allows all possible Landlock accesses (i.e. not only
 *     those identified by @access_request_parent1).  This matrix can
 *     initially refer to domain layer masks and, when the accesses for the
 *     destination and source are the same, to requested layer masks.
 * @log_request_parent1: Audit request to fill if the related access is denied.
 * @dentry_child1: Dentry to the initial child of the parent1 path.  This
 *     pointer must be NULL for non-refer actions (i.e. not link nor rename).
 * @access_request_parent2: Similar to @access_request_parent1 but for a
 *     request involving a source and a destination.  This refers to the
 *     destination, except in case of RENAME_EXCHANGE where it also refers to
 *     the source.  Must be set to 0 when using a simple path request.
 * @layer_masks_parent2: Similar to @layer_masks_parent1 but for a refer
 *     action.  This must be NULL otherwise.
 * @log_request_parent2: Audit request to fill if the related access is denied.
 * @dentry_child2: Dentry to the initial child of the parent2 path.  This
 *     pointer is only set for RENAME_EXCHANGE actions and must be NULL
 *     otherwise.
 *
 * This helper first checks that the destination has a superset of restrictions
 * compared to the source (if any) for a common path.  Because of
 * RENAME_EXCHANGE actions, source and destinations may be swapped.  It then
 * checks that the collected accesses and the remaining ones are enough to
 * allow the request.
 *
 * Returns:
 * - true if the access request is granted;
 * - false otherwise.
 */
static bool
is_access_to_paths_allowed(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
                           const struct path *const path,
                           const access_mask_t access_request_parent1,
                           struct layer_access_masks *layer_masks_parent1,
                           struct landlock_request *const log_request_parent1,
                           struct dentry *const dentry_child1,
                           const access_mask_t access_request_parent2,
                           struct layer_access_masks *layer_masks_parent2,
                           struct landlock_request *const log_request_parent2,
                           struct dentry *const dentry_child2)
{
        bool allowed_parent1 = false, allowed_parent2 = false, is_dom_check,
             child1_is_directory = true, child2_is_directory = true;
        struct path walker_path;
        access_mask_t access_masked_parent1, access_masked_parent2;
        struct layer_access_masks _layer_masks_child1, _layer_masks_child2;
        struct layer_access_masks *layer_masks_child1 = NULL,
                                  *layer_masks_child2 = NULL;

        if (!access_request_parent1 && !access_request_parent2)
                return true;

        if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!path))
                return true;

        if (is_nouser_or_private(path->dentry))
                return true;

        if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!layer_masks_parent1))
                return false;

        allowed_parent1 = is_layer_masks_allowed(layer_masks_parent1);

        if (unlikely(layer_masks_parent2)) {
                if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!dentry_child1))
                        return false;

                allowed_parent2 = is_layer_masks_allowed(layer_masks_parent2);

                /*
                 * For a double request, first check for potential privilege
                 * escalation by looking at domain handled accesses (which are
                 * a superset of the meaningful requested accesses).
                 */
                access_masked_parent1 = access_masked_parent2 =
                        landlock_union_access_masks(domain).fs;
                is_dom_check = true;
        } else {
                if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dentry_child1 || dentry_child2))
                        return false;
                /* For a simple request, only check for requested accesses. */
                access_masked_parent1 = access_request_parent1;
                access_masked_parent2 = access_request_parent2;
                is_dom_check = false;
        }

        if (unlikely(dentry_child1)) {
                if (landlock_init_layer_masks(domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
                                              &_layer_masks_child1,
                                              LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE))
                        landlock_unmask_layers(find_rule(domain, dentry_child1),
                                               &_layer_masks_child1);
                layer_masks_child1 = &_layer_masks_child1;
                child1_is_directory = d_is_dir(dentry_child1);
        }
        if (unlikely(dentry_child2)) {
                if (landlock_init_layer_masks(domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
                                              &_layer_masks_child2,
                                              LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE))
                        landlock_unmask_layers(find_rule(domain, dentry_child2),
                                               &_layer_masks_child2);
                layer_masks_child2 = &_layer_masks_child2;
                child2_is_directory = d_is_dir(dentry_child2);
        }

        walker_path = *path;
        path_get(&walker_path);
        /*
         * We need to walk through all the hierarchy to not miss any relevant
         * restriction.
         */
        while (true) {
                const struct landlock_rule *rule;

                /*
                 * If at least all accesses allowed on the destination are
                 * already allowed on the source, respectively if there is at
                 * least as much as restrictions on the destination than on the
                 * source, then we can safely refer files from the source to
                 * the destination without risking a privilege escalation.
                 * This also applies in the case of RENAME_EXCHANGE, which
                 * implies checks on both direction.  This is crucial for
                 * standalone multilayered security policies.  Furthermore,
                 * this helps avoid policy writers to shoot themselves in the
                 * foot.
                 */
                if (unlikely(is_dom_check &&
                             no_more_access(
                                     layer_masks_parent1, layer_masks_child1,
                                     child1_is_directory, layer_masks_parent2,
                                     layer_masks_child2,
                                     child2_is_directory))) {
                        /*
                         * Now, downgrades the remaining checks from domain
                         * handled accesses to requested accesses.
                         */
                        is_dom_check = false;
                        access_masked_parent1 = access_request_parent1;
                        access_masked_parent2 = access_request_parent2;

                        allowed_parent1 =
                                allowed_parent1 ||
                                scope_to_request(access_masked_parent1,
                                                 layer_masks_parent1);
                        allowed_parent2 =
                                allowed_parent2 ||
                                scope_to_request(access_masked_parent2,
                                                 layer_masks_parent2);

                        /* Stops when all accesses are granted. */
                        if (allowed_parent1 && allowed_parent2)
                                break;
                }

                rule = find_rule(domain, walker_path.dentry);
                allowed_parent1 =
                        allowed_parent1 ||
                        landlock_unmask_layers(rule, layer_masks_parent1);
                allowed_parent2 =
                        allowed_parent2 ||
                        landlock_unmask_layers(rule, layer_masks_parent2);

                /* Stops when a rule from each layer grants access. */
                if (allowed_parent1 && allowed_parent2)
                        break;

jump_up:
                if (walker_path.dentry == walker_path.mnt->mnt_root) {
                        if (follow_up(&walker_path)) {
                                /* Ignores hidden mount points. */
                                goto jump_up;
                        } else {
                                /*
                                 * Stops at the real root.  Denies access
                                 * because not all layers have granted access.
                                 */
                                break;
                        }
                }

                if (unlikely(IS_ROOT(walker_path.dentry))) {
                        if (likely(walker_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL)) {
                                /*
                                 * Stops and allows access when reaching disconnected root
                                 * directories that are part of internal filesystems (e.g. nsfs,
                                 * which is reachable through /proc/<pid>/ns/<namespace>).
                                 */
                                allowed_parent1 = true;
                                allowed_parent2 = true;
                                break;
                        }

                        /*
                         * We reached a disconnected root directory from a bind mount.
                         * Let's continue the walk with the mount point we missed.
                         */
                        dput(walker_path.dentry);
                        walker_path.dentry = walker_path.mnt->mnt_root;
                        dget(walker_path.dentry);
                } else {
                        struct dentry *const parent_dentry =
                                dget_parent(walker_path.dentry);

                        dput(walker_path.dentry);
                        walker_path.dentry = parent_dentry;
                }
        }
        path_put(&walker_path);

        /*
         * Check CONFIG_AUDIT to enable elision of log_request_parent* and
         * associated caller's stack variables thanks to dead code elimination.
         */
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
        if (!allowed_parent1 && log_request_parent1) {
                log_request_parent1->type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS;
                log_request_parent1->audit.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
                log_request_parent1->audit.u.path = *path;
                log_request_parent1->access = access_masked_parent1;
                log_request_parent1->layer_masks = layer_masks_parent1;
        }

        if (!allowed_parent2 && log_request_parent2) {
                log_request_parent2->type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS;
                log_request_parent2->audit.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
                log_request_parent2->audit.u.path = *path;
                log_request_parent2->access = access_masked_parent2;
                log_request_parent2->layer_masks = layer_masks_parent2;
        }
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */

        return allowed_parent1 && allowed_parent2;
}

static int current_check_access_path(const struct path *const path,
                                     access_mask_t access_request)
{
        const struct access_masks masks = {
                .fs = access_request,
        };
        const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
                landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), masks, NULL);
        struct layer_access_masks layer_masks;
        struct landlock_request request = {};

        if (!subject)
                return 0;

        access_request = landlock_init_layer_masks(subject->domain,
                                                   access_request, &layer_masks,
                                                   LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
        if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(subject->domain, path, access_request,
                                       &layer_masks, &request, NULL, 0, NULL,
                                       NULL, NULL))
                return 0;

        landlock_log_denial(subject, &request);
        return -EACCES;
}

static __attribute_const__ access_mask_t get_mode_access(const umode_t mode)
{
        switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
        case S_IFLNK:
                return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM;
        case S_IFDIR:
                return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR;
        case S_IFCHR:
                return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR;
        case S_IFBLK:
                return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK;
        case S_IFIFO:
                return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO;
        case S_IFSOCK:
                return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK;
        case S_IFREG:
        case 0:
                /* A zero mode translates to S_IFREG. */
        default:
                /* Treats weird files as regular files. */
                return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG;
        }
}

static access_mask_t maybe_remove(const struct dentry *const dentry)
{
        if (d_is_negative(dentry))
                return 0;
        return d_is_dir(dentry) ? LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR :
                                  LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE;
}

/**
 * collect_domain_accesses - Walk through a file path and collect accesses
 *
 * @domain: Domain to check against.
 * @mnt_root: Last directory to check.
 * @dir: Directory to start the walk from.
 * @layer_masks_dom: Where to store the collected accesses.
 *
 * This helper is useful to begin a path walk from the @dir directory to a
 * @mnt_root directory used as a mount point.  This mount point is the common
 * ancestor between the source and the destination of a renamed and linked
 * file.  While walking from @dir to @mnt_root, we record all the domain's
 * allowed accesses in @layer_masks_dom.
 *
 * Because of disconnected directories, this walk may not reach @mnt_dir.  In
 * this case, the walk will continue to @mnt_dir after this call.
 *
 * This is similar to is_access_to_paths_allowed() but much simpler because it
 * only handles walking on the same mount point and only checks one set of
 * accesses.
 *
 * Returns:
 * - true if all the domain access rights are allowed for @dir;
 * - false if the walk reached @mnt_root.
 */
static bool collect_domain_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
                                    const struct dentry *const mnt_root,
                                    struct dentry *dir,
                                    struct layer_access_masks *layer_masks_dom)
{
        bool ret = false;

        if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain || !mnt_root || !dir || !layer_masks_dom))
                return true;
        if (is_nouser_or_private(dir))
                return true;

        if (!landlock_init_layer_masks(domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
                                       layer_masks_dom, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE))
                return true;

        dget(dir);
        while (true) {
                struct dentry *parent_dentry;

                /* Gets all layers allowing all domain accesses. */
                if (landlock_unmask_layers(find_rule(domain, dir),
                                           layer_masks_dom)) {
                        /*
                         * Stops when all handled accesses are allowed by at
                         * least one rule in each layer.
                         */
                        ret = true;
                        break;
                }

                /*
                 * Stops at the mount point or the filesystem root for a disconnected
                 * directory.
                 */
                if (dir == mnt_root || unlikely(IS_ROOT(dir)))
                        break;

                parent_dentry = dget_parent(dir);
                dput(dir);
                dir = parent_dentry;
        }
        dput(dir);
        return ret;
}

/**
 * current_check_refer_path - Check if a rename or link action is allowed
 *
 * @old_dentry: File or directory requested to be moved or linked.
 * @new_dir: Destination parent directory.
 * @new_dentry: Destination file or directory.
 * @removable: Sets to true if it is a rename operation.
 * @exchange: Sets to true if it is a rename operation with RENAME_EXCHANGE.
 *
 * Because of its unprivileged constraints, Landlock relies on file hierarchies
 * (and not only inodes) to tie access rights to files.  Being able to link or
 * rename a file hierarchy brings some challenges.  Indeed, moving or linking a
 * file (i.e. creating a new reference to an inode) can have an impact on the
 * actions allowed for a set of files if it would change its parent directory
 * (i.e. reparenting).
 *
 * To avoid trivial access right bypasses, Landlock first checks if the file or
 * directory requested to be moved would gain new access rights inherited from
 * its new hierarchy.  Before returning any error, Landlock then checks that
 * the parent source hierarchy and the destination hierarchy would allow the
 * link or rename action.  If it is not the case, an error with EACCES is
 * returned to inform user space that there is no way to remove or create the
 * requested source file type.  If it should be allowed but the new inherited
 * access rights would be greater than the source access rights, then the
 * kernel returns an error with EXDEV.  Prioritizing EACCES over EXDEV enables
 * user space to abort the whole operation if there is no way to do it, or to
 * manually copy the source to the destination if this remains allowed, e.g.
 * because file creation is allowed on the destination directory but not direct
 * linking.
 *
 * To achieve this goal, the kernel needs to compare two file hierarchies: the
 * one identifying the source file or directory (including itself), and the
 * destination one.  This can be seen as a multilayer partial ordering problem.
 * The kernel walks through these paths and collects in a matrix the access
 * rights that are denied per layer.  These matrices are then compared to see
 * if the destination one has more (or the same) restrictions as the source
 * one.  If this is the case, the requested action will not return EXDEV, which
 * doesn't mean the action is allowed.  The parent hierarchy of the source
 * (i.e. parent directory), and the destination hierarchy must also be checked
 * to verify that they explicitly allow such action (i.e.  referencing,
 * creation and potentially removal rights).  The kernel implementation is then
 * required to rely on potentially four matrices of access rights: one for the
 * source file or directory (i.e. the child), a potentially other one for the
 * other source/destination (in case of RENAME_EXCHANGE), one for the source
 * parent hierarchy and a last one for the destination hierarchy.  These
 * ephemeral matrices take some space on the stack, which limits the number of
 * layers to a deemed reasonable number: 16.
 *
 * Returns:
 * - 0 if access is allowed;
 * - -EXDEV if @old_dentry would inherit new access rights from @new_dir;
 * - -EACCES if file removal or creation is denied.
 */
static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
                                    const struct path *const new_dir,
                                    struct dentry *const new_dentry,
                                    const bool removable, const bool exchange)
{
        const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
                landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), any_fs, NULL);
        bool allow_parent1, allow_parent2;
        access_mask_t access_request_parent1, access_request_parent2;
        struct path mnt_dir;
        struct dentry *old_parent;
        struct layer_access_masks layer_masks_parent1 = {},
                                  layer_masks_parent2 = {};
        struct landlock_request request1 = {}, request2 = {};

        if (!subject)
                return 0;

        if (unlikely(d_is_negative(old_dentry)))
                return -ENOENT;
        if (exchange) {
                if (unlikely(d_is_negative(new_dentry)))
                        return -ENOENT;
                access_request_parent1 =
                        get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(new_dentry)->i_mode);
        } else {
                access_request_parent1 = 0;
        }
        access_request_parent2 =
                get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode);
        if (removable) {
                access_request_parent1 |= maybe_remove(old_dentry);
                access_request_parent2 |= maybe_remove(new_dentry);
        }

        /* The mount points are the same for old and new paths, cf. EXDEV. */
        if (old_dentry->d_parent == new_dir->dentry) {
                /*
                 * The LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER access right is not required
                 * for same-directory referer (i.e. no reparenting).
                 */
                access_request_parent1 = landlock_init_layer_masks(
                        subject->domain,
                        access_request_parent1 | access_request_parent2,
                        &layer_masks_parent1, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
                if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(subject->domain, new_dir,
                                               access_request_parent1,
                                               &layer_masks_parent1, &request1,
                                               NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL))
                        return 0;

                landlock_log_denial(subject, &request1);
                return -EACCES;
        }

        access_request_parent1 |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER;
        access_request_parent2 |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER;

        /* Saves the common mount point. */
        mnt_dir.mnt = new_dir->mnt;
        mnt_dir.dentry = new_dir->mnt->mnt_root;

        /*
         * old_dentry may be the root of the common mount point and
         * !IS_ROOT(old_dentry) at the same time (e.g. with open_tree() and
         * OPEN_TREE_CLONE).  We do not need to call dget(old_parent) because
         * we keep a reference to old_dentry.
         */
        old_parent = (old_dentry == mnt_dir.dentry) ? old_dentry :
                                                      old_dentry->d_parent;

        /* new_dir->dentry is equal to new_dentry->d_parent */
        allow_parent1 = collect_domain_accesses(subject->domain, mnt_dir.dentry,
                                                old_parent,
                                                &layer_masks_parent1);
        allow_parent2 = collect_domain_accesses(subject->domain, mnt_dir.dentry,
                                                new_dir->dentry,
                                                &layer_masks_parent2);

        if (allow_parent1 && allow_parent2)
                return 0;

        /*
         * To be able to compare source and destination domain access rights,
         * take into account the @old_dentry access rights aggregated with its
         * parent access rights.  This will be useful to compare with the
         * destination parent access rights.
         */
        if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(
                    subject->domain, &mnt_dir, access_request_parent1,
                    &layer_masks_parent1, &request1, old_dentry,
                    access_request_parent2, &layer_masks_parent2, &request2,
                    exchange ? new_dentry : NULL))
                return 0;

        if (request1.access) {
                request1.audit.u.path.dentry = old_parent;
                landlock_log_denial(subject, &request1);
        }
        if (request2.access) {
                request2.audit.u.path.dentry = new_dir->dentry;
                landlock_log_denial(subject, &request2);
        }

        /*
         * This prioritizes EACCES over EXDEV for all actions, including
         * renames with RENAME_EXCHANGE.
         */
        if (likely(is_eacces(&layer_masks_parent1, access_request_parent1) ||
                   is_eacces(&layer_masks_parent2, access_request_parent2)))
                return -EACCES;

        /*
         * Gracefully forbids reparenting if the destination directory
         * hierarchy is not a superset of restrictions of the source directory
         * hierarchy, or if LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER is not allowed by the
         * source or the destination.
         */
        return -EXDEV;
}

/* Inode hooks */

static void hook_inode_free_security_rcu(void *inode_security)
{
        struct landlock_inode_security *inode_sec;

        /*
         * All inodes must already have been untied from their object by
         * release_inode() or hook_sb_delete().
         */
        inode_sec = inode_security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
        WARN_ON_ONCE(inode_sec->object);
}

/* Super-block hooks */

/*
 * Release the inodes used in a security policy.
 *
 * Cf. fsnotify_unmount_inodes() and evict_inodes()
 */
static void hook_sb_delete(struct super_block *const sb)
{
        struct inode *inode, *prev_inode = NULL;

        if (!landlock_initialized)
                return;

        spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
        list_for_each_entry(inode, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) {
                struct landlock_object *object;

                /* Only handles referenced inodes. */
                if (!icount_read(inode))
                        continue;

                /*
                 * Protects against concurrent modification of inode (e.g.
                 * from get_inode_object()).
                 */
                spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
                /*
                 * Checks I_FREEING and I_WILL_FREE  to protect against a race
                 * condition when release_inode() just called iput(), which
                 * could lead to a NULL dereference of inode->security or a
                 * second call to iput() for the same Landlock object.  Also
                 * checks I_NEW because such inode cannot be tied to an object.
                 */
                if (inode_state_read(inode) &
                    (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE | I_NEW)) {
                        spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
                        continue;
                }

                rcu_read_lock();
                object = rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object);
                if (!object) {
                        rcu_read_unlock();
                        spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
                        continue;
                }
                /* Keeps a reference to this inode until the next loop walk. */
                __iget(inode);
                spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);

                /*
                 * If there is no concurrent release_inode() ongoing, then we
                 * are in charge of calling iput() on this inode, otherwise we
                 * will just wait for it to finish.
                 */
                spin_lock(&object->lock);
                if (object->underobj == inode) {
                        object->underobj = NULL;
                        spin_unlock(&object->lock);
                        rcu_read_unlock();

                        /*
                         * Because object->underobj was not NULL,
                         * release_inode() and get_inode_object() guarantee
                         * that it is safe to reset
                         * landlock_inode(inode)->object while it is not NULL.
                         * It is therefore not necessary to lock inode->i_lock.
                         */
                        rcu_assign_pointer(landlock_inode(inode)->object, NULL);
                        /*
                         * At this point, we own the ihold() reference that was
                         * originally set up by get_inode_object() and the
                         * __iget() reference that we just set in this loop
                         * walk.  Therefore there are at least two references
                         * on the inode.
                         */
                        iput_not_last(inode);
                } else {
                        spin_unlock(&object->lock);
                        rcu_read_unlock();
                }

                if (prev_inode) {
                        /*
                         * At this point, we still own the __iget() reference
                         * that we just set in this loop walk.  Therefore we
                         * can drop the list lock and know that the inode won't
                         * disappear from under us until the next loop walk.
                         */
                        spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
                        /*
                         * We can now actually put the inode reference from the
                         * previous loop walk, which is not needed anymore.
                         */
                        iput(prev_inode);
                        cond_resched();
                        spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
                }
                prev_inode = inode;
        }
        spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);

        /* Puts the inode reference from the last loop walk, if any. */
        if (prev_inode)
                iput(prev_inode);
        /* Waits for pending iput() in release_inode(). */
        wait_var_event(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs,
                       !atomic_long_read(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs));
}

static void
log_fs_change_topology_path(const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject,
                            size_t handle_layer, const struct path *const path)
{
        landlock_log_denial(subject, &(struct landlock_request) {
                .type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_CHANGE_TOPOLOGY,
                .audit = {
                        .type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH,
                        .u.path = *path,
                },
                .layer_plus_one = handle_layer + 1,
        });
}

static void log_fs_change_topology_dentry(
        const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject, size_t handle_layer,
        struct dentry *const dentry)
{
        landlock_log_denial(subject, &(struct landlock_request) {
                .type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_CHANGE_TOPOLOGY,
                .audit = {
                        .type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY,
                        .u.dentry = dentry,
                },
                .layer_plus_one = handle_layer + 1,
        });
}

/*
 * Because a Landlock security policy is defined according to the filesystem
 * topology (i.e. the mount namespace), changing it may grant access to files
 * not previously allowed.
 *
 * To make it simple, deny any filesystem topology modification by landlocked
 * processes.  Non-landlocked processes may still change the namespace of a
 * landlocked process, but this kind of threat must be handled by a system-wide
 * access-control security policy.
 *
 * This could be lifted in the future if Landlock can safely handle mount
 * namespace updates requested by a landlocked process.  Indeed, we could
 * update the current domain (which is currently read-only) by taking into
 * account the accesses of the source and the destination of a new mount point.
 * However, it would also require to make all the child domains dynamically
 * inherit these new constraints.  Anyway, for backward compatibility reasons,
 * a dedicated user space option would be required (e.g. as a ruleset flag).
 */
static int hook_sb_mount(const char *const dev_name,
                         const struct path *const path, const char *const type,
                         const unsigned long flags, void *const data)
{
        size_t handle_layer;
        const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
                landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), any_fs,
                                                &handle_layer);

        if (!subject)
                return 0;

        log_fs_change_topology_path(subject, handle_layer, path);
        return -EPERM;
}

static int hook_move_mount(const struct path *const from_path,
                           const struct path *const to_path)
{
        size_t handle_layer;
        const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
                landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), any_fs,
                                                &handle_layer);

        if (!subject)
                return 0;

        log_fs_change_topology_path(subject, handle_layer, to_path);
        return -EPERM;
}

/*
 * Removing a mount point may reveal a previously hidden file hierarchy, which
 * may then grant access to files, which may have previously been forbidden.
 */
static int hook_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *const mnt, const int flags)
{
        size_t handle_layer;
        const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
                landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), any_fs,
                                                &handle_layer);

        if (!subject)
                return 0;

        log_fs_change_topology_dentry(subject, handle_layer, mnt->mnt_root);
        return -EPERM;
}

static int hook_sb_remount(struct super_block *const sb, void *const mnt_opts)
{
        size_t handle_layer;
        const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
                landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), any_fs,
                                                &handle_layer);

        if (!subject)
                return 0;

        log_fs_change_topology_dentry(subject, handle_layer, sb->s_root);
        return -EPERM;
}

/*
 * pivot_root(2), like mount(2), changes the current mount namespace.  It must
 * then be forbidden for a landlocked process.
 *
 * However, chroot(2) may be allowed because it only changes the relative root
 * directory of the current process.  Moreover, it can be used to restrict the
 * view of the filesystem.
 */
static int hook_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *const old_path,
                             const struct path *const new_path)
{
        size_t handle_layer;
        const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
                landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), any_fs,
                                                &handle_layer);

        if (!subject)
                return 0;

        log_fs_change_topology_path(subject, handle_layer, new_path);
        return -EPERM;
}

/* Path hooks */

static int hook_path_link(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
                          const struct path *const new_dir,
                          struct dentry *const new_dentry)
{
        return current_check_refer_path(old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry, false,
                                        false);
}

static int hook_path_rename(const struct path *const old_dir,
                            struct dentry *const old_dentry,
                            const struct path *const new_dir,
                            struct dentry *const new_dentry,
                            const unsigned int flags)
{
        /* old_dir refers to old_dentry->d_parent and new_dir->mnt */
        return current_check_refer_path(old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry, true,
                                        !!(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE));
}

static int hook_path_mkdir(const struct path *const dir,
                           struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode)
{
        return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR);
}

static int hook_path_mknod(const struct path *const dir,
                           struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode,
                           const unsigned int dev)
{
        return current_check_access_path(dir, get_mode_access(mode));
}

static int hook_path_symlink(const struct path *const dir,
                             struct dentry *const dentry,
                             const char *const old_name)
{
        return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM);
}

static int hook_path_unlink(const struct path *const dir,
                            struct dentry *const dentry)
{
        return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE);
}

static int hook_path_rmdir(const struct path *const dir,
                           struct dentry *const dentry)
{
        return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR);
}

static int hook_path_truncate(const struct path *const path)
{
        return current_check_access_path(path, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
}

/* File hooks */

/**
 * get_required_file_open_access - Get access needed to open a file
 *
 * @file: File being opened.
 *
 * Returns the access rights that are required for opening the given file,
 * depending on the file type and open mode.
 */
static access_mask_t
get_required_file_open_access(const struct file *const file)
{
        access_mask_t access = 0;

        if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
                /* A directory can only be opened in read mode. */
                if (S_ISDIR(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
                        return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR;
                access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE;
        }
        if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
                access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE;
        /* __FMODE_EXEC is indeed part of f_flags, not f_mode. */
        if (file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC)
                access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE;
        return access;
}

static int hook_file_alloc_security(struct file *const file)
{
        /*
         * Grants all access rights, even if most of them are not checked later
         * on. It is more consistent.
         *
         * Notably, file descriptors for regular files can also be acquired
         * without going through the file_open hook, for example when using
         * memfd_create(2).
         */
        landlock_file(file)->allowed_access = LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS;
        return 0;
}

static bool is_device(const struct file *const file)
{
        const struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);

        return S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) || S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode);
}

static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
{
        struct layer_access_masks layer_masks = {};
        access_mask_t open_access_request, full_access_request, allowed_access,
                optional_access;
        const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
                landlock_get_applicable_subject(file->f_cred, any_fs, NULL);
        struct landlock_request request = {};

        if (!subject)
                return 0;

        /*
         * Because a file may be opened with O_PATH, get_required_file_open_access()
         * may return 0.  This case will be handled with a future Landlock
         * evolution.
         */
        open_access_request = get_required_file_open_access(file);

        /*
         * We look up more access than what we immediately need for open(), so
         * that we can later authorize operations on opened files.
         */
        optional_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
        if (is_device(file))
                optional_access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;

        full_access_request = open_access_request | optional_access;

        if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(
                    subject->domain, &file->f_path,
                    landlock_init_layer_masks(subject->domain,
                                              full_access_request, &layer_masks,
                                              LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE),
                    &layer_masks, &request, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
                allowed_access = full_access_request;
        } else {
                /*
                 * Calculate the actual allowed access rights from layer_masks.
                 * Remove the access rights from the full access request which
                 * are still unfulfilled in any of the layers.
                 */
                allowed_access = full_access_request;
                for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks.access); i++)
                        allowed_access &= ~layer_masks.access[i];
        }

        /*
         * For operations on already opened files (i.e. ftruncate()), it is the
         * access rights at the time of open() which decide whether the
         * operation is permitted. Therefore, we record the relevant subset of
         * file access rights in the opened struct file.
         */
        landlock_file(file)->allowed_access = allowed_access;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
        landlock_file(file)->deny_masks = landlock_get_deny_masks(
                _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL, optional_access, &layer_masks);
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */

        if (access_mask_subset(open_access_request, allowed_access))
                return 0;

        /* Sets access to reflect the actual request. */
        request.access = open_access_request;
        landlock_log_denial(subject, &request);
        return -EACCES;
}

static int hook_file_truncate(struct file *const file)
{
        /*
         * Allows truncation if the truncate right was available at the time of
         * opening the file, to get a consistent access check as for read, write
         * and execute operations.
         *
         * Note: For checks done based on the file's Landlock allowed access, we
         * enforce them independently of whether the current thread is in a
         * Landlock domain, so that open files passed between independent
         * processes retain their behaviour.
         */
        if (landlock_file(file)->allowed_access & LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
                return 0;

        landlock_log_denial(landlock_cred(file->f_cred), &(struct landlock_request) {
                .type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS,
                .audit = {
                        .type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE,
                        .u.file = file,
                },
                .all_existing_optional_access = _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
                .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
                .deny_masks = landlock_file(file)->deny_masks,
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
        });
        return -EACCES;
}

static int hook_file_ioctl_common(const struct file *const file,
                                  const unsigned int cmd, const bool is_compat)
{
        access_mask_t allowed_access = landlock_file(file)->allowed_access;

        /*
         * It is the access rights at the time of opening the file which
         * determine whether IOCTL can be used on the opened file later.
         *
         * The access right is attached to the opened file in hook_file_open().
         */
        if (allowed_access & LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)
                return 0;

        if (!is_device(file))
                return 0;

        if (unlikely(is_compat) ? is_masked_device_ioctl_compat(cmd) :
                                  is_masked_device_ioctl(cmd))
                return 0;

        landlock_log_denial(landlock_cred(file->f_cred), &(struct landlock_request) {
                .type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS,
                .audit = {
                        .type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP,
                        .u.op = &(struct lsm_ioctlop_audit) {
                                .path = file->f_path,
                                .cmd = cmd,
                        },
                },
                .all_existing_optional_access = _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
                .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV,
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
                .deny_masks = landlock_file(file)->deny_masks,
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
        });
        return -EACCES;
}

static int hook_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
                           unsigned long arg)
{
        return hook_file_ioctl_common(file, cmd, false);
}

static int hook_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
                                  unsigned long arg)
{
        return hook_file_ioctl_common(file, cmd, true);
}

/*
 * Always allow sending signals between threads of the same process.  This
 * ensures consistency with hook_task_kill().
 */
static bool control_current_fowner(struct fown_struct *const fown)
{
        struct task_struct *p;

        /*
         * Lock already held by __f_setown(), see commit 26f204380a3c ("fs: Fix
         * file_set_fowner LSM hook inconsistencies").
         */
        lockdep_assert_held(&fown->lock);

        /*
         * Some callers (e.g. fcntl_dirnotify) may not be in an RCU read-side
         * critical section.
         */
        guard(rcu)();
        p = pid_task(fown->pid, fown->pid_type);
        if (!p)
                return true;

        return !same_thread_group(p, current);
}

static void hook_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
{
        struct landlock_ruleset *prev_dom;
        struct landlock_cred_security fown_subject = {};
        size_t fown_layer = 0;

        if (control_current_fowner(file_f_owner(file))) {
                static const struct access_masks signal_scope = {
                        .scope = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
                };
                const struct landlock_cred_security *new_subject =
                        landlock_get_applicable_subject(
                                current_cred(), signal_scope, &fown_layer);
                if (new_subject) {
                        landlock_get_ruleset(new_subject->domain);
                        fown_subject = *new_subject;
                }
        }

        prev_dom = landlock_file(file)->fown_subject.domain;
        landlock_file(file)->fown_subject = fown_subject;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
        landlock_file(file)->fown_layer = fown_layer;
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT*/

        /* May be called in an RCU read-side critical section. */
        landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(prev_dom);
}

static void hook_file_free_security(struct file *file)
{
        landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(landlock_file(file)->fown_subject.domain);
}

static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security_rcu, hook_inode_free_security_rcu),

        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_delete, hook_sb_delete),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, hook_sb_mount),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, hook_move_mount),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, hook_sb_umount),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, hook_sb_remount),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, hook_sb_pivotroot),

        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, hook_path_link),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, hook_path_rename),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, hook_path_mkdir),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, hook_path_mknod),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, hook_path_symlink),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, hook_path_unlink),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, hook_path_rmdir),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, hook_path_truncate),

        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, hook_file_alloc_security),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, hook_file_open),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_truncate, hook_file_truncate),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, hook_file_ioctl),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl_compat, hook_file_ioctl_compat),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, hook_file_set_fowner),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, hook_file_free_security),
};

__init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void)
{
        security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
                           &landlock_lsmid);
}

#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST

/* clang-format off */
static struct kunit_case test_cases[] = {
        KUNIT_CASE(test_no_more_access),
        KUNIT_CASE(test_scope_to_request_with_exec_none),
        KUNIT_CASE(test_scope_to_request_with_exec_some),
        KUNIT_CASE(test_scope_to_request_without_access),
        KUNIT_CASE(test_is_eacces_with_none),
        KUNIT_CASE(test_is_eacces_with_refer),
        KUNIT_CASE(test_is_eacces_with_write),
        {}
};
/* clang-format on */

static struct kunit_suite test_suite = {
        .name = "landlock_fs",
        .test_cases = test_cases,
};

kunit_test_suite(test_suite);

#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */