root/usr.bin/ssh/auth2-pubkey.c
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.126 2026/04/02 07:48:13 djm Exp $ */
/*
 * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
 * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */


#include <sys/types.h>

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <paths.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <glob.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>

#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "channels.h" /* XXX for session.h */
#include "session.h" /* XXX for child_set_env(); refactor? */
#include "sk-api.h"

/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_pubkey;

static char *
format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
{
        char *ret, *fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
            options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);

        xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s", sshkey_type(key), fp);
        free(fp);
        return ret;
}

static int
userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
{
        Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
        struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
        struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
        struct sshkey *key = NULL, *hostkey = NULL;
        char *pkalg = NULL, *userstyle = NULL, *key_s = NULL, *ca_s = NULL;
        u_char *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL, have_sig;
        size_t blen, slen;
        int hostbound, r, pktype;
        int req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, authenticated = 0;
        struct sshauthopt *authopts = NULL;
        struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;

        hostbound = strcmp(method, "publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com") == 0;

        if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &have_sig)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0)
                fatal_fr(r, "parse %s packet", method);

        /* hostbound auth includes the hostkey offered at initial KEX */
        if (hostbound) {
                if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &b)) != 0 ||
                    (r = sshkey_fromb(b, &hostkey)) != 0)
                        fatal_fr(r, "parse %s hostkey", method);
                if (ssh->kex->initial_hostkey == NULL)
                        fatal_f("internal error: initial hostkey not recorded");
                if (!sshkey_equal(hostkey, ssh->kex->initial_hostkey))
                        fatal_f("%s packet contained wrong host key", method);
                sshbuf_free(b);
                b = NULL;
        }

        if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2) {
                char *keystring;
                struct sshbuf *pkbuf;

                if ((pkbuf = sshbuf_from(pkblob, blen)) == NULL)
                        fatal_f("sshbuf_from failed");
                if ((keystring = sshbuf_dtob64_string(pkbuf, 0)) == NULL)
                        fatal_f("sshbuf_dtob64 failed");
                debug2_f("%s user %s %s public key %s %s",
                    authctxt->valid ? "valid" : "invalid", authctxt->user,
                    have_sig ? "attempting" : "querying", pkalg, keystring);
                sshbuf_free(pkbuf);
                free(keystring);
        }

        pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg);
        if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
                /* this is perfectly legal */
                verbose_f("unsupported public key algorithm: %s", pkalg);
                goto done;
        }
        if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
                error_fr(r, "parse key");
                goto done;
        }
        if (key == NULL) {
                error_f("cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
                goto done;
        }
        if (key->type != pktype || (sshkey_type_plain(pktype) == KEY_ECDSA &&
            sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(pkalg) != key->ecdsa_nid)) {
                error_f("key type mismatch for decoded key "
                    "(received %s, expected %s)", sshkey_ssh_name(key), pkalg);
                goto done;
        }
        if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key)) {
                logit("refusing previously-used %s key", sshkey_type(key));
                goto done;
        }
        if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) != 1) {
                logit_f("signature algorithm %s not in "
                    "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms", pkalg);
                goto done;
        }
        if ((r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key,
            options.ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) {
                logit_fr(r, "certificate signature algorithm %s",
                    (key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL) ?
                    "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type);
                goto done;
        }
        if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key,
            options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
                logit_r(r, "refusing %s key", sshkey_type(key));
                goto done;
        }
        key_s = format_key(key);
        if (sshkey_is_cert(key))
                ca_s = format_key(key->cert->signature_key);

        if (have_sig) {
                debug3_f("%s have %s signature for %s%s%s",
                    method, pkalg, key_s,
                    ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ", ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s);
                if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0 ||
                    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
                        fatal_fr(r, "parse signature packet");
                if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
                        fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
                if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
                        if ((r = sshbuf_putb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0)
                                fatal_fr(r, "put old session id");
                } else {
                        if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b,
                            ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0)
                                fatal_fr(r, "put session id");
                }
                if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
                        debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
                        goto done;
                }
                /* reconstruct packet */
                xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
                    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
                    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
                if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
                    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 ||
                    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
                    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, method)) != 0 ||
                    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_sig)) != 0 ||
                    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg)) != 0 ||
                    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
                        fatal_fr(r, "reconstruct %s packet", method);
                if (hostbound &&
                    (r = sshkey_puts(ssh->kex->initial_hostkey, b)) != 0)
                        fatal_fr(r, "reconstruct %s packet", method);
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
                sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
                /* test for correct signature */
                authenticated = 0;
                if (mm_user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts) &&
                    mm_sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
                    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b),
                    (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL,
                    ssh->compat, &sig_details) == 0) {
                        authenticated = 1;
                }
                if (authenticated == 1 && sig_details != NULL) {
                        auth2_record_info(authctxt, "signature count = %u",
                            sig_details->sk_counter);
                        debug_f("sk_counter = %u, sk_flags = 0x%02x",
                            sig_details->sk_counter, sig_details->sk_flags);
                        req_presence = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
                            PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) ||
                            !authopts->no_require_user_presence;
                        if (req_presence && (sig_details->sk_flags &
                            SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) == 0) {
                                error("public key %s signature for %s%s from "
                                    "%.128s port %d rejected: user presence "
                                    "(authenticator touch) requirement "
                                    "not met ", key_s,
                                    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
                                    authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
                                    ssh_remote_port(ssh));
                                authenticated = 0;
                                goto done;
                        }
                        req_verify = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
                            PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED) ||
                            authopts->require_verify;
                        if (req_verify && (sig_details->sk_flags &
                            SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD) == 0) {
                                error("public key %s signature for %s%s from "
                                    "%.128s port %d rejected: user "
                                    "verification requirement not met ", key_s,
                                    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
                                    authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
                                    ssh_remote_port(ssh));
                                authenticated = 0;
                                goto done;
                        }
                }
                auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key);
        } else {
                debug_f("%s test pkalg %s pkblob %s%s%s", method, pkalg, key_s,
                    ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ", ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s);

                if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
                        fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");

                if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
                        debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
                        goto done;
                }
                /* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
                /*
                 * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
                 * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
                 * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
                 * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
                 * issue? -markus
                 */
                if (mm_user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 0, NULL)) {
                        if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK))
                            != 0 ||
                            (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, pkalg)) != 0 ||
                            (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkblob, blen)) != 0 ||
                            (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
                            (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
                                fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
                        authctxt->postponed = 1;
                }
        }
done:
        if (authenticated == 1 && auth_activate_options(ssh, authopts) != 0) {
                debug_f("key options inconsistent with existing");
                authenticated = 0;
        }
        debug2_f("authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg);

        sshbuf_free(b);
        sshauthopt_free(authopts);
        sshkey_free(key);
        sshkey_free(hostkey);
        free(userstyle);
        free(pkalg);
        free(pkblob);
        free(key_s);
        free(ca_s);
        free(sig);
        sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
        return authenticated;
}

static int
match_principals_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
    struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
        FILE *f;
        int r, success = 0;
        size_t i;
        glob_t gl;
        struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;

        if (authoptsp != NULL)
                *authoptsp = NULL;

        temporarily_use_uid(pw);
        r = glob(file, 0, NULL, &gl);
        restore_uid();
        if (r != 0) {
                if (r != GLOB_NOMATCH) {
                        logit_f("glob \"%s\" failed", file);
                }
                return 0;
        } else if (gl.gl_pathc > INT_MAX) {
                fatal_f("too many glob results for \"%s\"", file);
        } else if (gl.gl_pathc > 1) {
                debug2_f("glob \"%s\" returned %zu matches", file,
                    gl.gl_pathc);
        }
        for (i = 0; !success && i < gl.gl_pathc; i++) {
                temporarily_use_uid(pw);
                debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file);
                if ((f = auth_openprincipals(gl.gl_pathv[i], pw,
                    options.strict_modes)) == NULL) {
                        restore_uid();
                        continue;
                }
                success = auth_process_principals(f, gl.gl_pathv[i],
                    cert, &opts);
                fclose(f);
                restore_uid();
                if (!success) {
                        sshauthopt_free(opts);
                        opts = NULL;
                }
        }
        globfree(&gl);
        if (success && authoptsp != NULL) {
                *authoptsp = opts;
                opts = NULL;
        }
        sshauthopt_free(opts);
        return success;
}

/*
 * Checks whether principal is allowed in output of command.
 * returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise.
 */
static int
match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key,
    const char *conn_id, const char *rdomain, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
        struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL;
        const struct sshkey_cert *cert = key->cert;
        FILE *f = NULL;
        int r, ok, found_principal = 0;
        int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0;
        pid_t pid;
        char *tmp, *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
        char *ca_fp = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *catext = NULL, *keytext = NULL;
        char serial_s[32], uidstr[32];
        void (*osigchld)(int);

        if (authoptsp != NULL)
                *authoptsp = NULL;
        if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL)
                return 0;
        if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) {
                error("No user for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand specified, "
                    "skipping");
                return 0;
        }

        /*
         * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
         * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
         */
        osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);

        /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
        username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user,
            "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
        runas_pw = getpwnam(username);
        if (runas_pw == NULL) {
                error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
                    username, strerror(errno));
                goto out;
        }

        /* Turn the command into an argument vector */
        if (argv_split(options.authorized_principals_command,
            &ac, &av, 0) != 0) {
                error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains "
                    "invalid quotes", options.authorized_principals_command);
                goto out;
        }
        if (ac == 0) {
                error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
                    options.authorized_principals_command);
                goto out;
        }
        if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(cert->signature_key,
            options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
                error_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
                goto out;
        }
        if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
            options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
                error_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
                goto out;
        }
        if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(cert->signature_key, &catext)) != 0) {
                error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_base64 failed");
                goto out;
        }
        if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
                error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_base64 failed");
                goto out;
        }
        snprintf(serial_s, sizeof(serial_s), "%llu",
            (unsigned long long)cert->serial);
        snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
            (unsigned long long)user_pw->pw_uid);
        for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
                tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
                    "C", conn_id,
                    "D", rdomain,
                    "U", uidstr,
                    "u", user_pw->pw_name,
                    "h", user_pw->pw_dir,
                    "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
                    "T", sshkey_ssh_name(cert->signature_key),
                    "f", key_fp,
                    "F", ca_fp,
                    "k", keytext,
                    "K", catext,
                    "i", cert->key_id,
                    "s", serial_s,
                    (char *)NULL);
                if (tmp == NULL)
                        fatal_f("percent_expand failed");
                free(av[i]);
                av[i] = tmp;
        }
        /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
        command = argv_assemble(ac, av);

        if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command,
            ac, av, &f,
            SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
            runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
                goto out;

        uid_swapped = 1;
        temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw);

        ok = auth_process_principals(f, "(command)", cert, authoptsp);

        fclose(f);
        f = NULL;

        if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command, 0) != 0)
                goto out;

        /* Read completed successfully */
        found_principal = ok;
 out:
        if (f != NULL)
                fclose(f);
        ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
        for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
                free(av[i]);
        free(av);
        if (uid_swapped)
                restore_uid();
        free(command);
        free(username);
        free(ca_fp);
        free(key_fp);
        free(catext);
        free(keytext);
        return found_principal;
}

/* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */
static int
user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
    const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host,
    const char *conn_id, const char *rdomain, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
        char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
        const char *reason;
        struct sshauthopt *principals_opts = NULL, *cert_opts = NULL;
        struct sshauthopt *final_opts = NULL;
        int r, ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals;

        if (authoptsp != NULL)
                *authoptsp = NULL;

        if (!sshkey_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
                return 0;

        if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
            options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
                return 0;

        if ((r = sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
            options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0)) != 0) {
                debug2_fr(r, "CA %s %s is not listed in %s",
                    sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
                    options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
                goto out;
        }
        /*
         * If AuthorizedPrincipals is in use, then compare the certificate
         * principals against the names in that file rather than matching
         * against the username.
         */
        if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) {
                if (match_principals_file(pw, principals_file,
                    key->cert, &principals_opts))
                        found_principal = 1;
        }
        /* Try querying command if specified */
        if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(pw, key,
            conn_id, rdomain, &principals_opts))
                found_principal = 1;
        /* If principals file or command is specified, then require a match */
        use_authorized_principals = principals_file != NULL ||
            options.authorized_principals_command != NULL;
        if (!found_principal && use_authorized_principals) {
                reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal";
                goto fail_reason;
        }
        if (use_authorized_principals && principals_opts == NULL)
                fatal_f("internal error: missing principals_opts");
        if (sshkey_cert_check_authority_now(key, 0, 0,
            use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0)
                goto fail_reason;

        /* Check authority from options in key and from principals file/cmd */
        if ((cert_opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(key)) == NULL) {
                reason = "Invalid certificate options";
                goto fail_reason;
        }
        if (auth_authorise_keyopts(pw, cert_opts, 0,
            remote_ip, remote_host, "cert") != 0) {
                reason = "Refused by certificate options";
                goto fail_reason;
        }
        if (principals_opts == NULL) {
                final_opts = cert_opts;
                cert_opts = NULL;
        } else {
                if (auth_authorise_keyopts(pw, principals_opts, 0,
                    remote_ip, remote_host, "principals") != 0) {
                        reason = "Refused by certificate principals options";
                        goto fail_reason;
                }
                if ((final_opts = sshauthopt_merge(principals_opts,
                    cert_opts, &reason)) == NULL) {
 fail_reason:
                        error("Refusing certificate ID \"%s\" serial=%llu "
                            "signed by %s CA %s: %s", key->cert->key_id,
                            (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
                            sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
                            reason);
                        auth_debug_add("Refused Certificate ID \"%s\" "
                            "serial=%llu: %s", key->cert->key_id,
                            (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, reason);
                        goto out;
                }
        }

        /* Success */
        verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) signed by "
            "%s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
            (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
            sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
            options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
        if (authoptsp != NULL) {
                *authoptsp = final_opts;
                final_opts = NULL;
        }
        ret = 1;
 out:
        sshauthopt_free(principals_opts);
        sshauthopt_free(cert_opts);
        sshauthopt_free(final_opts);
        free(principals_file);
        free(ca_fp);
        return ret;
}

/*
 * Checks whether key is allowed in file.
 * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
 */
static int
user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
    char *file, const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host,
    struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
        FILE *f;
        int found_key = 0;

        if (authoptsp != NULL)
                *authoptsp = NULL;

        /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
        temporarily_use_uid(pw);

        debug("trying public key file %s", file);
        if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) {
                found_key = auth_check_authkeys_file(pw, f, file,
                    key, remote_ip, remote_host, authoptsp);
                fclose(f);
        }

        restore_uid();
        return found_key;
}

/*
 * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command.
 * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
 */
static int
user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key,
    const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host,
    const char *conn_id, const char *rdomain, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
        struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL;
        FILE *f = NULL;
        int r, ok, found_key = 0;
        int i, uid_swapped = 0, ac = 0;
        pid_t pid;
        char *username = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL;
        char uidstr[32], *tmp, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
        void (*osigchld)(int);

        if (authoptsp != NULL)
                *authoptsp = NULL;
        if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL)
                return 0;
        if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
                error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping");
                return 0;
        }

        /*
         * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
         * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
         */
        osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);

        /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
        username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user,
            "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
        runas_pw = getpwnam(username);
        if (runas_pw == NULL) {
                error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
                    username, strerror(errno));
                goto out;
        }

        /* Prepare AuthorizedKeysCommand */
        if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
            SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
                error_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
                goto out;
        }
        if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
                error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_base64 failed");
                goto out;
        }

        /* Turn the command into an argument vector */
        if (argv_split(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av, 0) != 0) {
                error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes",
                    options.authorized_keys_command);
                goto out;
        }
        if (ac == 0) {
                error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
                    options.authorized_keys_command);
                goto out;
        }
        snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
            (unsigned long long)user_pw->pw_uid);
        for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
                tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
                    "C", conn_id,
                    "D", rdomain,
                    "U", uidstr,
                    "u", user_pw->pw_name,
                    "h", user_pw->pw_dir,
                    "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
                    "f", key_fp,
                    "k", keytext,
                    (char *)NULL);
                if (tmp == NULL)
                        fatal_f("percent_expand failed");
                free(av[i]);
                av[i] = tmp;
        }
        /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
        command = argv_assemble(ac, av);

        /*
         * If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments
         * then fall back to the old behaviour of passing the
         * target username as a single argument.
         */
        if (ac == 1) {
                av = xreallocarray(av, ac + 2, sizeof(*av));
                av[1] = xstrdup(user_pw->pw_name);
                av[2] = NULL;
                /* Fix up command too, since it is used in log messages */
                free(command);
                xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]);
        }

        if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", command,
            ac, av, &f,
            SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
            runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
                goto out;

        uid_swapped = 1;
        temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw);

        ok = auth_check_authkeys_file(user_pw, f,
            options.authorized_keys_command, key, remote_ip,
            remote_host, authoptsp);

        fclose(f);
        f = NULL;

        if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command, 0) != 0)
                goto out;

        /* Read completed successfully */
        found_key = ok;
 out:
        if (f != NULL)
                fclose(f);
        ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
        for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
                free(av[i]);
        free(av);
        if (uid_swapped)
                restore_uid();
        free(command);
        free(username);
        free(key_fp);
        free(keytext);
        return found_key;
}

/*
 * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user.
 */
int
user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
    int auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
        u_int success = 0, i, j;
        char *file = NULL, *conn_id;
        struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
        const char *rdomain, *remote_ip, *remote_host;

        if (authoptsp != NULL)
                *authoptsp = NULL;

        if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
                return 0;
        if (sshkey_is_cert(key) &&
            auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))
                return 0;

        if ((rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL)
                rdomain = "";
        remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
        remote_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
        xasprintf(&conn_id, "%s %d %s %d",
            ssh_local_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_local_port(ssh),
            remote_ip, ssh_remote_port(ssh));

        for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
                int r;
                glob_t gl;

                if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
                        continue;
                file = expand_authorized_keys(
                    options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
                temporarily_use_uid(pw);
                r = glob(file, 0, NULL, &gl);
                restore_uid();
                if (r != 0) {
                        if (r != GLOB_NOMATCH) {
                                logit_f("glob \"%s\" failed", file);
                        }
                        free(file);
                        file = NULL;
                        continue;
                } else if (gl.gl_pathc > INT_MAX) {
                        fatal_f("too many glob results for \"%s\"", file);
                } else if (gl.gl_pathc > 1) {
                        debug2_f("glob \"%s\" returned %zu matches", file,
                            gl.gl_pathc);
                }
                for (j = 0; !success && j < gl.gl_pathc; j++) {
                        success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, gl.gl_pathv[j],
                            remote_ip, remote_host, &opts);
                        if (!success) {
                                sshauthopt_free(opts);
                                opts = NULL;
                        }
                }
                free(file);
                file = NULL;
                globfree(&gl);
        }
        if (success)
                goto out;

        if ((success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key, remote_ip, remote_host,
            conn_id, rdomain, &opts)) != 0)
                goto out;
        sshauthopt_free(opts);
        opts = NULL;

        if ((success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key, remote_ip,
            remote_host, conn_id, rdomain, &opts)) != 0)
                goto out;
        sshauthopt_free(opts);
        opts = NULL;

 out:
        free(conn_id);
        if (success && authoptsp != NULL) {
                *authoptsp = opts;
                opts = NULL;
        }
        sshauthopt_free(opts);
        return success;
}

Authmethod method_pubkey = {
        &methodcfg_pubkey,
        userauth_pubkey,
};