root/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
 * Copyright (C) 2019 Microsoft Corporation.
 *
 * Author:  Jaskaran Singh Khurana <jaskarankhurana@linux.microsoft.com>
 *
 */
#include <linux/device-mapper.h>
#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include "dm-verity.h"
#include "dm-verity-verify-sig.h"

#define DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ERR(s) DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION " " s

static struct key *dm_verity_keyring;

static bool dm_verity_keyring_unsealed __ro_after_init;
module_param_named(keyring_unsealed, dm_verity_keyring_unsealed, bool, 0444);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(keyring_unsealed, "Leave the dm-verity keyring unsealed");

static bool require_signatures;
module_param(require_signatures, bool, 0444);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(require_signatures,
                "Verify the roothash of dm-verity hash tree");

#define DM_VERITY_IS_SIG_FORCE_ENABLED() \
        (require_signatures != false)

bool verity_verify_is_sig_opt_arg(const char *arg_name)
{
        return (!strcasecmp(arg_name,
                            DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPT_SIG_KEY));
}

static int verity_verify_get_sig_from_key(const char *key_desc,
                                        struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts)
{
        struct key *key;
        const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
        int ret = 0;

        key = request_key(&key_type_user,
                        key_desc, NULL);
        if (IS_ERR(key))
                return PTR_ERR(key);

        down_read(&key->sem);

        ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key);
        if (!ukp) {
                ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
                goto end;
        }

        sig_opts->sig = kmalloc(ukp->datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
        if (!sig_opts->sig) {
                ret = -ENOMEM;
                goto end;
        }
        sig_opts->sig_size = ukp->datalen;

        memcpy(sig_opts->sig, ukp->data, sig_opts->sig_size);

end:
        up_read(&key->sem);
        key_put(key);

        return ret;
}

int verity_verify_sig_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as,
                                     struct dm_verity *v,
                                     struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts,
                                     unsigned int *argc,
                                     const char *arg_name)
{
        struct dm_target *ti = v->ti;
        int ret;
        const char *sig_key = NULL;

        if (v->signature_key_desc) {
                ti->error = DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ERR("root_hash_sig_key_desc already specified");
                return -EINVAL;
        }

        if (!*argc) {
                ti->error = DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ERR("Signature key not specified");
                return -EINVAL;
        }

        sig_key = dm_shift_arg(as);
        (*argc)--;

        ret = verity_verify_get_sig_from_key(sig_key, sig_opts);
        if (ret < 0) {
                ti->error = DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ERR("Invalid key specified");
                return ret;
        }

        v->signature_key_desc = kstrdup(sig_key, GFP_KERNEL);
        if (!v->signature_key_desc) {
                ti->error = DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ERR("Could not allocate memory for signature key");
                return -ENOMEM;
        }

        return 0;
}

/*
 * verify_verify_roothash - Verify the root hash of the verity hash device
 *                           using builtin trusted keys.
 *
 * @root_hash: For verity, the roothash/data to be verified.
 * @root_hash_len: Size of the roothash/data to be verified.
 * @sig_data: The trusted signature that verifies the roothash/data.
 * @sig_len: Size of the signature.
 *
 */
int verity_verify_root_hash(const void *root_hash, size_t root_hash_len,
                            const void *sig_data, size_t sig_len)
{
        int ret;

        if (!root_hash || root_hash_len == 0)
                return -EINVAL;

        if (!sig_data  || sig_len == 0) {
                if (DM_VERITY_IS_SIG_FORCE_ENABLED())
                        return -ENOKEY;
                else
                        return 0;
        }

        ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(root_hash, root_hash_len, sig_data,
                                sig_len,
#ifdef CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRING
                                VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
#else
                                NULL,
#endif
                                VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL);
#ifdef CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_PLATFORM_KEYRING
        if (ret == -ENOKEY || ret == -EKEYREJECTED)
                ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(root_hash, root_hash_len, sig_data,
                                        sig_len,
                                        VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
                                        VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL);
#endif

        if (ret != -ENOKEY && ret != -EKEYREJECTED)
                return ret;

        if (dm_verity_keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree &&
            dm_verity_keyring->restrict_link)
                ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(root_hash, root_hash_len,
                                             sig_data, sig_len,
                                             dm_verity_keyring,
                                             VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
                                             NULL, NULL);

        return ret;
}

void verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts)
{
        kfree(sig_opts->sig);
        sig_opts->sig = NULL;
        sig_opts->sig_size = 0;
}

int __init dm_verity_verify_sig_init(void)
{
        dm_verity_keyring = keyring_alloc(".dm-verity",
                                          GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
                                          current_cred(),
                                          KEY_POS_SEARCH |
                                          KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
                                          KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH |
                                          KEY_USR_SETATTR,
                                          KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
                                          NULL, NULL);
        if (IS_ERR(dm_verity_keyring))
                panic("dm-verity can't allocate keyring\n");

        if (!dm_verity_keyring_unsealed &&
            keyring_restrict(make_key_ref(dm_verity_keyring, true), NULL, NULL))
                panic("dm-verity can't seal keyring\n");

        return 0;
}

void dm_verity_verify_sig_exit(void)
{
        key_revoke(dm_verity_keyring);
        key_put(dm_verity_keyring);
}