root/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
 * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
 *
 * Macros and functions to access KVM PTEs (also known as SPTEs)
 *
 * Copyright (C) 2006 Qumranet, Inc.
 * Copyright 2020 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
 */
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt

#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
#include "mmu.h"
#include "mmu_internal.h"
#include "x86.h"
#include "spte.h"

#include <asm/e820/api.h>
#include <asm/memtype.h>
#include <asm/vmx.h>

bool __read_mostly enable_mmio_caching = true;
static bool __ro_after_init allow_mmio_caching;
module_param_named(mmio_caching, enable_mmio_caching, bool, 0444);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_INTERNAL(enable_mmio_caching);

bool __read_mostly kvm_ad_enabled;

u64 __read_mostly shadow_host_writable_mask;
u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmu_writable_mask;
u64 __read_mostly shadow_nx_mask;
u64 __read_mostly shadow_x_mask; /* mutual exclusive with nx_mask */
u64 __read_mostly shadow_user_mask;
u64 __read_mostly shadow_accessed_mask;
u64 __read_mostly shadow_dirty_mask;
u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_value;
u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_mask;
u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_access_mask;
u64 __read_mostly shadow_present_mask;
u64 __read_mostly shadow_me_value;
u64 __read_mostly shadow_me_mask;
u64 __read_mostly shadow_acc_track_mask;

u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask;
u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask;

static u8 __init kvm_get_host_maxphyaddr(void)
{
        /*
         * boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits is reduced when MKTME or SME are detected
         * in CPU detection code, but the processor treats those reduced bits as
         * 'keyID' thus they are not reserved bits. Therefore KVM needs to look at
         * the physical address bits reported by CPUID, i.e. the raw MAXPHYADDR,
         * when reasoning about CPU behavior with respect to MAXPHYADDR.
         */
        if (likely(boot_cpu_data.extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000008))
                return cpuid_eax(0x80000008) & 0xff;

        /*
         * Quite weird to have VMX or SVM but not MAXPHYADDR; probably a VM with
         * custom CPUID.  Proceed with whatever the kernel found since these features
         * aren't virtualizable (SME/SEV also require CPUIDs higher than 0x80000008).
         */
        return boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits;
}

void __init kvm_mmu_spte_module_init(void)
{
        /*
         * Snapshot userspace's desire to allow MMIO caching.  Whether or not
         * KVM can actually enable MMIO caching depends on vendor-specific
         * hardware capabilities and other module params that can't be resolved
         * until the vendor module is loaded, i.e. enable_mmio_caching can and
         * will change when the vendor module is (re)loaded.
         */
        allow_mmio_caching = enable_mmio_caching;

        kvm_host.maxphyaddr = kvm_get_host_maxphyaddr();
}

static u64 generation_mmio_spte_mask(u64 gen)
{
        u64 mask;

        WARN_ON_ONCE(gen & ~MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK);

        mask = (gen << MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_SHIFT) & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK;
        mask |= (gen << MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_SHIFT) & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK;
        return mask;
}

u64 make_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gfn, unsigned int access)
{
        u64 gen = kvm_vcpu_memslots(vcpu)->generation & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK;
        u64 spte = generation_mmio_spte_mask(gen);
        u64 gpa = gfn << PAGE_SHIFT;

        access &= shadow_mmio_access_mask;
        spte |= vcpu->kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value | access;
        spte |= gpa | shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask;
        spte |= (gpa & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask)
                << SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN;

        return spte;
}

static bool __kvm_is_mmio_pfn(kvm_pfn_t pfn)
{
        if (pfn_valid(pfn))
                return !is_zero_pfn(pfn) && PageReserved(pfn_to_page(pfn)) &&
                        /*
                         * Some reserved pages, such as those from NVDIMM
                         * DAX devices, are not for MMIO, and can be mapped
                         * with cached memory type for better performance.
                         * However, the above check misconceives those pages
                         * as MMIO, and results in KVM mapping them with UC
                         * memory type, which would hurt the performance.
                         * Therefore, we check the host memory type in addition
                         * and only treat UC/UC-/WC pages as MMIO.
                         */
                        (!pat_enabled() || pat_pfn_immune_to_uc_mtrr(pfn));

        return !e820__mapped_raw_any(pfn_to_hpa(pfn),
                                     pfn_to_hpa(pfn + 1) - 1,
                                     E820_TYPE_RAM);
}

static bool kvm_is_mmio_pfn(kvm_pfn_t pfn, int *is_host_mmio)
{
        /*
         * Determining if a PFN is host MMIO is relative expensive.  Cache the
         * result locally (in the sole caller) to avoid doing the full query
         * multiple times when creating a single SPTE.
         */
        if (*is_host_mmio < 0)
                *is_host_mmio = __kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn);

        return *is_host_mmio;
}

static void kvm_track_host_mmio_mapping(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct kvm_mmu_page *root = root_to_sp(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa);

        if (root)
                WRITE_ONCE(root->has_mapped_host_mmio, true);
        else
                WRITE_ONCE(vcpu->kvm->arch.has_mapped_host_mmio, true);

        /*
         * Force vCPUs to exit and flush CPU buffers if the vCPU is using the
         * affected root(s).
         */
        kvm_make_all_cpus_request(vcpu->kvm, KVM_REQ_OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE);
}

/*
 * Returns true if the SPTE needs to be updated atomically due to having bits
 * that may be changed without holding mmu_lock, and for which KVM must not
 * lose information.  E.g. KVM must not drop Dirty bit information.  The caller
 * is responsible for checking if the SPTE is shadow-present, and for
 * determining whether or not the caller cares about non-leaf SPTEs.
 */
bool spte_needs_atomic_update(u64 spte)
{
        /* SPTEs can be made Writable bit by KVM's fast page fault handler. */
        if (!is_writable_pte(spte) && is_mmu_writable_spte(spte))
                return true;

        /*
         * A/D-disabled SPTEs can be access-tracked by aging, and access-tracked
         * SPTEs can be restored by KVM's fast page fault handler.
         */
        if (!spte_ad_enabled(spte))
                return true;

        /*
         * Dirty and Accessed bits can be set by the CPU.  Ignore the Accessed
         * bit, as KVM tolerates false negatives/positives, e.g. KVM doesn't
         * invalidate TLBs when aging SPTEs, and so it's safe to clobber the
         * Accessed bit (and rare in practice).
         */
        return is_writable_pte(spte) && !(spte & shadow_dirty_mask);
}

bool make_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
               const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
               unsigned int pte_access, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
               u64 old_spte, bool prefetch, bool synchronizing,
               bool host_writable, u64 *new_spte)
{
        int level = sp->role.level;
        u64 spte = SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK;
        int is_host_mmio = -1;
        bool wrprot = false;

        /*
         * For the EPT case, shadow_present_mask has no RWX bits set if
         * exec-only page table entries are supported.  In that case,
         * ACC_USER_MASK and shadow_user_mask are used to represent
         * read access.  See FNAME(gpte_access) in paging_tmpl.h.
         */
        WARN_ON_ONCE((pte_access | shadow_present_mask) == SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);

        if (sp->role.ad_disabled)
                spte |= SPTE_TDP_AD_DISABLED;
        else if (kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(vcpu->kvm, sp))
                spte |= SPTE_TDP_AD_WRPROT_ONLY;

        spte |= shadow_present_mask;
        if (!prefetch || synchronizing)
                spte |= shadow_accessed_mask;

        /*
         * For simplicity, enforce the NX huge page mitigation even if not
         * strictly necessary.  KVM could ignore the mitigation if paging is
         * disabled in the guest, as the guest doesn't have any page tables to
         * abuse.  But to safely ignore the mitigation, KVM would have to
         * ensure a new MMU is loaded (or all shadow pages zapped) when CR0.PG
         * is toggled on, and that's a net negative for performance when TDP is
         * enabled.  When TDP is disabled, KVM will always switch to a new MMU
         * when CR0.PG is toggled, but leveraging that to ignore the mitigation
         * would tie make_spte() further to vCPU/MMU state, and add complexity
         * just to optimize a mode that is anything but performance critical.
         */
        if (level > PG_LEVEL_4K && (pte_access & ACC_EXEC_MASK) &&
            is_nx_huge_page_enabled(vcpu->kvm)) {
                pte_access &= ~ACC_EXEC_MASK;
        }

        if (pte_access & ACC_EXEC_MASK)
                spte |= shadow_x_mask;
        else
                spte |= shadow_nx_mask;

        if (pte_access & ACC_USER_MASK)
                spte |= shadow_user_mask;

        if (level > PG_LEVEL_4K)
                spte |= PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK;

        if (kvm_x86_ops.get_mt_mask)
                spte |= kvm_x86_call(get_mt_mask)(vcpu, gfn,
                                                  kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn, &is_host_mmio));
        if (host_writable)
                spte |= shadow_host_writable_mask;
        else
                pte_access &= ~ACC_WRITE_MASK;

        if (shadow_me_value && !kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn, &is_host_mmio))
                spte |= shadow_me_value;

        spte |= (u64)pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;

        if (pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK) {
                /*
                 * Unsync shadow pages that are reachable by the new, writable
                 * SPTE.  Write-protect the SPTE if the page can't be unsync'd,
                 * e.g. it's write-tracked (upper-level SPs) or has one or more
                 * shadow pages and unsync'ing pages is not allowed.
                 *
                 * When overwriting an existing leaf SPTE, and the old SPTE was
                 * writable, skip trying to unsync shadow pages as any relevant
                 * shadow pages must already be unsync, i.e. the hash lookup is
                 * unnecessary (and expensive).  Note, this relies on KVM not
                 * changing PFNs without first zapping the old SPTE, which is
                 * guaranteed by both the shadow MMU and the TDP MMU.
                 */
                if ((!is_last_spte(old_spte, level) || !is_writable_pte(old_spte)) &&
                    mmu_try_to_unsync_pages(vcpu->kvm, slot, gfn, synchronizing, prefetch))
                        wrprot = true;
                else
                        spte |= PT_WRITABLE_MASK | shadow_mmu_writable_mask |
                                shadow_dirty_mask;
        }

        if (prefetch && !synchronizing)
                spte = mark_spte_for_access_track(spte);

        WARN_ONCE(is_rsvd_spte(&vcpu->arch.mmu->shadow_zero_check, spte, level),
                  "spte = 0x%llx, level = %d, rsvd bits = 0x%llx", spte, level,
                  get_rsvd_bits(&vcpu->arch.mmu->shadow_zero_check, spte, level));

        /*
         * Mark the memslot dirty *after* modifying it for access tracking.
         * Unlike folios, memslots can be safely marked dirty out of mmu_lock,
         * i.e. in the fast page fault handler.
         */
        if ((spte & PT_WRITABLE_MASK) && kvm_slot_dirty_track_enabled(slot)) {
                /* Enforced by kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust. */
                WARN_ON_ONCE(level > PG_LEVEL_4K);
                mark_page_dirty_in_slot(vcpu->kvm, slot, gfn);
        }

        if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM_MMIO) &&
            !kvm_vcpu_can_access_host_mmio(vcpu) &&
            kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn, &is_host_mmio))
                kvm_track_host_mmio_mapping(vcpu);

        *new_spte = spte;
        return wrprot;
}

static u64 modify_spte_protections(u64 spte, u64 set, u64 clear)
{
        bool is_access_track = is_access_track_spte(spte);

        if (is_access_track)
                spte = restore_acc_track_spte(spte);

        KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(set & clear);
        spte = (spte | set) & ~clear;

        if (is_access_track)
                spte = mark_spte_for_access_track(spte);

        return spte;
}

static u64 make_spte_executable(u64 spte)
{
        return modify_spte_protections(spte, shadow_x_mask, shadow_nx_mask);
}

static u64 make_spte_nonexecutable(u64 spte)
{
        return modify_spte_protections(spte, shadow_nx_mask, shadow_x_mask);
}

/*
 * Construct an SPTE that maps a sub-page of the given huge page SPTE where
 * `index` identifies which sub-page.
 *
 * This is used during huge page splitting to build the SPTEs that make up the
 * new page table.
 */
u64 make_small_spte(struct kvm *kvm, u64 huge_spte,
                    union kvm_mmu_page_role role, int index)
{
        u64 child_spte = huge_spte;

        KVM_BUG_ON(!is_shadow_present_pte(huge_spte) || !is_large_pte(huge_spte), kvm);

        /*
         * The child_spte already has the base address of the huge page being
         * split. So we just have to OR in the offset to the page at the next
         * lower level for the given index.
         */
        child_spte |= (index * KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(role.level)) << PAGE_SHIFT;

        if (role.level == PG_LEVEL_4K) {
                child_spte &= ~PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK;

                /*
                 * When splitting to a 4K page where execution is allowed, mark
                 * the page executable as the NX hugepage mitigation no longer
                 * applies.
                 */
                if ((role.access & ACC_EXEC_MASK) && is_nx_huge_page_enabled(kvm))
                        child_spte = make_spte_executable(child_spte);
        }

        return child_spte;
}

u64 make_huge_spte(struct kvm *kvm, u64 small_spte, int level)
{
        u64 huge_spte;

        KVM_BUG_ON(!is_shadow_present_pte(small_spte) || level == PG_LEVEL_4K, kvm);

        huge_spte = small_spte | PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK;

        /*
         * huge_spte already has the address of the sub-page being collapsed
         * from small_spte, so just clear the lower address bits to create the
         * huge page address.
         */
        huge_spte &= KVM_HPAGE_MASK(level) | ~PAGE_MASK;

        if (is_nx_huge_page_enabled(kvm))
                huge_spte = make_spte_nonexecutable(huge_spte);

        return huge_spte;
}

u64 make_nonleaf_spte(u64 *child_pt, bool ad_disabled)
{
        u64 spte = SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK;

        spte |= __pa(child_pt) | shadow_present_mask | PT_WRITABLE_MASK |
                shadow_user_mask | shadow_x_mask | shadow_me_value;

        if (ad_disabled)
                spte |= SPTE_TDP_AD_DISABLED;
        else
                spte |= shadow_accessed_mask;

        return spte;
}

u64 mark_spte_for_access_track(u64 spte)
{
        if (spte_ad_enabled(spte))
                return spte & ~shadow_accessed_mask;

        if (is_access_track_spte(spte))
                return spte;

        check_spte_writable_invariants(spte);

        WARN_ONCE(spte & (SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_MASK <<
                          SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_SHIFT),
                  "Access Tracking saved bit locations are not zero\n");

        spte |= (spte & SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_MASK) <<
                SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_SHIFT;
        spte &= ~(shadow_acc_track_mask | shadow_accessed_mask);

        return spte;
}

void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_value, u64 mmio_mask, u64 access_mask)
{
        BUG_ON((u64)(unsigned)access_mask != access_mask);
        WARN_ON(mmio_value & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask);

        /*
         * Reset to the original module param value to honor userspace's desire
         * to (dis)allow MMIO caching.  Update the param itself so that
         * userspace can see whether or not KVM is actually using MMIO caching.
         */
        enable_mmio_caching = allow_mmio_caching;
        if (!enable_mmio_caching)
                mmio_value = 0;

        /*
         * The mask must contain only bits that are carved out specifically for
         * the MMIO SPTE mask, e.g. to ensure there's no overlap with the MMIO
         * generation.
         */
        if (WARN_ON(mmio_mask & ~SPTE_MMIO_ALLOWED_MASK))
                mmio_value = 0;

        /*
         * Disable MMIO caching if the MMIO value collides with the bits that
         * are used to hold the relocated GFN when the L1TF mitigation is
         * enabled.  This should never fire as there is no known hardware that
         * can trigger this condition, e.g. SME/SEV CPUs that require a custom
         * MMIO value are not susceptible to L1TF.
         */
        if (WARN_ON(mmio_value & (shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask <<
                                  SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN)))
                mmio_value = 0;

        /*
         * The masked MMIO value must obviously match itself and a frozen SPTE
         * must not get a false positive.  Frozen SPTEs and MMIO SPTEs should
         * never collide as MMIO must set some RWX bits, and frozen SPTEs must
         * not set any RWX bits.
         */
        if (WARN_ON((mmio_value & mmio_mask) != mmio_value) ||
            WARN_ON(mmio_value && (FROZEN_SPTE & mmio_mask) == mmio_value))
                mmio_value = 0;

        if (!mmio_value)
                enable_mmio_caching = false;

        shadow_mmio_value = mmio_value;
        shadow_mmio_mask  = mmio_mask;
        shadow_mmio_access_mask = access_mask;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_INTERNAL(kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask);

void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_value(struct kvm *kvm, u64 mmio_value)
{
        kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value = mmio_value;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_INTERNAL(kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_value);

void kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask(u64 me_value, u64 me_mask)
{
        /* shadow_me_value must be a subset of shadow_me_mask */
        if (WARN_ON(me_value & ~me_mask))
                me_value = me_mask = 0;

        shadow_me_value = me_value;
        shadow_me_mask = me_mask;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_INTERNAL(kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask);

void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only)
{
        kvm_ad_enabled          = has_ad_bits;

        shadow_user_mask        = VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK;
        shadow_accessed_mask    = VMX_EPT_ACCESS_BIT;
        shadow_dirty_mask       = VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT;
        shadow_nx_mask          = 0ull;
        shadow_x_mask           = VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK;
        /* VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT is needed for W or X violation. */
        shadow_present_mask     =
                (has_exec_only ? 0ull : VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK) | VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT;

        shadow_acc_track_mask   = VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK;
        shadow_host_writable_mask = EPT_SPTE_HOST_WRITABLE;
        shadow_mmu_writable_mask  = EPT_SPTE_MMU_WRITABLE;

        /*
         * EPT Misconfigurations are generated if the value of bits 2:0
         * of an EPT paging-structure entry is 110b (write/execute).
         */
        kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(VMX_EPT_MISCONFIG_WX_VALUE,
                                   VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK | VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT, 0);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_INTERNAL(kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks);

void kvm_mmu_reset_all_pte_masks(void)
{
        u8 low_phys_bits;
        u64 mask;

        kvm_ad_enabled = true;

        /*
         * If the CPU has 46 or less physical address bits, then set an
         * appropriate mask to guard against L1TF attacks. Otherwise, it is
         * assumed that the CPU is not vulnerable to L1TF.
         *
         * Some Intel CPUs address the L1 cache using more PA bits than are
         * reported by CPUID. Use the PA width of the L1 cache when possible
         * to achieve more effective mitigation, e.g. if system RAM overlaps
         * the most significant bits of legal physical address space.
         */
        shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask = 0;
        low_phys_bits = boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits;
        if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF) &&
            !WARN_ON_ONCE(boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits >=
                          52 - SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN)) {
                low_phys_bits = boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits
                        - SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN;
                shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask =
                        rsvd_bits(low_phys_bits, boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits - 1);
        }

        shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask =
                GENMASK_ULL(low_phys_bits - 1, PAGE_SHIFT);

        shadow_user_mask        = PT_USER_MASK;
        shadow_accessed_mask    = PT_ACCESSED_MASK;
        shadow_dirty_mask       = PT_DIRTY_MASK;
        shadow_nx_mask          = PT64_NX_MASK;
        shadow_x_mask           = 0;
        shadow_present_mask     = PT_PRESENT_MASK;

        shadow_acc_track_mask   = 0;
        shadow_me_mask          = 0;
        shadow_me_value         = 0;

        shadow_host_writable_mask = DEFAULT_SPTE_HOST_WRITABLE;
        shadow_mmu_writable_mask  = DEFAULT_SPTE_MMU_WRITABLE;

        /*
         * Set a reserved PA bit in MMIO SPTEs to generate page faults with
         * PFEC.RSVD=1 on MMIO accesses.  64-bit PTEs (PAE, x86-64, and EPT
         * paging) support a maximum of 52 bits of PA, i.e. if the CPU supports
         * 52-bit physical addresses then there are no reserved PA bits in the
         * PTEs and so the reserved PA approach must be disabled.
         */
        if (kvm_host.maxphyaddr < 52)
                mask = BIT_ULL(51) | PT_PRESENT_MASK;
        else
                mask = 0;

        kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(mask, mask, ACC_WRITE_MASK | ACC_USER_MASK);
}