/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */

#ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
#define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_

#include <linux/static_key.h>
#include <linux/objtool.h>
#include <linux/linkage.h>

#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
#include <asm/msr-index.h>
#include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
#include <asm/percpu.h>

/*
 * Call depth tracking for Intel SKL CPUs to address the RSB underflow
 * issue in software.
 *
 * The tracking does not use a counter. It uses uses arithmetic shift
 * right on call entry and logical shift left on return.
 *
 * The depth tracking variable is initialized to 0x8000.... when the call
 * depth is zero. The arithmetic shift right sign extends the MSB and
 * saturates after the 12th call. The shift count is 5 for both directions
 * so the tracking covers 12 nested calls.
 *
 *  Call
 *  0: 0x8000000000000000       0x0000000000000000
 *  1: 0xfc00000000000000       0xf000000000000000
 * ...
 * 11: 0xfffffffffffffff8       0xfffffffffffffc00
 * 12: 0xffffffffffffffff       0xffffffffffffffe0
 *
 * After a return buffer fill the depth is credited 12 calls before the
 * next stuffing has to take place.
 *
 * There is a inaccuracy for situations like this:
 *
 *  10 calls
 *   5 returns
 *   3 calls
 *   4 returns
 *   3 calls
 *   ....
 *
 * The shift count might cause this to be off by one in either direction,
 * but there is still a cushion vs. the RSB depth. The algorithm does not
 * claim to be perfect and it can be speculated around by the CPU, but it
 * is considered that it obfuscates the problem enough to make exploitation
 * extremely difficult.
 */
#define RET_DEPTH_SHIFT                 5
#define RSB_RET_STUFF_LOOPS             16
#define RET_DEPTH_INIT                  0x8000000000000000ULL
#define RET_DEPTH_INIT_FROM_CALL        0xfc00000000000000ULL
#define RET_DEPTH_CREDIT                0xffffffffffffffffULL

#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG
# define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CALLS                            \
        incq    PER_CPU_VAR(__x86_call_count);
# define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_RETS                             \
        incq    PER_CPU_VAR(__x86_ret_count);
# define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_STUFFS                           \
        incq    PER_CPU_VAR(__x86_stuffs_count);
# define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CTXSW                            \
        incq    PER_CPU_VAR(__x86_ctxsw_count);
#else
# define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CALLS
# define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_RETS
# define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_STUFFS
# define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CTXSW
#endif

#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) && !defined(COMPILE_OFFSETS)

#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>

#define CREDIT_CALL_DEPTH                                       \
        movq    $-1, PER_CPU_VAR(__x86_call_depth);

#define RESET_CALL_DEPTH                                        \
        xor     %eax, %eax;                                     \
        bts     $63, %rax;                                      \
        movq    %rax, PER_CPU_VAR(__x86_call_depth);

#define RESET_CALL_DEPTH_FROM_CALL                              \
        movb    $0xfc, %al;                                     \
        shl     $56, %rax;                                      \
        movq    %rax, PER_CPU_VAR(__x86_call_depth);            \
        CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CALLS

#define INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH                                    \
        sarq    $5, PER_CPU_VAR(__x86_call_depth);              \
        CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CALLS

#else
#define CREDIT_CALL_DEPTH
#define RESET_CALL_DEPTH
#define RESET_CALL_DEPTH_FROM_CALL
#define INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH
#endif

/*
 * Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
 *
 * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
 * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
 *
 * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
 * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
 * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
 * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
 * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
 *
 * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and
 * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that
 * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there.
 */

#define RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE    32
#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS         32      /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */

/*
 * Common helper for __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER and __FILL_ONE_RETURN.
 */
#define __FILL_RETURN_SLOT                      \
        ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL;           \
        call    772f;                           \
        int3;                                   \
772:

/*
 * Stuff the entire RSB.
 *
 * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
 * the optimal version - two calls, each with their own speculation
 * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
 */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr)                   \
        mov     $(nr/2), reg;                           \
771:                                                    \
        __FILL_RETURN_SLOT                              \
        __FILL_RETURN_SLOT                              \
        add     $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, %_ASM_SP;       \
        dec     reg;                                    \
        jnz     771b;                                   \
        /* barrier for jnz misprediction */             \
        lfence;                                         \
        CREDIT_CALL_DEPTH                               \
        CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CTXSW
#else
/*
 * i386 doesn't unconditionally have LFENCE, as such it can't
 * do a loop.
 */
#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr)                   \
        .rept nr;                                       \
        __FILL_RETURN_SLOT;                             \
        .endr;                                          \
        add     $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, %_ASM_SP;
#endif

/*
 * Stuff a single RSB slot.
 *
 * To mitigate Post-Barrier RSB speculation, one CALL instruction must be
 * forced to retire before letting a RET instruction execute.
 *
 * On PBRSB-vulnerable CPUs, it is not safe for a RET to be executed
 * before this point.
 */
#define __FILL_ONE_RETURN                               \
        __FILL_RETURN_SLOT                              \
        add     $(BITS_PER_LONG/8), %_ASM_SP;           \
        lfence;

#ifdef __ASSEMBLER__

/*
 * (ab)use RETPOLINE_SAFE on RET to annotate away 'bare' RET instructions
 * vs RETBleed validation.
 */
#define ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE

/*
 * Abuse ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE on a NOP to indicate UNRET_END, should
 * eventually turn into its own annotation.
 */
.macro VALIDATE_UNRET_END
#if defined(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION) && \
        (defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO))
        ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
        nop
#endif
.endm

/*
 * Emits a conditional CS prefix that is compatible with
 * -mindirect-branch-cs-prefix.
 */
.macro __CS_PREFIX reg:req
        .irp rs,r8,r9,r10,r11,r12,r13,r14,r15
        .ifc \reg,\rs
        .byte 0x2e
        .endif
        .endr
.endm

/*
 * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple
 * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2
 * attack.
 *
 * NOTE: these do not take kCFI into account and are thus not comparable to C
 * indirect calls, take care when using. The target of these should be an ENDBR
 * instruction irrespective of kCFI.
 */
.macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
        __CS_PREFIX \reg
        jmp     __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg
#else
        jmp     *%\reg
        int3
#endif
.endm

.macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req
#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
        __CS_PREFIX \reg
        call    __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg
#else
        call    *%\reg
#endif
.endm

 /*
  * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
  * monstrosity above, manually.
  */
.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req ftr2=ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS)
        ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \
                __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr)), \ftr, \
                __stringify(nop;nop;__FILL_ONE_RETURN), \ftr2

.Lskip_rsb_\@:
.endm

/*
 * The CALL to srso_alias_untrain_ret() must be patched in directly at
 * the spot where untraining must be done, ie., srso_alias_untrain_ret()
 * must be the target of a CALL instruction instead of indirectly
 * jumping to a wrapper which then calls it. Therefore, this macro is
 * called outside of __UNTRAIN_RET below, for the time being, before the
 * kernel can support nested alternatives with arbitrary nesting.
 */
.macro CALL_UNTRAIN_RET
#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)
        ALTERNATIVE_2 "", "call entry_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \
                          "call srso_alias_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS
#endif
.endm

/*
 * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. Requires KERNEL CR3 because the
 * return thunk isn't mapped into the userspace tables (then again, AMD
 * typically has NO_MELTDOWN).
 *
 * While retbleed_untrain_ret() doesn't clobber anything but requires stack,
 * write_ibpb() will clobber AX, CX, DX.
 *
 * As such, this must be placed after every *SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 at a point
 * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction.
 */
.macro __UNTRAIN_RET ibpb_feature, call_depth_insns
#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)
        VALIDATE_UNRET_END
        CALL_UNTRAIN_RET
        ALTERNATIVE_2 "",                                               \
                      "call write_ibpb", \ibpb_feature,                 \
                     __stringify(\call_depth_insns), X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH
#endif
.endm

#define UNTRAIN_RET \
        __UNTRAIN_RET X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB, __stringify(RESET_CALL_DEPTH)

#define UNTRAIN_RET_VM \
        __UNTRAIN_RET X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT, __stringify(RESET_CALL_DEPTH)

#define UNTRAIN_RET_FROM_CALL \
        __UNTRAIN_RET X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB, __stringify(RESET_CALL_DEPTH_FROM_CALL)


.macro CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT
#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
        ALTERNATIVE "",                                                 \
                    __stringify(INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH), X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH
#endif
.endm

/*
 * Macro to execute VERW insns that mitigate transient data sampling
 * attacks such as MDS or TSA. On affected systems a microcode update
 * overloaded VERW insns to also clear the CPU buffers. VERW clobbers
 * CFLAGS.ZF.
 * Note: Only the memory operand variant of VERW clears the CPU buffers.
 */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
#define VERW    verw x86_verw_sel(%rip)
#else
/*
 * In 32bit mode, the memory operand must be a %cs reference. The data segments
 * may not be usable (vm86 mode), and the stack segment may not be flat (ESPFIX32).
 */
#define VERW    verw %cs:x86_verw_sel
#endif

/*
 * Provide a stringified VERW macro for simple usage, and a non-stringified
 * VERW macro for use in more elaborate sequences, e.g. to encode a conditional
 * VERW within an ALTERNATIVE.
 */
#define __CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS     __stringify(VERW)

/* If necessary, emit VERW on exit-to-userspace to clear CPU buffers. */
#define CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS \
        ALTERNATIVE "", __CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS, X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
.macro CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY
        ALTERNATIVE "", "call clear_bhb_loop", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP
.endm

.macro CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY_VMEXIT
        ALTERNATIVE "", "call clear_bhb_loop", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_VMEXIT
.endm
#else
#define CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY
#define CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY_VMEXIT
#endif

#else /* __ASSEMBLER__ */

#define ITS_THUNK_SIZE  64

typedef u8 retpoline_thunk_t[RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE];
typedef u8 its_thunk_t[ITS_THUNK_SIZE];
extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_array[];
extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_call_thunk_array[];
extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_jump_thunk_array[];
extern its_thunk_t       __x86_indirect_its_thunk_array[];

#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
extern void __x86_return_thunk(void);
#else
static inline void __x86_return_thunk(void) {}
#endif

#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
extern void retbleed_return_thunk(void);
#else
static inline void retbleed_return_thunk(void) {}
#endif

extern void srso_alias_untrain_ret(void);

#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
extern void srso_return_thunk(void);
extern void srso_alias_return_thunk(void);
#else
static inline void srso_return_thunk(void) {}
static inline void srso_alias_return_thunk(void) {}
#endif

#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_ITS
extern void its_return_thunk(void);
#else
static inline void its_return_thunk(void) {}
#endif

extern void retbleed_return_thunk(void);
extern void srso_return_thunk(void);
extern void srso_alias_return_thunk(void);

extern void entry_untrain_ret(void);
extern void write_ibpb(void);

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
extern void clear_bhb_loop(void);
#endif

extern void (*x86_return_thunk)(void);

extern void __warn_thunk(void);

#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
extern void call_depth_return_thunk(void);

#define CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT                                      \
        ALTERNATIVE("",                                         \
                    __stringify(INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH),          \
                    X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH)

DECLARE_PER_CPU_CACHE_HOT(u64, __x86_call_depth);

#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG
DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_call_count);
DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_ret_count);
DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_stuffs_count);
DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_ctxsw_count);
#endif
#else /* !CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */

static inline void call_depth_return_thunk(void) {}
#define CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT ""

#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */

#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE

#define GEN(reg) \
        extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg;
#include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
#undef GEN

#define GEN(reg)                                                \
        extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_call_thunk_ ## reg;
#include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
#undef GEN

#define GEN(reg)                                                \
        extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_jump_thunk_ ## reg;
#include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
#undef GEN

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64

/*
 * Emits a conditional CS prefix that is compatible with
 * -mindirect-branch-cs-prefix.
 */
#define __CS_PREFIX(reg)                                \
        ".irp rs,r8,r9,r10,r11,r12,r13,r14,r15\n"       \
        ".ifc \\rs," reg "\n"                           \
        ".byte 0x2e\n"                                  \
        ".endif\n"                                      \
        ".endr\n"

/*
 * Inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC
 * which is ensured when CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE is defined.
 */
#define CALL_NOSPEC     __CS_PREFIX("%V[thunk_target]") \
                        "call __x86_indirect_thunk_%V[thunk_target]\n"

# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr)

#else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
/*
 * For i386 we use the original ret-equivalent retpoline, because
 * otherwise we'll run out of registers. We don't care about CET
 * here, anyway.
 */
# define CALL_NOSPEC                                            \
        ALTERNATIVE_2(                                          \
        ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE "\n"                            \
        "call *%[thunk_target]\n",                              \
        "       jmp    904f;\n"                                 \
        "       .align 16\n"                                    \
        "901:   call   903f;\n"                                 \
        "902:   pause;\n"                                       \
        "       lfence;\n"                                      \
        "       jmp    902b;\n"                                 \
        "       .align 16\n"                                    \
        "903:   lea    4(%%esp), %%esp;\n"                      \
        "       pushl  %[thunk_target];\n"                      \
        "       ret;\n"                                         \
        "       .align 16\n"                                    \
        "904:   call   901b;\n",                                \
        X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,                                  \
        "lfence;\n"                                             \
        ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE "\n"                            \
        "call *%[thunk_target]\n",                              \
        X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)

# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
#endif
#else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */
# define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n"
# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
#endif

/* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */
enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
        SPECTRE_V2_NONE,
        SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE,
        SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE,
        SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS,
        SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
        SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE,
        SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
};

/* The indirect branch speculation control variants */
enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation {
        SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE,
        SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT,
        SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED,
        SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL,
        SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP,
};

/* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */
enum ssb_mitigation {
        SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE,
        SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_AUTO,
        SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE,
        SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL,
        SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP,
};

static __always_inline
void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature)
{
        asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "wrmsr", %c[feature])
                : : "c" (msr),
                    "a" ((u32)val),
                    "d" ((u32)(val >> 32)),
                    [feature] "i" (feature)
                : "memory");
}

DECLARE_PER_CPU(bool, x86_ibpb_exit_to_user);

static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
{
        asm_inline volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "call write_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_IBPB)
                            : ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
                            :: "rax", "rcx", "rdx", "memory");
}

/* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
extern void update_spec_ctrl_cond(u64 val);
extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void);

/*
 * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction
 * before calling into firmware.
 *
 * (Implemented as CPP macros due to header hell.)
 */
#define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start()                    \
do {                                                                    \
        preempt_disable();                                              \
        alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,                       \
                              spec_ctrl_current() | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS,     \
                              X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);                 \
        alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB,         \
                              X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB_FW);                 \
} while (0)

#define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end()                      \
do {                                                                    \
        alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,                       \
                              spec_ctrl_current(),                      \
                              X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);                 \
        preempt_enable();                                               \
} while (0)

DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);

DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_vcpu_ibpb);

DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(cpu_buf_idle_clear);

DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);

extern u16 x86_verw_sel;

#include <asm/segment.h>

/**
 * x86_clear_cpu_buffers - Buffer clearing support for different x86 CPU vulns
 *
 * This uses the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
 * combination with microcode which triggers a CPU buffer flush when the
 * instruction is executed.
 */
static __always_inline void x86_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
{
        static const u16 ds = __KERNEL_DS;

        /*
         * Has to be the memory-operand variant because only that
         * guarantees the CPU buffer flush functionality according to
         * documentation. The register-operand variant does not.
         * Works with any segment selector, but a valid writable
         * data segment is the fastest variant.
         *
         * "cc" clobber is required because VERW modifies ZF.
         */
        asm volatile("verw %[ds]" : : [ds] "m" (ds) : "cc");
}

/**
 * x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Buffer clearing support in idle for the MDS
 * and TSA vulnerabilities.
 *
 * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
 */
static __always_inline void x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
{
        if (static_branch_likely(&cpu_buf_idle_clear))
                x86_clear_cpu_buffers();
}

#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */

#endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */