root/crypto/openssh/auth.c
/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.162 2024/09/15 01:18:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
 * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */

#include "includes.h"

#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>

#include <netinet/in.h>

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
#include <login.h>
#endif
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
#include <shadow.h>
#endif
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <time.h>

#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "groupaccess.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "loginrec.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "authfile.h"
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "blocklist_client.h"

/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern struct include_list includes;
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;

/* Debugging messages */
static struct sshbuf *auth_debug;

/*
 * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
 * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
 * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
 * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
 * listed there, false will be returned.
 * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
 * Otherwise true is returned.
 */
int
allowed_user(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd * pw)
{
        struct stat st;
        const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL;
        u_int i;
        int r;

        /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
        if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
                return 0;

        if (!options.use_pam && platform_locked_account(pw)) {
                logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
                    pw->pw_name);
                return 0;
        }

        /*
         * Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we
         * are chrooting.
         */
        if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
            strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
                char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ?
                    _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */

                if (stat(shell, &st) == -1) {
                        logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
                            "does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell);
                        free(shell);
                        return 0;
                }
                if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
                    (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
                        logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
                            "is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell);
                        free(shell);
                        return 0;
                }
                free(shell);
        }

        if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
            options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
                hostname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
                ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
        }

        /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
        if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
                for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++) {
                        r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
                            options.deny_users[i]);
                        if (r < 0) {
                                fatal("Invalid DenyUsers pattern \"%.100s\"",
                                    options.deny_users[i]);
                        } else if (r != 0) {
                                logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
                                    "because listed in DenyUsers",
                                    pw->pw_name, hostname);
                                return 0;
                        }
                }
        }
        /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
        if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
                for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++) {
                        r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
                            options.allow_users[i]);
                        if (r < 0) {
                                fatal("Invalid AllowUsers pattern \"%.100s\"",
                                    options.allow_users[i]);
                        } else if (r == 1)
                                break;
                }
                /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
                if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
                        logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
                            "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
                        return 0;
                }
        }
        if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
                /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
                if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
                        logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
                            "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
                        return 0;
                }

                /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
                if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
                        if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
                            options.num_deny_groups)) {
                                ga_free();
                                logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
                                    "because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
                                    pw->pw_name, hostname);
                                return 0;
                        }
                /*
                 * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
                 * isn't listed there
                 */
                if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
                        if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
                            options.num_allow_groups)) {
                                ga_free();
                                logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
                                    "because none of user's groups are listed "
                                    "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
                                return 0;
                        }
                ga_free();
        }

#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER
        if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, loginmsg))
                return 0;
#endif

        /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
        return 1;
}

/*
 * Formats any key left in authctxt->auth_method_key for inclusion in
 * auth_log()'s message. Also includes authxtct->auth_method_info if present.
 */
static char *
format_method_key(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
        const struct sshkey *key = authctxt->auth_method_key;
        const char *methinfo = authctxt->auth_method_info;
        char *fp, *cafp, *ret = NULL;

        if (key == NULL)
                return NULL;

        if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
                fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
                    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
                cafp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
                    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
                xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s",
                    sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
                    key->cert->key_id,
                    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
                    sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key),
                    cafp == NULL ? "(null)" : cafp,
                    methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ",
                    methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo);
                free(fp);
                free(cafp);
        } else {
                fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
                    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
                xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s%s%s", sshkey_type(key),
                    fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
                    methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ",
                    methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo);
                free(fp);
        }
        return ret;
}

void
auth_log(struct ssh *ssh, int authenticated, int partial,
    const char *method, const char *submethod)
{
        Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
        int level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
        const char *authmsg;
        char *extra = NULL;

        if (!mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
                return;

        /* Raise logging level */
        if (authenticated == 1 ||
            !authctxt->valid ||
            authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
            strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
                level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;

        if (authctxt->postponed)
                authmsg = "Postponed";
        else if (partial)
                authmsg = "Partial";
        else {
                authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
                if (authenticated)
                        BLOCKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLOCKLIST_AUTH_OK,
                            "Authenticated");
        }

        if ((extra = format_method_key(authctxt)) == NULL) {
                if (authctxt->auth_method_info != NULL)
                        extra = xstrdup(authctxt->auth_method_info);
        }

        do_log2(level, "%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2%s%s",
            authmsg,
            method,
            submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
            authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
            authctxt->user,
            ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
            ssh_remote_port(ssh),
            extra != NULL ? ": " : "",
            extra != NULL ? extra : "");

        free(extra);

#if defined(CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN) || defined(SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS)
        if (authenticated == 0 && !(authctxt->postponed || partial)) {
                /* Log failed login attempt */
# ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
                if (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 ||
                    strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
                    strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0)
                        record_failed_login(ssh, authctxt->user,
                            auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
# endif
# ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
                audit_event(ssh, audit_classify_auth(method));
# endif
        }
#endif
#if defined(CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN) && defined(WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE)
        if (authenticated)
                sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user,
                    auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh",
                    loginmsg);
#endif
}

void
auth_maxtries_exceeded(struct ssh *ssh)
{
        Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;

        BLOCKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLOCKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, "Maximum attempts exceeded");
        error("maximum authentication attempts exceeded for "
            "%s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2",
            authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
            authctxt->user,
            ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
            ssh_remote_port(ssh));
        ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Too many authentication failures");
        /* NOTREACHED */
}

/*
 * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
 */
int
auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
{
        switch (options.permit_root_login) {
        case PERMIT_YES:
                return 1;
        case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
                if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
                    strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
                    strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
                        return 1;
                break;
        case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
                if (auth_opts->force_command != NULL) {
                        logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
                        return 1;
                }
                break;
        }
        logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s port %d",
            ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
        return 0;
}


/*
 * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
 * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
 * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
 *
 * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
 */
char *
expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
{
        char *file, uidstr[32], ret[PATH_MAX];
        int i;

        snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
            (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
        file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
            "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);

        /*
         * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
         * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
         */
        if (path_absolute(file))
                return (file);

        i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
        if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
                fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
        free(file);
        return (xstrdup(ret));
}

char *
authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw)
{
        if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL)
                return NULL;
        return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw);
}

/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
HostStatus
check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, const char *host,
    const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
{
        char *user_hostfile;
        struct stat st;
        HostStatus host_status;
        struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
        const struct hostkey_entry *found;

        hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
        load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile, 0);
        if (userfile != NULL) {
                user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
                if (options.strict_modes &&
                    (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
                    ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
                    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
                        logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
                            "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
                            pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
                        auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes",
                            user_hostfile);
                } else {
                        temporarily_use_uid(pw);
                        load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile, 0);
                        restore_uid();
                }
                free(user_hostfile);
        }
        host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found);
        if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED)
                error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication",
                    host);
        else if (host_status == HOST_OK)
                debug_f("key for %s found at %s:%ld",
                    found->host, found->file, found->line);
        else
                debug_f("key for host %s not found", host);

        free_hostkeys(hostkeys);

        return host_status;
}

struct passwd *
getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const char *user)
{
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
        extern login_cap_t *lc;
#ifdef HAVE_AUTH_HOSTOK
        const char *from_host, *from_ip;
#endif
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
        auth_session_t *as;
#endif
#endif
        struct passwd *pw;
        struct connection_info *ci;
        u_int i;

        ci = server_get_connection_info(ssh, 1, options.use_dns);
        ci->user = user;
        ci->user_invalid = getpwnam(user) == NULL;
        parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, ci);
        log_change_level(options.log_level);
        log_verbose_reset();
        for (i = 0; i < options.num_log_verbose; i++)
                log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[i]);
        server_process_permitopen(ssh);

#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
        aix_setauthdb(user);
#endif

        pw = getpwnam(user);

#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
        aix_restoreauthdb();
#endif
        if (pw == NULL) {
                BLOCKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLOCKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, "Invalid user");
                logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s port %d",
                    user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
                record_failed_login(ssh, user,
                    auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
                audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER);
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
                return (NULL);
        }
        if (!allowed_user(ssh, pw))
                return (NULL);
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
        if ((lc = login_getpwclass(pw)) == NULL) {
                debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
                return (NULL);
        }
#ifdef HAVE_AUTH_HOSTOK
        from_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
        from_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
        if (!auth_hostok(lc, from_host, from_ip)) {
                debug("Denied connection for %.200s from %.200s [%.200s].",
                      pw->pw_name, from_host, from_ip);
                return (NULL);
        }
#endif /* HAVE_AUTH_HOSTOK */
#ifdef HAVE_AUTH_TIMEOK
        if (!auth_timeok(lc, time(NULL))) {
                debug("LOGIN %.200s REFUSED (TIME)", pw->pw_name);
                return (NULL);
        }
#endif /* HAVE_AUTH_TIMEOK */
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
        if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
            auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
                debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
                pw = NULL;
        }
        if (as != NULL)
                auth_close(as);
#endif
#endif
        if (pw != NULL)
                return (pwcopy(pw));
        return (NULL);
}

/* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */
int
auth_key_is_revoked(struct sshkey *key)
{
        char *fp = NULL;
        int r;

        if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL)
                return 0;
        if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
            SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
                r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
                error_fr(r, "fingerprint key");
                goto out;
        }

        r = sshkey_check_revoked(key, options.revoked_keys_file);
        switch (r) {
        case 0:
                break; /* not revoked */
        case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED:
                error("Authentication key %s %s revoked by file %s",
                    sshkey_type(key), fp, options.revoked_keys_file);
                goto out;
        default:
                error_r(r, "Error checking authentication key %s %s in "
                    "revoked keys file %s", sshkey_type(key), fp,
                    options.revoked_keys_file);
                goto out;
        }

        /* Success */
        r = 0;

 out:
        free(fp);
        return r == 0 ? 0 : 1;
}

void
auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
{
        char buf[1024];
        va_list args;
        int r;

        va_start(args, fmt);
        vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
        va_end(args);
        debug3("%s", buf);
        if (auth_debug != NULL)
                if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(auth_debug, buf)) != 0)
                        fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_cstring");
}

void
auth_debug_send(struct ssh *ssh)
{
        char *msg;
        int r;

        if (auth_debug == NULL)
                return;
        while (sshbuf_len(auth_debug) != 0) {
                if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(auth_debug, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
                        fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_get_cstring");
                ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "%s", msg);
                free(msg);
        }
}

void
auth_debug_reset(void)
{
        if (auth_debug != NULL)
                sshbuf_reset(auth_debug);
        else if ((auth_debug = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
                fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
}

struct passwd *
fakepw(void)
{
        static int done = 0;
        static struct passwd fake;
        const char hashchars[] = "./ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
            "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"; /* from bcrypt.c */
        char *cp;

        if (done)
                return (&fake);

        memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
        fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
        fake.pw_passwd = xstrdup("$2a$10$"
            "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx");
        for (cp = fake.pw_passwd + 7; *cp != '\0'; cp++)
                *cp = hashchars[arc4random_uniform(sizeof(hashchars) - 1)];
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
        fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
#endif
        fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid;
        fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid;
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
        fake.pw_class = "";
#endif
        fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
        fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
        done = 1;

        return (&fake);
}

/*
 * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
 * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
 * several times.
 */

const char *
auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
{
        static char *dnsname;

        if (!use_dns)
                return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
        if (dnsname != NULL)
                return dnsname;
        dnsname = ssh_remote_hostname(ssh);
        return dnsname;
}

/* These functions link key/cert options to the auth framework */

/* Log sshauthopt options locally and (optionally) for remote transmission */
void
auth_log_authopts(const char *loc, const struct sshauthopt *opts, int do_remote)
{
        int do_env = options.permit_user_env && opts->nenv > 0;
        int do_permitopen = opts->npermitopen > 0 &&
            (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0;
        int do_permitlisten = opts->npermitlisten > 0 &&
            (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) != 0;
        size_t i;
        char msg[1024], buf[64];

        snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", opts->force_tun_device);
        /* Try to keep this alphabetically sorted */
        snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "key options:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s",
            opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag ? " agent-forwarding" : "",
            opts->force_command == NULL ? "" : " command",
            do_env ?  " environment" : "",
            opts->valid_before == 0 ? "" : "expires",
            opts->no_require_user_presence ? " no-touch-required" : "",
            do_permitopen ?  " permitopen" : "",
            do_permitlisten ?  " permitlisten" : "",
            opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ? " port-forwarding" : "",
            opts->cert_principals == NULL ? "" : " principals",
            opts->permit_pty_flag ? " pty" : "",
            opts->require_verify ? " uv" : "",
            opts->force_tun_device == -1 ? "" : " tun=",
            opts->force_tun_device == -1 ? "" : buf,
            opts->permit_user_rc ? " user-rc" : "",
            opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag ? " x11-forwarding" : "");

        debug("%s: %s", loc, msg);
        if (do_remote)
                auth_debug_add("%s: %s", loc, msg);

        if (options.permit_user_env) {
                for (i = 0; i < opts->nenv; i++) {
                        debug("%s: environment: %s", loc, opts->env[i]);
                        if (do_remote) {
                                auth_debug_add("%s: environment: %s",
                                    loc, opts->env[i]);
                        }
                }
        }

        /* Go into a little more details for the local logs. */
        if (opts->valid_before != 0) {
                format_absolute_time(opts->valid_before, buf, sizeof(buf));
                debug("%s: expires at %s", loc, buf);
        }
        if (opts->cert_principals != NULL) {
                debug("%s: authorized principals: \"%s\"",
                    loc, opts->cert_principals);
        }
        if (opts->force_command != NULL)
                debug("%s: forced command: \"%s\"", loc, opts->force_command);
        if (do_permitopen) {
                for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitopen; i++) {
                        debug("%s: permitted open: %s",
                            loc, opts->permitopen[i]);
                }
        }
        if (do_permitlisten) {
                for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitlisten; i++) {
                        debug("%s: permitted listen: %s",
                            loc, opts->permitlisten[i]);
                }
        }
}

/* Activate a new set of key/cert options; merging with what is there. */
int
auth_activate_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshauthopt *opts)
{
        struct sshauthopt *old = auth_opts;
        const char *emsg = NULL;

        debug_f("setting new authentication options");
        if ((auth_opts = sshauthopt_merge(old, opts, &emsg)) == NULL) {
                error("Inconsistent authentication options: %s", emsg);
                return -1;
        }
        return 0;
}

/* Disable forwarding, etc for the session */
void
auth_restrict_session(struct ssh *ssh)
{
        struct sshauthopt *restricted;

        debug_f("restricting session");

        /* A blank sshauthopt defaults to permitting nothing */
        if ((restricted = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL)
                fatal_f("sshauthopt_new failed");
        restricted->permit_pty_flag = 1;
        restricted->restricted = 1;

        if (auth_activate_options(ssh, restricted) != 0)
                fatal_f("failed to restrict session");
        sshauthopt_free(restricted);
}