root/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.310 2025/02/18 08:02:48 djm Exp $ */
/*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
 *                    All rights reserved
 * The authentication agent program.
 *
 * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
 * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
 * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
 * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
 * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
 *
 * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */

#include "includes.h"

#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
# include <sys/un.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"

#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif

#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
# include <poll.h>
#endif
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
# include <util.h>
#endif

#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
#include "sk-api.h"
#include "myproposal.h"

#ifndef DEFAULT_ALLOWED_PROVIDERS
# define DEFAULT_ALLOWED_PROVIDERS "/usr/lib*/*,/usr/local/lib*/*"
#endif
#ifndef DEFAULT_WEBSAFE_ALLOWLIST
# define DEFAULT_WEBSAFE_ALLOWLIST "ssh:*"
#endif

/* Maximum accepted message length */
#define AGENT_MAX_LEN           (256*1024)
/* Maximum bytes to read from client socket */
#define AGENT_RBUF_LEN          (4096)
/* Maximum number of recorded session IDs/hostkeys per connection */
#define AGENT_MAX_SESSION_IDS           16
/* Maximum size of session ID */
#define AGENT_MAX_SID_LEN               128
/* Maximum number of destination constraints to accept on a key */
#define AGENT_MAX_DEST_CONSTRAINTS      1024
/* Maximum number of associated certificate constraints to accept on a key */
#define AGENT_MAX_EXT_CERTS             1024

/* XXX store hostkey_sid in a refcounted tree */

typedef enum {
        AUTH_UNUSED = 0,
        AUTH_SOCKET = 1,
        AUTH_CONNECTION = 2,
} sock_type;

struct hostkey_sid {
        struct sshkey *key;
        struct sshbuf *sid;
        int forwarded;
};

typedef struct socket_entry {
        int fd;
        sock_type type;
        struct sshbuf *input;
        struct sshbuf *output;
        struct sshbuf *request;
        size_t nsession_ids;
        struct hostkey_sid *session_ids;
        int session_bind_attempted;
} SocketEntry;

u_int sockets_alloc = 0;
SocketEntry *sockets = NULL;

typedef struct identity {
        TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
        struct sshkey *key;
        char *comment;
        char *provider;
        time_t death;
        u_int confirm;
        char *sk_provider;
        struct dest_constraint *dest_constraints;
        size_t ndest_constraints;
} Identity;

struct idtable {
        int nentries;
        TAILQ_HEAD(idqueue, identity) idlist;
};

/* private key table */
struct idtable *idtab;

int max_fd = 0;

/* pid of shell == parent of agent */
pid_t parent_pid = -1;
time_t parent_alive_interval = 0;

static sig_atomic_t signalled_exit;
static sig_atomic_t signalled_keydrop;

/* pid of process for which cleanup_socket is applicable */
pid_t cleanup_pid = 0;

/* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */
char socket_name[PATH_MAX];
char socket_dir[PATH_MAX];

/* Pattern-list of allowed PKCS#11/Security key paths */
static char *allowed_providers;

/*
 * Allows PKCS11 providers or SK keys that use non-internal providers to
 * be added over a remote connection (identified by session-bind@openssh.com).
 */
static int remote_add_provider;

/* locking */
#define LOCK_SIZE       32
#define LOCK_SALT_SIZE  16
#define LOCK_ROUNDS     1
int locked = 0;
u_char lock_pwhash[LOCK_SIZE];
u_char lock_salt[LOCK_SALT_SIZE];

extern char *__progname;

/* Default lifetime in seconds (0 == forever) */
static int lifetime = 0;

static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;

/* Refuse signing of non-SSH messages for web-origin FIDO keys */
static int restrict_websafe = 1;
static char *websafe_allowlist;

/*
 * Client connection count; incremented in new_socket() and decremented in
 * close_socket().  When it reaches 0, ssh-agent will exit.  Since it is
 * normally initialized to 1, it will never reach 0.  However, if the -x
 * option is specified, it is initialized to 0 in main(); in that case,
 * ssh-agent will exit as soon as it has had at least one client but no
 * longer has any.
 */
static int xcount = 1;

static void
close_socket(SocketEntry *e)
{
        size_t i;
        int last = 0;

        if (e->type == AUTH_CONNECTION) {
                debug("xcount %d -> %d", xcount, xcount - 1);
                if (--xcount == 0)
                        last = 1;
        }
        close(e->fd);
        sshbuf_free(e->input);
        sshbuf_free(e->output);
        sshbuf_free(e->request);
        for (i = 0; i < e->nsession_ids; i++) {
                sshkey_free(e->session_ids[i].key);
                sshbuf_free(e->session_ids[i].sid);
        }
        free(e->session_ids);
        memset(e, '\0', sizeof(*e));
        e->fd = -1;
        e->type = AUTH_UNUSED;
        if (last)
                cleanup_exit(0);
}

static void
idtab_init(void)
{
        idtab = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*idtab));
        TAILQ_INIT(&idtab->idlist);
        idtab->nentries = 0;
}

static void
free_dest_constraint_hop(struct dest_constraint_hop *dch)
{
        u_int i;

        if (dch == NULL)
                return;
        free(dch->user);
        free(dch->hostname);
        for (i = 0; i < dch->nkeys; i++)
                sshkey_free(dch->keys[i]);
        free(dch->keys);
        free(dch->key_is_ca);
}

static void
free_dest_constraints(struct dest_constraint *dcs, size_t ndcs)
{
        size_t i;

        for (i = 0; i < ndcs; i++) {
                free_dest_constraint_hop(&dcs[i].from);
                free_dest_constraint_hop(&dcs[i].to);
        }
        free(dcs);
}

#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
static void
dup_dest_constraint_hop(const struct dest_constraint_hop *dch,
    struct dest_constraint_hop *out)
{
        u_int i;
        int r;

        out->user = dch->user == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(dch->user);
        out->hostname = dch->hostname == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(dch->hostname);
        out->is_ca = dch->is_ca;
        out->nkeys = dch->nkeys;
        out->keys = out->nkeys == 0 ? NULL :
            xcalloc(out->nkeys, sizeof(*out->keys));
        out->key_is_ca = out->nkeys == 0 ? NULL :
            xcalloc(out->nkeys, sizeof(*out->key_is_ca));
        for (i = 0; i < dch->nkeys; i++) {
                if (dch->keys[i] != NULL &&
                    (r = sshkey_from_private(dch->keys[i],
                    &(out->keys[i]))) != 0)
                        fatal_fr(r, "copy key");
                out->key_is_ca[i] = dch->key_is_ca[i];
        }
}

static struct dest_constraint *
dup_dest_constraints(const struct dest_constraint *dcs, size_t ndcs)
{
        size_t i;
        struct dest_constraint *ret;

        if (ndcs == 0)
                return NULL;
        ret = xcalloc(ndcs, sizeof(*ret));
        for (i = 0; i < ndcs; i++) {
                dup_dest_constraint_hop(&dcs[i].from, &ret[i].from);
                dup_dest_constraint_hop(&dcs[i].to, &ret[i].to);
        }
        return ret;
}
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */

#ifdef DEBUG_CONSTRAINTS
static void
dump_dest_constraint_hop(const struct dest_constraint_hop *dch)
{
        u_int i;
        char *fp;

        debug_f("user %s hostname %s is_ca %d nkeys %u",
            dch->user == NULL ? "(null)" : dch->user,
            dch->hostname == NULL ? "(null)" : dch->hostname,
            dch->is_ca, dch->nkeys);
        for (i = 0; i < dch->nkeys; i++) {
                fp = NULL;
                if (dch->keys[i] != NULL &&
                    (fp = sshkey_fingerprint(dch->keys[i],
                    SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
                        fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
                debug_f("key %u/%u: %s%s%s key_is_ca %d", i, dch->nkeys,
                    dch->keys[i] == NULL ? "" : sshkey_ssh_name(dch->keys[i]),
                    dch->keys[i] == NULL ? "" : " ",
                    dch->keys[i] == NULL ? "none" : fp,
                    dch->key_is_ca[i]);
                free(fp);
        }
}
#endif /* DEBUG_CONSTRAINTS */

static void
dump_dest_constraints(const char *context,
    const struct dest_constraint *dcs, size_t ndcs)
{
#ifdef DEBUG_CONSTRAINTS
        size_t i;

        debug_f("%s: %zu constraints", context, ndcs);
        for (i = 0; i < ndcs; i++) {
                debug_f("constraint %zu / %zu: from: ", i, ndcs);
                dump_dest_constraint_hop(&dcs[i].from);
                debug_f("constraint %zu / %zu: to: ", i, ndcs);
                dump_dest_constraint_hop(&dcs[i].to);
        }
        debug_f("done for %s", context);
#endif /* DEBUG_CONSTRAINTS */
}

static void
free_identity(Identity *id)
{
        sshkey_free(id->key);
        free(id->provider);
        free(id->comment);
        free(id->sk_provider);
        free_dest_constraints(id->dest_constraints, id->ndest_constraints);
        free(id);
}

/*
 * Match 'key' against the key/CA list in a destination constraint hop
 * Returns 0 on success or -1 otherwise.
 */
static int
match_key_hop(const char *tag, const struct sshkey *key,
    const struct dest_constraint_hop *dch)
{
        const char *reason = NULL;
        const char *hostname = dch->hostname ? dch->hostname : "(ORIGIN)";
        u_int i;
        char *fp;

        if (key == NULL)
                return -1;
        /* XXX logspam */
        if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
            SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
                fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
        debug3_f("%s: entering hostname %s, requested key %s %s, %u keys avail",
            tag, hostname, sshkey_type(key), fp, dch->nkeys);
        free(fp);
        for (i = 0; i < dch->nkeys; i++) {
                if (dch->keys[i] == NULL)
                        return -1;
                /* XXX logspam */
                if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(dch->keys[i], SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
                    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
                        fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
                debug3_f("%s: key %u: %s%s %s", tag, i,
                    dch->key_is_ca[i] ? "CA " : "",
                    sshkey_type(dch->keys[i]), fp);
                free(fp);
                if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
                        /* plain key */
                        if (dch->key_is_ca[i] ||
                            !sshkey_equal(key, dch->keys[i]))
                                continue;
                        return 0;
                }
                /* certificate */
                if (!dch->key_is_ca[i])
                        continue;
                if (key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_key == NULL)
                        return -1; /* shouldn't happen */
                if (!sshkey_equal(key->cert->signature_key, dch->keys[i]))
                        continue;
                if (sshkey_cert_check_host(key, hostname, 1,
                    SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, &reason) != 0) {
                        debug_f("cert %s / hostname %s rejected: %s",
                            key->cert->key_id, hostname, reason);
                        continue;
                }
                return 0;
        }
        return -1;
}

/* Check destination constraints on an identity against the hostkey/user */
static int
permitted_by_dest_constraints(const struct sshkey *fromkey,
    const struct sshkey *tokey, Identity *id, const char *user,
    const char **hostnamep)
{
        size_t i;
        struct dest_constraint *d;

        if (hostnamep != NULL)
                *hostnamep = NULL;
        for (i = 0; i < id->ndest_constraints; i++) {
                d = id->dest_constraints + i;
                /* XXX remove logspam */
                debug2_f("constraint %zu %s%s%s (%u keys) > %s%s%s (%u keys)",
                    i, d->from.user ? d->from.user : "",
                    d->from.user ? "@" : "",
                    d->from.hostname ? d->from.hostname : "(ORIGIN)",
                    d->from.nkeys,
                    d->to.user ? d->to.user : "", d->to.user ? "@" : "",
                    d->to.hostname ? d->to.hostname : "(ANY)", d->to.nkeys);

                /* Match 'from' key */
                if (fromkey == NULL) {
                        /* We are matching the first hop */
                        if (d->from.hostname != NULL || d->from.nkeys != 0)
                                continue;
                } else if (match_key_hop("from", fromkey, &d->from) != 0)
                        continue;

                /* Match 'to' key */
                if (tokey != NULL && match_key_hop("to", tokey, &d->to) != 0)
                        continue;

                /* Match user if specified */
                if (d->to.user != NULL && user != NULL &&
                    !match_pattern(user, d->to.user))
                        continue;

                /* successfully matched this constraint */
                if (hostnamep != NULL)
                        *hostnamep = d->to.hostname;
                debug2_f("allowed for hostname %s",
                    d->to.hostname == NULL ? "*" : d->to.hostname);
                return 0;
        }
        /* no match */
        debug2_f("%s identity \"%s\" not permitted for this destination",
            sshkey_type(id->key), id->comment);
        return -1;
}

/*
 * Check whether hostkeys on a SocketEntry and the optionally specified user
 * are permitted by the destination constraints on the Identity.
 * Returns 0 on success or -1 otherwise.
 */
static int
identity_permitted(Identity *id, SocketEntry *e, char *user,
    const char **forward_hostnamep, const char **last_hostnamep)
{
        size_t i;
        const char **hp;
        struct hostkey_sid *hks;
        const struct sshkey *fromkey = NULL;
        const char *test_user;
        char *fp1, *fp2;

        /* XXX remove logspam */
        debug3_f("entering: key %s comment \"%s\", %zu socket bindings, "
            "%zu constraints", sshkey_type(id->key), id->comment,
            e->nsession_ids, id->ndest_constraints);
        if (id->ndest_constraints == 0)
                return 0; /* unconstrained */
        if (e->session_bind_attempted && e->nsession_ids == 0) {
                error_f("previous session bind failed on socket");
                return -1;
        }
        if (e->nsession_ids == 0)
                return 0; /* local use */
        /*
         * Walk through the hops recorded by session_id and try to find a
         * constraint that satisfies each.
         */
        for (i = 0; i < e->nsession_ids; i++) {
                hks = e->session_ids + i;
                if (hks->key == NULL)
                        fatal_f("internal error: no bound key");
                /* XXX remove logspam */
                fp1 = fp2 = NULL;
                if (fromkey != NULL &&
                    (fp1 = sshkey_fingerprint(fromkey, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
                    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
                        fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
                if ((fp2 = sshkey_fingerprint(hks->key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
                    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
                        fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
                debug3_f("socketentry fd=%d, entry %zu %s, "
                    "from hostkey %s %s to user %s hostkey %s %s",
                    e->fd, i, hks->forwarded ? "FORWARD" : "AUTH",
                    fromkey ? sshkey_type(fromkey) : "(ORIGIN)",
                    fromkey ? fp1 : "", user ? user : "(ANY)",
                    sshkey_type(hks->key), fp2);
                free(fp1);
                free(fp2);
                /*
                 * Record the hostnames for the initial forwarding and
                 * the final destination.
                 */
                hp = NULL;
                if (i == e->nsession_ids - 1)
                        hp = last_hostnamep;
                else if (i == 0)
                        hp = forward_hostnamep;
                /* Special handling for final recorded binding */
                test_user = NULL;
                if (i == e->nsession_ids - 1) {
                        /* Can only check user at final hop */
                        test_user = user;
                        /*
                         * user is only presented for signature requests.
                         * If this is the case, make sure last binding is not
                         * for a forwarding.
                         */
                        if (hks->forwarded && user != NULL) {
                                error_f("tried to sign on forwarding hop");
                                return -1;
                        }
                } else if (!hks->forwarded) {
                        error_f("tried to forward though signing bind");
                        return -1;
                }
                if (permitted_by_dest_constraints(fromkey, hks->key, id,
                    test_user, hp) != 0)
                        return -1;
                fromkey = hks->key;
        }
        /*
         * Another special case: if the last bound session ID was for a
         * forwarding, and this function is not being called to check a sign
         * request (i.e. no 'user' supplied), then only permit the key if
         * there is a permission that would allow it to be used at another
         * destination. This hides keys that are allowed to be used to
         * authenticate *to* a host but not permitted for *use* beyond it.
         */
        hks = &e->session_ids[e->nsession_ids - 1];
        if (hks->forwarded && user == NULL &&
            permitted_by_dest_constraints(hks->key, NULL, id,
            NULL, NULL) != 0) {
                debug3_f("key permitted at host but not after");
                return -1;
        }

        /* success */
        return 0;
}

static int
socket_is_remote(SocketEntry *e)
{
        return e->session_bind_attempted || (e->nsession_ids != 0);
}

/* return matching private key for given public key */
static Identity *
lookup_identity(struct sshkey *key)
{
        Identity *id;

        TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &idtab->idlist, next) {
                if (sshkey_equal(key, id->key))
                        return (id);
        }
        return (NULL);
}

/* Check confirmation of keysign request */
static int
confirm_key(Identity *id, const char *extra)
{
        char *p;
        int ret = -1;

        p = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
        if (p != NULL &&
            ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.%s%s",
            id->comment, p,
            extra == NULL ? "" : "\n", extra == NULL ? "" : extra))
                ret = 0;
        free(p);

        return (ret);
}

static void
send_status(SocketEntry *e, int success)
{
        int r;

        if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(e->output, 1)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshbuf_put_u8(e->output, success ?
            SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
                fatal_fr(r, "compose");
}

/* send list of supported public keys to 'client' */
static void
process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e)
{
        Identity *id;
        struct sshbuf *msg, *keys;
        int r;
        u_int i = 0, nentries = 0;
        char *fp;

        debug2_f("entering");

        if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (keys = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
                fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
        TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &idtab->idlist, next) {
                if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
                    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
                        fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
                debug_f("key %u / %u: %s %s", i++, idtab->nentries,
                    sshkey_ssh_name(id->key), fp);
                dump_dest_constraints(__func__,
                    id->dest_constraints, id->ndest_constraints);
                free(fp);
                /* identity not visible, don't include in response */
                if (identity_permitted(id, e, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0)
                        continue;
                if ((r = sshkey_puts_opts(id->key, keys,
                    SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO)) != 0 ||
                    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(keys, id->comment)) != 0) {
                        error_fr(r, "compose key/comment");
                        continue;
                }
                nentries++;
        }
        debug2_f("replying with %u allowed of %u available keys",
            nentries, idtab->nentries);
        if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, nentries)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshbuf_putb(msg, keys)) != 0)
                fatal_fr(r, "compose");
        if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
                fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
        sshbuf_free(msg);
        sshbuf_free(keys);
}


static char *
agent_decode_alg(struct sshkey *key, u_int flags)
{
        if (key->type == KEY_RSA) {
                if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256)
                        return "rsa-sha2-256";
                else if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512)
                        return "rsa-sha2-512";
        } else if (key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT) {
                if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256)
                        return "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com";
                else if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512)
                        return "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com";
        }
        return NULL;
}

/*
 * Attempt to parse the contents of a buffer as a SSH publickey userauth
 * request, checking its contents for consistency and matching the embedded
 * key against the one that is being used for signing.
 * Note: does not modify msg buffer.
 * Optionally extract the username, session ID and/or hostkey from the request.
 */
static int
parse_userauth_request(struct sshbuf *msg, const struct sshkey *expected_key,
    char **userp, struct sshbuf **sess_idp, struct sshkey **hostkeyp)
{
        struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sess_id = NULL;
        char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *pkalg = NULL;
        int r;
        u_char t, sig_follows;
        struct sshkey *mkey = NULL, *hostkey = NULL;

        if (userp != NULL)
                *userp = NULL;
        if (sess_idp != NULL)
                *sess_idp = NULL;
        if (hostkeyp != NULL)
                *hostkeyp = NULL;
        if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(msg)) == NULL)
                fatal_f("sshbuf_fromb");

        /* SSH userauth request */
        if ((r = sshbuf_froms(b, &sess_id)) != 0)
                goto out;
        if (sshbuf_len(sess_id) == 0) {
                r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                goto out;
        }
        if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &t)) != 0 || /* SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST */
            (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &user, NULL)) != 0 || /* server user */
            (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &service, NULL)) != 0 || /* service */
            (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &method, NULL)) != 0 || /* method */
            (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &sig_follows)) != 0 || /* sig-follows */
            (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 || /* alg */
            (r = sshkey_froms(b, &mkey)) != 0) /* key */
                goto out;
        if (t != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST ||
            sig_follows != 1 ||
            strcmp(service, "ssh-connection") != 0 ||
            !sshkey_equal(expected_key, mkey) ||
            sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg) != expected_key->type) {
                r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                goto out;
        }
        if (strcmp(method, "publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com") == 0) {
                if ((r = sshkey_froms(b, &hostkey)) != 0)
                        goto out;
        } else if (strcmp(method, "publickey") != 0) {
                r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                goto out;
        }
        if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
                r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                goto out;
        }
        /* success */
        r = 0;
        debug3_f("well formed userauth");
        if (userp != NULL) {
                *userp = user;
                user = NULL;
        }
        if (sess_idp != NULL) {
                *sess_idp = sess_id;
                sess_id = NULL;
        }
        if (hostkeyp != NULL) {
                *hostkeyp = hostkey;
                hostkey = NULL;
        }
 out:
        sshbuf_free(b);
        sshbuf_free(sess_id);
        free(user);
        free(service);
        free(method);
        free(pkalg);
        sshkey_free(mkey);
        sshkey_free(hostkey);
        return r;
}

/*
 * Attempt to parse the contents of a buffer as a SSHSIG signature request.
 * Note: does not modify buffer.
 */
static int
parse_sshsig_request(struct sshbuf *msg)
{
        int r;
        struct sshbuf *b;

        if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(msg)) == NULL)
                fatal_f("sshbuf_fromb");

        if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(b, 0, "SSHSIG", 6)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshbuf_consume(b, 6)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* namespace */
            (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */
            (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* hashalg */
            (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0) /* H(msg) */
                goto out;
        if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
                r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                goto out;
        }
        /* success */
        r = 0;
 out:
        sshbuf_free(b);
        return r;
}

/*
 * This function inspects a message to be signed by a FIDO key that has a
 * web-like application string (i.e. one that does not begin with "ssh:".
 * It checks that the message is one of those expected for SSH operations
 * (pubkey userauth, sshsig, CA key signing) to exclude signing challenges
 * for the web.
 */
static int
check_websafe_message_contents(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *data)
{
        if (parse_userauth_request(data, key, NULL, NULL, NULL) == 0) {
                debug_f("signed data matches public key userauth request");
                return 1;
        }
        if (parse_sshsig_request(data) == 0) {
                debug_f("signed data matches SSHSIG signature request");
                return 1;
        }

        /* XXX check CA signature operation */

        error("web-origin key attempting to sign non-SSH message");
        return 0;
}

static int
buf_equal(const struct sshbuf *a, const struct sshbuf *b)
{
        if (sshbuf_ptr(a) == NULL || sshbuf_ptr(b) == NULL)
                return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
        if (sshbuf_len(a) != sshbuf_len(b))
                return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
        if (timingsafe_bcmp(sshbuf_ptr(a), sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(a)) != 0)
                return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
        return 0;
}

/* ssh2 only */
static void
process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
{
        u_char *signature = NULL;
        size_t slen = 0;
        u_int compat = 0, flags;
        int r, ok = -1, retried = 0;
        char *fp = NULL, *pin = NULL, *prompt = NULL;
        char *user = NULL, *sig_dest = NULL;
        const char *fwd_host = NULL, *dest_host = NULL;
        struct sshbuf *msg = NULL, *data = NULL, *sid = NULL;
        struct sshkey *key = NULL, *hostkey = NULL;
        struct identity *id;
        struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL;

        debug_f("entering");

        if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (data = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
                fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
        if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(e->request, data)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &flags)) != 0) {
                error_fr(r, "parse");
                goto send;
        }

        if ((id = lookup_identity(key)) == NULL) {
                verbose_f("%s key not found", sshkey_type(key));
                goto send;
        }
        if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
            SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
                fatal_f("fingerprint failed");

        if (id->ndest_constraints != 0) {
                if (e->nsession_ids == 0) {
                        logit_f("refusing use of destination-constrained key "
                            "to sign on unbound connection");
                        goto send;
                }
                if (parse_userauth_request(data, key, &user, &sid,
                    &hostkey) != 0) {
                        logit_f("refusing use of destination-constrained key "
                           "to sign an unidentified signature");
                        goto send;
                }
                /* XXX logspam */
                debug_f("user=%s", user);
                if (identity_permitted(id, e, user, &fwd_host, &dest_host) != 0)
                        goto send;
                /* XXX display fwd_host/dest_host in askpass UI */
                /*
                 * Ensure that the session ID is the most recent one
                 * registered on the socket - it should have been bound by
                 * ssh immediately before userauth.
                 */
                if (buf_equal(sid,
                    e->session_ids[e->nsession_ids - 1].sid) != 0) {
                        error_f("unexpected session ID (%zu listed) on "
                            "signature request for target user %s with "
                            "key %s %s", e->nsession_ids, user,
                            sshkey_type(id->key), fp);
                        goto send;
                }
                /*
                 * Ensure that the hostkey embedded in the signature matches
                 * the one most recently bound to the socket. An exception is
                 * made for the initial forwarding hop.
                 */
                if (e->nsession_ids > 1 && hostkey == NULL) {
                        error_f("refusing use of destination-constrained key: "
                            "no hostkey recorded in signature for forwarded "
                            "connection");
                        goto send;
                }
                if (hostkey != NULL && !sshkey_equal(hostkey,
                    e->session_ids[e->nsession_ids - 1].key)) {
                        error_f("refusing use of destination-constrained key: "
                            "mismatch between hostkey in request and most "
                            "recently bound session");
                        goto send;
                }
                xasprintf(&sig_dest, "public key authentication request for "
                    "user \"%s\" to listed host", user);
        }
        if (id->confirm && confirm_key(id, sig_dest) != 0) {
                verbose_f("user refused key");
                goto send;
        }
        if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key)) {
                if (restrict_websafe &&
                    match_pattern_list(id->key->sk_application,
                    websafe_allowlist, 0) != 1 &&
                    !check_websafe_message_contents(key, data)) {
                        /* error already logged */
                        goto send;
                }
                if (id->key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) {
                        notifier = notify_start(0,
                            "Confirm user presence for key %s %s%s%s",
                            sshkey_type(id->key), fp,
                            sig_dest == NULL ? "" : "\n",
                            sig_dest == NULL ? "" : sig_dest);
                }
        }
 retry_pin:
        if ((r = sshkey_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen,
            sshbuf_ptr(data), sshbuf_len(data), agent_decode_alg(key, flags),
            id->sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0) {
                debug_fr(r, "sshkey_sign");
                if (pin == NULL && !retried && sshkey_is_sk(id->key) &&
                    r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
                        notify_complete(notifier, NULL);
                        notifier = NULL;
                        /* XXX include sig_dest */
                        xasprintf(&prompt, "Enter PIN%sfor %s key %s: ",
                            (id->key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) ?
                            " and confirm user presence " : " ",
                            sshkey_type(id->key), fp);
                        pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_USE_ASKPASS);
                        retried = 1;
                        goto retry_pin;
                }
                error_fr(r, "sshkey_sign");
                goto send;
        }
        /* Success */
        ok = 0;
        debug_f("good signature");
 send:
        notify_complete(notifier, "User presence confirmed");

        if (ok == 0) {
                if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE)) != 0 ||
                    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, signature, slen)) != 0)
                        fatal_fr(r, "compose");
        } else if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
                fatal_fr(r, "compose failure");

        if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
                fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");

        sshbuf_free(sid);
        sshbuf_free(data);
        sshbuf_free(msg);
        sshkey_free(key);
        sshkey_free(hostkey);
        free(fp);
        free(signature);
        free(sig_dest);
        free(user);
        free(prompt);
        if (pin != NULL)
                freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
}

/* shared */
static void
process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e)
{
        int r, success = 0;
        struct sshkey *key = NULL;
        Identity *id;

        debug2_f("entering");
        if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0) {
                error_fr(r, "parse key");
                goto done;
        }
        if ((id = lookup_identity(key)) == NULL) {
                debug_f("key not found");
                goto done;
        }
        /* identity not visible, cannot be removed */
        if (identity_permitted(id, e, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0)
                goto done; /* error already logged */
        /* We have this key, free it. */
        if (idtab->nentries < 1)
                fatal_f("internal error: nentries %d", idtab->nentries);
        TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
        free_identity(id);
        idtab->nentries--;
        success = 1;
 done:
        sshkey_free(key);
        send_status(e, success);
}

static void
remove_all_identities(void)
{
        Identity *id;

        debug2_f("entering");
        /* Loop over all identities and clear the keys. */
        for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id;
            id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist)) {
                TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
                free_identity(id);
        }

        /* Mark that there are no identities. */
        idtab->nentries = 0;
}

static void
process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e)
{
        remove_all_identities();

        /* Send success. */
        send_status(e, 1);
}

/* removes expired keys and returns number of seconds until the next expiry */
static time_t
reaper(void)
{
        time_t deadline = 0, now = monotime();
        Identity *id, *nxt;

        for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
                nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next);
                if (id->death == 0)
                        continue;
                if (now >= id->death) {
                        debug("expiring key '%s'", id->comment);
                        TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
                        free_identity(id);
                        idtab->nentries--;
                } else
                        deadline = (deadline == 0) ? id->death :
                            MINIMUM(deadline, id->death);
        }
        if (deadline == 0 || deadline <= now)
                return 0;
        else
                return (deadline - now);
}

static int
parse_dest_constraint_hop(struct sshbuf *b, struct dest_constraint_hop *dch)
{
        u_char key_is_ca;
        size_t elen = 0;
        int r;
        struct sshkey *k = NULL;
        char *fp;

        memset(dch, '\0', sizeof(*dch));
        if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &dch->user, NULL)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &dch->hostname, NULL)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, &elen)) != 0) {
                error_fr(r, "parse");
                goto out;
        }
        if (elen != 0) {
                error_f("unsupported extensions (len %zu)", elen);
                r = SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
                goto out;
        }
        if (*dch->hostname == '\0') {
                free(dch->hostname);
                dch->hostname = NULL;
        }
        if (*dch->user == '\0') {
                free(dch->user);
                dch->user = NULL;
        }
        while (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
                dch->keys = xrecallocarray(dch->keys, dch->nkeys,
                    dch->nkeys + 1, sizeof(*dch->keys));
                dch->key_is_ca = xrecallocarray(dch->key_is_ca, dch->nkeys,
                    dch->nkeys + 1, sizeof(*dch->key_is_ca));
                if ((r = sshkey_froms(b, &k)) != 0 ||
                    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &key_is_ca)) != 0)
                        goto out;
                if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(k, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
                    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
                        fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
                debug3_f("%s%s%s: adding %skey %s %s",
                    dch->user == NULL ? "" : dch->user,
                    dch->user == NULL ? "" : "@",
                    dch->hostname, key_is_ca ? "CA " : "", sshkey_type(k), fp);
                free(fp);
                dch->keys[dch->nkeys] = k;
                dch->key_is_ca[dch->nkeys] = key_is_ca != 0;
                dch->nkeys++;
                k = NULL; /* transferred */
        }
        /* success */
        r = 0;
 out:
        sshkey_free(k);
        return r;
}

static int
parse_dest_constraint(struct sshbuf *m, struct dest_constraint *dc)
{
        struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *frombuf = NULL, *tobuf = NULL;
        int r;
        size_t elen = 0;

        debug3_f("entering");

        memset(dc, '\0', sizeof(*dc));
        if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshbuf_froms(b, &frombuf)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshbuf_froms(b, &tobuf)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, &elen)) != 0) {
                error_fr(r, "parse");
                goto out;
        }
        if ((r = parse_dest_constraint_hop(frombuf, &dc->from)) != 0 ||
            (r = parse_dest_constraint_hop(tobuf, &dc->to)) != 0)
                goto out; /* already logged */
        if (elen != 0) {
                error_f("unsupported extensions (len %zu)", elen);
                r = SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
                goto out;
        }
        debug2_f("parsed %s (%u keys) > %s%s%s (%u keys)",
            dc->from.hostname ? dc->from.hostname : "(ORIGIN)", dc->from.nkeys,
            dc->to.user ? dc->to.user : "", dc->to.user ? "@" : "",
            dc->to.hostname ? dc->to.hostname : "(ANY)", dc->to.nkeys);
        /* check consistency */
        if ((dc->from.hostname == NULL) != (dc->from.nkeys == 0) ||
            dc->from.user != NULL) {
                error_f("inconsistent \"from\" specification");
                r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                goto out;
        }
        if (dc->to.hostname == NULL || dc->to.nkeys == 0) {
                error_f("incomplete \"to\" specification");
                r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                goto out;
        }
        /* success */
        r = 0;
 out:
        sshbuf_free(b);
        sshbuf_free(frombuf);
        sshbuf_free(tobuf);
        return r;
}

static int
parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp,
    struct dest_constraint **dcsp, size_t *ndcsp, int *cert_onlyp,
    struct sshkey ***certs, size_t *ncerts)
{
        char *ext_name = NULL;
        int r;
        struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
        u_char v;
        struct sshkey *k;

        if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &ext_name, NULL)) != 0) {
                error_fr(r, "parse constraint extension");
                goto out;
        }
        debug_f("constraint ext %s", ext_name);
        if (strcmp(ext_name, "sk-provider@openssh.com") == 0) {
                if (sk_providerp == NULL) {
                        error_f("%s not valid here", ext_name);
                        r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                        goto out;
                }
                if (*sk_providerp != NULL) {
                        error_f("%s already set", ext_name);
                        r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                        goto out;
                }
                if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, sk_providerp, NULL)) != 0) {
                        error_fr(r, "parse %s", ext_name);
                        goto out;
                }
        } else if (strcmp(ext_name,
            "restrict-destination-v00@openssh.com") == 0) {
                if (*dcsp != NULL) {
                        error_f("%s already set", ext_name);
                        r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                        goto out;
                }
                if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0) {
                        error_fr(r, "parse %s outer", ext_name);
                        goto out;
                }
                while (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
                        if (*ndcsp >= AGENT_MAX_DEST_CONSTRAINTS) {
                                error_f("too many %s constraints", ext_name);
                                r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                                goto out;
                        }
                        *dcsp = xrecallocarray(*dcsp, *ndcsp, *ndcsp + 1,
                            sizeof(**dcsp));
                        if ((r = parse_dest_constraint(b,
                            *dcsp + (*ndcsp)++)) != 0)
                                goto out; /* error already logged */
                }
        } else if (strcmp(ext_name,
            "associated-certs-v00@openssh.com") == 0) {
                if (certs == NULL || ncerts == NULL || cert_onlyp == NULL) {
                        error_f("%s not valid here", ext_name);
                        r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                        goto out;
                }
                if (*certs != NULL) {
                        error_f("%s already set", ext_name);
                        r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                        goto out;
                }
                if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &v)) != 0 ||
                    (r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0) {
                        error_fr(r, "parse %s", ext_name);
                        goto out;
                }
                *cert_onlyp = v != 0;
                while (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
                        if (*ncerts >= AGENT_MAX_EXT_CERTS) {
                                error_f("too many %s constraints", ext_name);
                                r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                                goto out;
                        }
                        *certs = xrecallocarray(*certs, *ncerts, *ncerts + 1,
                            sizeof(**certs));
                        if ((r = sshkey_froms(b, &k)) != 0) {
                                error_fr(r, "parse key");
                                goto out;
                        }
                        (*certs)[(*ncerts)++] = k;
                }
        } else {
                error_f("unsupported constraint \"%s\"", ext_name);
                r = SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
                goto out;
        }
        /* success */
        r = 0;
 out:
        free(ext_name);
        sshbuf_free(b);
        return r;
}

static int
parse_key_constraints(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshkey *k, time_t *deathp,
    u_int *secondsp, int *confirmp, char **sk_providerp,
    struct dest_constraint **dcsp, size_t *ndcsp,
    int *cert_onlyp, size_t *ncerts, struct sshkey ***certs)
{
        u_char ctype;
        int r;
        u_int seconds, maxsign = 0;

        while (sshbuf_len(m)) {
                if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ctype)) != 0) {
                        error_fr(r, "parse constraint type");
                        goto out;
                }
                switch (ctype) {
                case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
                        if (*deathp != 0) {
                                error_f("lifetime already set");
                                r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                                goto out;
                        }
                        if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &seconds)) != 0) {
                                error_fr(r, "parse lifetime constraint");
                                goto out;
                        }
                        *deathp = monotime() + seconds;
                        *secondsp = seconds;
                        break;
                case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
                        if (*confirmp != 0) {
                                error_f("confirm already set");
                                r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                                goto out;
                        }
                        *confirmp = 1;
                        break;
                case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN:
                        if (k == NULL) {
                                error_f("maxsign not valid here");
                                r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                                goto out;
                        }
                        if (maxsign != 0) {
                                error_f("maxsign already set");
                                r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                                goto out;
                        }
                        if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &maxsign)) != 0) {
                                error_fr(r, "parse maxsign constraint");
                                goto out;
                        }
                        if ((r = sshkey_enable_maxsign(k, maxsign)) != 0) {
                                error_fr(r, "enable maxsign");
                                goto out;
                        }
                        break;
                case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION:
                        if ((r = parse_key_constraint_extension(m,
                            sk_providerp, dcsp, ndcsp,
                            cert_onlyp, certs, ncerts)) != 0)
                                goto out; /* error already logged */
                        break;
                default:
                        error_f("Unknown constraint %d", ctype);
                        r = SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
                        goto out;
                }
        }
        /* success */
        r = 0;
 out:
        return r;
}

static void
process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e)
{
        Identity *id;
        int success = 0, confirm = 0;
        char *fp, *comment = NULL, *sk_provider = NULL;
        char canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
        time_t death = 0;
        u_int seconds = 0;
        struct dest_constraint *dest_constraints = NULL;
        size_t ndest_constraints = 0;
        struct sshkey *k = NULL;
        int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;

        debug2_f("entering");
        if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k)) != 0 ||
            k == NULL ||
            (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) {
                error_fr(r, "parse");
                goto out;
        }
        if (parse_key_constraints(e->request, k, &death, &seconds, &confirm,
            &sk_provider, &dest_constraints, &ndest_constraints,
            NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
                error_f("failed to parse constraints");
                sshbuf_reset(e->request);
                goto out;
        }
        dump_dest_constraints(__func__, dest_constraints, ndest_constraints);

        if (sk_provider != NULL) {
                if (!sshkey_is_sk(k)) {
                        error("Cannot add provider: %s is not an "
                            "authenticator-hosted key", sshkey_type(k));
                        goto out;
                }
                if (strcasecmp(sk_provider, "internal") == 0) {
                        debug_f("internal provider");
                } else {
                        if (socket_is_remote(e) && !remote_add_provider) {
                                verbose("failed add of SK provider \"%.100s\": "
                                    "remote addition of providers is disabled",
                                    sk_provider);
                                goto out;
                        }
                        if (realpath(sk_provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
                                verbose("failed provider \"%.100s\": "
                                    "realpath: %s", sk_provider,
                                    strerror(errno));
                                goto out;
                        }
                        free(sk_provider);
                        sk_provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
                        if (match_pattern_list(sk_provider,
                            allowed_providers, 0) != 1) {
                                error("Refusing add key: "
                                    "provider %s not allowed", sk_provider);
                                goto out;
                        }
                }
        }
        if ((r = sshkey_shield_private(k)) != 0) {
                error_fr(r, "shield private");
                goto out;
        }
        if (lifetime && !death)
                death = monotime() + lifetime;
        if ((id = lookup_identity(k)) == NULL) {
                id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
                TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
                /* Increment the number of identities. */
                idtab->nentries++;
        } else {
                /* identity not visible, do not update */
                if (identity_permitted(id, e, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0)
                        goto out; /* error already logged */
                /* key state might have been updated */
                sshkey_free(id->key);
                free(id->comment);
                free(id->sk_provider);
                free_dest_constraints(id->dest_constraints,
                    id->ndest_constraints);
        }
        /* success */
        id->key = k;
        id->comment = comment;
        id->death = death;
        id->confirm = confirm;
        id->sk_provider = sk_provider;
        id->dest_constraints = dest_constraints;
        id->ndest_constraints = ndest_constraints;

        if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(k, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
            SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
                fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
        debug_f("add %s %s \"%.100s\" (life: %u) (confirm: %u) "
            "(provider: %s) (destination constraints: %zu)",
            sshkey_ssh_name(k), fp, comment, seconds, confirm,
            sk_provider == NULL ? "none" : sk_provider, ndest_constraints);
        free(fp);
        /* transferred */
        k = NULL;
        comment = NULL;
        sk_provider = NULL;
        dest_constraints = NULL;
        ndest_constraints = 0;
        success = 1;
 out:
        free(sk_provider);
        free(comment);
        sshkey_free(k);
        free_dest_constraints(dest_constraints, ndest_constraints);
        send_status(e, success);
}

/* XXX todo: encrypt sensitive data with passphrase */
static void
process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock)
{
        int r, success = 0, delay;
        char *passwd;
        u_char passwdhash[LOCK_SIZE];
        static u_int fail_count = 0;
        size_t pwlen;

        debug2_f("entering");
        /*
         * This is deliberately fatal: the user has requested that we lock,
         * but we can't parse their request properly. The only safe thing to
         * do is abort.
         */
        if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &passwd, &pwlen)) != 0)
                fatal_fr(r, "parse");
        if (pwlen == 0) {
                debug("empty password not supported");
        } else if (locked && !lock) {
                if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt),
                    passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0)
                        fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf");
                if (timingsafe_bcmp(passwdhash, lock_pwhash, LOCK_SIZE) == 0) {
                        debug("agent unlocked");
                        locked = 0;
                        fail_count = 0;
                        explicit_bzero(lock_pwhash, sizeof(lock_pwhash));
                        success = 1;
                } else {
                        /* delay in 0.1s increments up to 10s */
                        if (fail_count < 100)
                                fail_count++;
                        delay = 100000 * fail_count;
                        debug("unlock failed, delaying %0.1lf seconds",
                            (double)delay/1000000);
                        usleep(delay);
                }
                explicit_bzero(passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash));
        } else if (!locked && lock) {
                debug("agent locked");
                locked = 1;
                arc4random_buf(lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt));
                if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt),
                    lock_pwhash, sizeof(lock_pwhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0)
                        fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf");
                success = 1;
        }
        freezero(passwd, pwlen);
        send_status(e, success);
}

static void
no_identities(SocketEntry *e)
{
        struct sshbuf *msg;
        int r;

        if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
                fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
        if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
                fatal_fr(r, "compose");
        sshbuf_free(msg);
}

#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
/* Add an identity to idlist; takes ownership of 'key' and 'comment' */
static void
add_p11_identity(struct sshkey *key, char *comment, const char *provider,
    time_t death, u_int confirm, struct dest_constraint *dest_constraints,
    size_t ndest_constraints)
{
        Identity *id;

        if (lookup_identity(key) != NULL) {
                sshkey_free(key);
                free(comment);
                return;
        }
        id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
        id->key = key;
        id->comment = comment;
        id->provider = xstrdup(provider);
        id->death = death;
        id->confirm = confirm;
        id->dest_constraints = dup_dest_constraints(dest_constraints,
            ndest_constraints);
        id->ndest_constraints = ndest_constraints;
        TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
        idtab->nentries++;
}

static void
process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
{
        char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
        char **comments = NULL;
        int r, i, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
        u_int seconds = 0;
        time_t death = 0;
        struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k;
        struct dest_constraint *dest_constraints = NULL;
        size_t j, ndest_constraints = 0, ncerts = 0;
        struct sshkey **certs = NULL;
        int cert_only = 0;

        debug2_f("entering");
        if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) {
                error_fr(r, "parse");
                goto send;
        }
        if (parse_key_constraints(e->request, NULL, &death, &seconds, &confirm,
            NULL, &dest_constraints, &ndest_constraints, &cert_only,
            &ncerts, &certs) != 0) {
                error_f("failed to parse constraints");
                goto send;
        }
        dump_dest_constraints(__func__, dest_constraints, ndest_constraints);
        if (socket_is_remote(e) && !remote_add_provider) {
                verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": remote addition of "
                    "providers is disabled", provider);
                goto send;
        }
        if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
                verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
                    provider, strerror(errno));
                goto send;
        }
        if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, allowed_providers, 0) != 1) {
                verbose("refusing PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": "
                    "provider not allowed", canonical_provider);
                goto send;
        }
        debug_f("add %.100s", canonical_provider);
        if (lifetime && !death)
                death = monotime() + lifetime;

        count = pkcs11_add_provider(canonical_provider, pin, &keys, &comments);
        for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
                if (comments[i] == NULL || comments[i][0] == '\0') {
                        free(comments[i]);
                        comments[i] = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
                }
                for (j = 0; j < ncerts; j++) {
                        if (!sshkey_is_cert(certs[j]))
                                continue;
                        if (!sshkey_equal_public(keys[i], certs[j]))
                                continue;
                        if (pkcs11_make_cert(keys[i], certs[j], &k) != 0)
                                continue;
                        add_p11_identity(k, xstrdup(comments[i]),
                            canonical_provider, death, confirm,
                            dest_constraints, ndest_constraints);
                        success = 1;
                }
                if (!cert_only && lookup_identity(keys[i]) == NULL) {
                        add_p11_identity(keys[i], comments[i],
                            canonical_provider, death, confirm,
                            dest_constraints, ndest_constraints);
                        keys[i] = NULL;         /* transferred */
                        comments[i] = NULL;     /* transferred */
                        success = 1;
                }
                /* XXX update constraints for existing keys */
                sshkey_free(keys[i]);
                free(comments[i]);
        }
send:
        free(pin);
        free(provider);
        free(keys);
        free(comments);
        free_dest_constraints(dest_constraints, ndest_constraints);
        for (j = 0; j < ncerts; j++)
                sshkey_free(certs[j]);
        free(certs);
        send_status(e, success);
}

static void
process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
{
        char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
        int r, success = 0;
        Identity *id, *nxt;

        debug2_f("entering");
        if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) {
                error_fr(r, "parse");
                goto send;
        }
        free(pin);

        if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
                verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
                    provider, strerror(errno));
                goto send;
        }

        debug_f("remove %.100s", canonical_provider);
        for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
                nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next);
                /* Skip file--based keys */
                if (id->provider == NULL)
                        continue;
                if (!strcmp(canonical_provider, id->provider)) {
                        TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
                        free_identity(id);
                        idtab->nentries--;
                }
        }
        if (pkcs11_del_provider(canonical_provider) == 0)
                success = 1;
        else
                error_f("pkcs11_del_provider failed");
send:
        free(provider);
        send_status(e, success);
}
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */

static int
process_ext_session_bind(SocketEntry *e)
{
        int r, sid_match, key_match;
        struct sshkey *key = NULL;
        struct sshbuf *sid = NULL, *sig = NULL;
        char *fp = NULL;
        size_t i;
        u_char fwd = 0;

        debug2_f("entering");
        e->session_bind_attempted = 1;
        if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshbuf_froms(e->request, &sid)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshbuf_froms(e->request, &sig)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &fwd)) != 0) {
                error_fr(r, "parse");
                goto out;
        }
        if (sshbuf_len(sid) > AGENT_MAX_SID_LEN) {
                error_f("session ID too long");
                goto out;
        }
        if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
            SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
                fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
        /* check signature with hostkey on session ID */
        if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, sshbuf_ptr(sig), sshbuf_len(sig),
            sshbuf_ptr(sid), sshbuf_len(sid), NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) {
                error_fr(r, "sshkey_verify for %s %s", sshkey_type(key), fp);
                goto out;
        }
        /* check whether sid/key already recorded */
        for (i = 0; i < e->nsession_ids; i++) {
                if (!e->session_ids[i].forwarded) {
                        error_f("attempt to bind session ID to socket "
                            "previously bound for authentication attempt");
                        r = -1;
                        goto out;
                }
                sid_match = buf_equal(sid, e->session_ids[i].sid) == 0;
                key_match = sshkey_equal(key, e->session_ids[i].key);
                if (sid_match && key_match) {
                        debug_f("session ID already recorded for %s %s",
                            sshkey_type(key), fp);
                        r = 0;
                        goto out;
                } else if (sid_match) {
                        error_f("session ID recorded against different key "
                            "for %s %s", sshkey_type(key), fp);
                        r = -1;
                        goto out;
                }
                /*
                 * new sid with previously-seen key can happen, e.g. multiple
                 * connections to the same host.
                 */
        }
        /* record new key/sid */
        if (e->nsession_ids >= AGENT_MAX_SESSION_IDS) {
                error_f("too many session IDs recorded");
                r = -1;
                goto out;
        }
        e->session_ids = xrecallocarray(e->session_ids, e->nsession_ids,
            e->nsession_ids + 1, sizeof(*e->session_ids));
        i = e->nsession_ids++;
        debug_f("recorded %s %s (slot %zu of %d)", sshkey_type(key), fp, i,
            AGENT_MAX_SESSION_IDS);
        e->session_ids[i].key = key;
        e->session_ids[i].forwarded = fwd != 0;
        key = NULL; /* transferred */
        /* can't transfer sid; it's refcounted and scoped to request's life */
        if ((e->session_ids[i].sid = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
                fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
        if ((r = sshbuf_putb(e->session_ids[i].sid, sid)) != 0)
                fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putb session ID");
        /* success */
        r = 0;
 out:
        free(fp);
        sshkey_free(key);
        sshbuf_free(sid);
        sshbuf_free(sig);
        return r == 0 ? 1 : 0;
}

static void
process_extension(SocketEntry *e)
{
        int r, success = 0;
        char *name;

        debug2_f("entering");
        if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &name, NULL)) != 0) {
                error_fr(r, "parse");
                goto send;
        }
        if (strcmp(name, "session-bind@openssh.com") == 0)
                success = process_ext_session_bind(e);
        else
                debug_f("unsupported extension \"%s\"", name);
        free(name);
send:
        send_status(e, success);
}
/*
 * dispatch incoming message.
 * returns 1 on success, 0 for incomplete messages or -1 on error.
 */
static int
process_message(u_int socknum)
{
        u_int msg_len;
        u_char type;
        const u_char *cp;
        int r;
        SocketEntry *e;

        if (socknum >= sockets_alloc)
                fatal_f("sock %u >= allocated %u", socknum, sockets_alloc);
        e = &sockets[socknum];

        if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < 5)
                return 0;               /* Incomplete message header. */
        cp = sshbuf_ptr(e->input);
        msg_len = PEEK_U32(cp);
        if (msg_len > AGENT_MAX_LEN) {
                debug_f("socket %u (fd=%d) message too long %u > %u",
                    socknum, e->fd, msg_len, AGENT_MAX_LEN);
                return -1;
        }
        if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < msg_len + 4)
                return 0;               /* Incomplete message body. */

        /* move the current input to e->request */
        sshbuf_reset(e->request);
        if ((r = sshbuf_get_stringb(e->input, e->request)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0) {
                if (r == SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE ||
                    r == SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE) {
                        error_fr(r, "parse");
                        return -1;
                }
                fatal_fr(r, "parse");
        }

        debug_f("socket %u (fd=%d) type %d", socknum, e->fd, type);

        /* check whether agent is locked */
        if (locked && type != SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK) {
                sshbuf_reset(e->request);
                switch (type) {
                case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES:
                        /* send empty lists */
                        no_identities(e);
                        break;
                default:
                        /* send a fail message for all other request types */
                        send_status(e, 0);
                }
                return 1;
        }

        switch (type) {
        case SSH_AGENTC_LOCK:
        case SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK:
                process_lock_agent(e, type == SSH_AGENTC_LOCK);
                break;
        case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES:
                process_remove_all_identities(e); /* safe for !WITH_SSH1 */
                break;
        /* ssh2 */
        case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST:
                process_sign_request2(e);
                break;
        case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES:
                process_request_identities(e);
                break;
        case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY:
        case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED:
                process_add_identity(e);
                break;
        case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY:
                process_remove_identity(e);
                break;
        case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES:
                process_remove_all_identities(e);
                break;
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
        case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY:
        case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED:
                process_add_smartcard_key(e);
                break;
        case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY:
                process_remove_smartcard_key(e);
                break;
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
        case SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION:
                process_extension(e);
                break;
        default:
                /* Unknown message.  Respond with failure. */
                error("Unknown message %d", type);
                sshbuf_reset(e->request);
                send_status(e, 0);
                break;
        }
        return 1;
}

static void
new_socket(sock_type type, int fd)
{
        u_int i, old_alloc, new_alloc;

        debug_f("type = %s", type == AUTH_CONNECTION ? "CONNECTION" :
            (type == AUTH_SOCKET ? "SOCKET" : "UNKNOWN"));
        if (type == AUTH_CONNECTION) {
                debug("xcount %d -> %d", xcount, xcount + 1);
                ++xcount;
        }
        set_nonblock(fd);

        if (fd > max_fd)
                max_fd = fd;

        for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++)
                if (sockets[i].type == AUTH_UNUSED) {
                        sockets[i].fd = fd;
                        if ((sockets[i].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
                            (sockets[i].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
                            (sockets[i].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
                                fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
                        sockets[i].type = type;
                        return;
                }
        old_alloc = sockets_alloc;
        new_alloc = sockets_alloc + 10;
        sockets = xrecallocarray(sockets, old_alloc, new_alloc,
            sizeof(sockets[0]));
        for (i = old_alloc; i < new_alloc; i++)
                sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
        sockets_alloc = new_alloc;
        sockets[old_alloc].fd = fd;
        if ((sockets[old_alloc].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
            (sockets[old_alloc].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
            (sockets[old_alloc].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
                fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
        sockets[old_alloc].type = type;
}

static int
handle_socket_read(u_int socknum)
{
        struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
        socklen_t slen;
        uid_t euid;
        gid_t egid;
        int fd;

        slen = sizeof(sunaddr);
        fd = accept(sockets[socknum].fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, &slen);
        if (fd == -1) {
                error("accept from AUTH_SOCKET: %s", strerror(errno));
                return -1;
        }
        if (getpeereid(fd, &euid, &egid) == -1) {
                error("getpeereid %d failed: %s", fd, strerror(errno));
                close(fd);
                return -1;
        }
        if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) {
                error("uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u",
                    (u_int) euid, (u_int) getuid());
                close(fd);
                return -1;
        }
        new_socket(AUTH_CONNECTION, fd);
        return 0;
}

static int
handle_conn_read(u_int socknum)
{
        char buf[AGENT_RBUF_LEN];
        ssize_t len;
        int r;

        if ((len = read(sockets[socknum].fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) <= 0) {
                if (len == -1) {
                        if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
                                return 0;
                        error_f("read error on socket %u (fd %d): %s",
                            socknum, sockets[socknum].fd, strerror(errno));
                }
                return -1;
        }
        if ((r = sshbuf_put(sockets[socknum].input, buf, len)) != 0)
                fatal_fr(r, "compose");
        explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
        for (;;) {
                if ((r = process_message(socknum)) == -1)
                        return -1;
                else if (r == 0)
                        break;
        }
        return 0;
}

static int
handle_conn_write(u_int socknum)
{
        ssize_t len;
        int r;

        if (sshbuf_len(sockets[socknum].output) == 0)
                return 0; /* shouldn't happen */
        if ((len = write(sockets[socknum].fd,
            sshbuf_ptr(sockets[socknum].output),
            sshbuf_len(sockets[socknum].output))) <= 0) {
                if (len == -1) {
                        if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
                                return 0;
                        error_f("read error on socket %u (fd %d): %s",
                            socknum, sockets[socknum].fd, strerror(errno));
                }
                return -1;
        }
        if ((r = sshbuf_consume(sockets[socknum].output, len)) != 0)
                fatal_fr(r, "consume");
        return 0;
}

static void
after_poll(struct pollfd *pfd, size_t npfd, u_int maxfds)
{
        size_t i;
        u_int socknum, activefds = npfd;

        for (i = 0; i < npfd; i++) {
                if (pfd[i].revents == 0)
                        continue;
                /* Find sockets entry */
                for (socknum = 0; socknum < sockets_alloc; socknum++) {
                        if (sockets[socknum].type != AUTH_SOCKET &&
                            sockets[socknum].type != AUTH_CONNECTION)
                                continue;
                        if (pfd[i].fd == sockets[socknum].fd)
                                break;
                }
                if (socknum >= sockets_alloc) {
                        error_f("no socket for fd %d", pfd[i].fd);
                        continue;
                }
                /* Process events */
                switch (sockets[socknum].type) {
                case AUTH_SOCKET:
                        if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLIN|POLLERR)) == 0)
                                break;
                        if (npfd > maxfds) {
                                debug3("out of fds (active %u >= limit %u); "
                                    "skipping accept", activefds, maxfds);
                                break;
                        }
                        if (handle_socket_read(socknum) == 0)
                                activefds++;
                        break;
                case AUTH_CONNECTION:
                        if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLIN|POLLHUP|POLLERR)) != 0 &&
                            handle_conn_read(socknum) != 0)
                                goto close_sock;
                        if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLOUT|POLLHUP)) != 0 &&
                            handle_conn_write(socknum) != 0) {
 close_sock:
                                if (activefds == 0)
                                        fatal("activefds == 0 at close_sock");
                                close_socket(&sockets[socknum]);
                                activefds--;
                                break;
                        }
                        break;
                default:
                        break;
                }
        }
}

static int
prepare_poll(struct pollfd **pfdp, size_t *npfdp, struct timespec *timeoutp, u_int maxfds)
{
        struct pollfd *pfd = *pfdp;
        size_t i, j, npfd = 0;
        time_t deadline;
        int r;

        /* Count active sockets */
        for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) {
                switch (sockets[i].type) {
                case AUTH_SOCKET:
                case AUTH_CONNECTION:
                        npfd++;
                        break;
                case AUTH_UNUSED:
                        break;
                default:
                        fatal("Unknown socket type %d", sockets[i].type);
                        break;
                }
        }
        if (npfd != *npfdp &&
            (pfd = recallocarray(pfd, *npfdp, npfd, sizeof(*pfd))) == NULL)
                fatal_f("recallocarray failed");
        *pfdp = pfd;
        *npfdp = npfd;

        for (i = j = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) {
                switch (sockets[i].type) {
                case AUTH_SOCKET:
                        if (npfd > maxfds) {
                                debug3("out of fds (active %zu >= limit %u); "
                                    "skipping arming listener", npfd, maxfds);
                                break;
                        }
                        pfd[j].fd = sockets[i].fd;
                        pfd[j].revents = 0;
                        pfd[j].events = POLLIN;
                        j++;
                        break;
                case AUTH_CONNECTION:
                        pfd[j].fd = sockets[i].fd;
                        pfd[j].revents = 0;
                        /*
                         * Only prepare to read if we can handle a full-size
                         * input read buffer and enqueue a max size reply..
                         */
                        if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(sockets[i].input,
                            AGENT_RBUF_LEN)) == 0 &&
                            (r = sshbuf_check_reserve(sockets[i].output,
                            AGENT_MAX_LEN)) == 0)
                                pfd[j].events = POLLIN;
                        else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE)
                                fatal_fr(r, "reserve");
                        if (sshbuf_len(sockets[i].output) > 0)
                                pfd[j].events |= POLLOUT;
                        j++;
                        break;
                default:
                        break;
                }
        }
        deadline = reaper();
        if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
                deadline = (deadline == 0) ? parent_alive_interval :
                    MINIMUM(deadline, parent_alive_interval);
        if (deadline != 0)
                ptimeout_deadline_sec(timeoutp, deadline);
        return (1);
}

static void
cleanup_socket(void)
{
        if (cleanup_pid != 0 && getpid() != cleanup_pid)
                return;
        debug_f("cleanup");
        if (socket_name[0])
                unlink(socket_name);
        if (socket_dir[0])
                rmdir(socket_dir);
}

void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
        cleanup_socket();
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
        pkcs11_terminate();
#endif
        _exit(i);
}

static void
cleanup_handler(int sig)
{
        signalled_exit = sig;
}

static void
keydrop_handler(int sig)
{
        signalled_keydrop = sig;
}

static void
check_parent_exists(void)
{
        /*
         * If our parent has exited then getppid() will return (pid_t)1,
         * so testing for that should be safe.
         */
        if (parent_pid != -1 && getppid() != parent_pid) {
                /* printf("Parent has died - Authentication agent exiting.\n"); */
                cleanup_socket();
                _exit(2);
        }
}

static void
usage(void)
{
        fprintf(stderr,
            "usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Ddx] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
            "                 [-O option] [-P allowed_providers] [-t life]\n"
            "       ssh-agent [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-O option]\n"
            "                 [-P allowed_providers] [-t life] command [arg ...]\n"
            "       ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n");
        exit(1);
}

int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
        int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, D_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0;
        int sock = -1, ch, result, saved_errno;
        char *shell, *format, *fdstr, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL;
        const char *errstr = NULL;
        const char *ccp;
#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
        struct rlimit rlim;
#endif
        extern int optind;
        extern char *optarg;
        pid_t pid;
        char pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid];
        size_t len;
        mode_t prev_mask;
        struct timespec timeout;
        struct pollfd *pfd = NULL;
        size_t npfd = 0;
        u_int maxfds;
        sigset_t nsigset, osigset;

        /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
        sanitise_stdfd();

        /* drop */
        (void)setegid(getgid());
        (void)setgid(getgid());
        setuid(geteuid());

        platform_disable_tracing(0);    /* strict=no */

#ifdef RLIMIT_NOFILE
        if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim) == -1)
                fatal("%s: getrlimit: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
#endif

        __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
        seed_rng();

        while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:O:P:t:x")) != -1) {
                switch (ch) {
                case 'E':
                        fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
                        if (fingerprint_hash == -1)
                                fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg);
                        break;
                case 'c':
                        if (s_flag)
                                usage();
                        c_flag++;
                        break;
                case 'k':
                        k_flag++;
                        break;
                case 'O':
                        if (strcmp(optarg, "no-restrict-websafe") == 0)
                                restrict_websafe = 0;
                        else if (strcmp(optarg, "allow-remote-pkcs11") == 0)
                                remote_add_provider = 1;
                        else if ((ccp = strprefix(optarg,
                            "websafe-allow=", 0)) != NULL) {
                                if (websafe_allowlist != NULL)
                                        fatal("websafe-allow already set");
                                websafe_allowlist = xstrdup(ccp);
                        } else
                                fatal("Unknown -O option");
                        break;
                case 'P':
                        if (allowed_providers != NULL)
                                fatal("-P option already specified");
                        allowed_providers = xstrdup(optarg);
                        break;
                case 's':
                        if (c_flag)
                                usage();
                        s_flag++;
                        break;
                case 'd':
                        if (d_flag || D_flag)
                                usage();
                        d_flag++;
                        break;
                case 'D':
                        if (d_flag || D_flag)
                                usage();
                        D_flag++;
                        break;
                case 'a':
                        agentsocket = optarg;
                        break;
                case 't':
                        if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
                                fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n");
                                usage();
                        }
                        break;
                case 'x':
                        xcount = 0;
                        break;
                default:
                        usage();
                }
        }
        ac -= optind;
        av += optind;

        if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag || D_flag))
                usage();

        if (allowed_providers == NULL)
                allowed_providers = xstrdup(DEFAULT_ALLOWED_PROVIDERS);
        if (websafe_allowlist == NULL)
                websafe_allowlist = xstrdup(DEFAULT_WEBSAFE_ALLOWLIST);

        if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
                shell = getenv("SHELL");
                if (shell != NULL && (len = strlen(shell)) > 2 &&
                    strncmp(shell + len - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
                        c_flag = 1;
        }
        if (k_flag) {
                pidstr = getenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
                if (pidstr == NULL) {
                        fprintf(stderr, "%s not set, cannot kill agent\n",
                            SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
                        exit(1);
                }
                pid = (int)strtonum(pidstr, 2, INT_MAX, &errstr);
                if (errstr) {
                        fprintf(stderr,
                            "%s=\"%s\", which is not a good PID: %s\n",
                            SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstr, errstr);
                        exit(1);
                }
                if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1) {
                        perror("kill");
                        exit(1);
                }
                format = c_flag ? "unsetenv %s;\n" : "unset %s;\n";
                printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
                printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
                printf("echo Agent pid %ld killed;\n", (long)pid);
                exit(0);
        }

        /*
         * Minimum file descriptors:
         * stdio (3) + listener (1) + syslog (1 maybe) + connection (1) +
         * a few spare for libc / stack protectors / sanitisers, etc.
         */
#define SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS (3+1+1+1+4)
        if (rlim.rlim_cur < SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS)
                fatal("%s: file descriptor rlimit %lld too low (minimum %u)",
                    __progname, (long long)rlim.rlim_cur, SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS);
        maxfds = rlim.rlim_cur - SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS;

        parent_pid = getpid();

        /* Has the socket been provided via socket activation? */
        if (agentsocket == NULL && ac == 0 && (d_flag || D_flag) &&
            (pidstr = getenv("LISTEN_PID")) != NULL &&
            (fdstr = getenv("LISTEN_FDS")) != NULL) {
                if (strcmp(fdstr, "1") != 0) {
                        fatal("unexpected LISTEN_FDS contents "
                            "(want: \"1\" got\"%s\"", fdstr);
                }
                if (fcntl(3, F_GETFL) == -1)
                        fatal("LISTEN_FDS set but fd 3 unavailable");
                pid = (int)strtonum(pidstr, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr);
                if (errstr != NULL)
                        fatal("invalid LISTEN_PID: %s", errstr);
                if (pid != getpid())
                        fatal("bad LISTEN_PID: %d vs pid %d", pid, getpid());
                debug("using socket activation on fd=3");
                sock = 3;
        }

        /* Otherwise, create private directory for agent socket */
        if (sock == -1) {
                if (agentsocket == NULL) {
                        mktemp_proto(socket_dir, sizeof(socket_dir));
                        if (mkdtemp(socket_dir) == NULL) {
                                perror("mkdtemp: private socket dir");
                                exit(1);
                        }
                        snprintf(socket_name, sizeof socket_name,
                           "%s/agent.%ld", socket_dir,
                    (long)parent_pid);
                } else {
                        /* Try to use specified agent socket */
                        socket_dir[0] = '\0';
                        strlcpy(socket_name, agentsocket, sizeof socket_name);
                }
        }

        closefrom(sock == -1 ? STDERR_FILENO + 1 : sock + 1);

        /*
         * Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from
         * the parent.
         */
        if (sock == -1) {
                prev_mask = umask(0177);
                sock = unix_listener(socket_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0);
                if (sock < 0) {
                        /* XXX - unix_listener() calls error() not perror() */
                        *socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink existing file */
                        cleanup_exit(1);
                }
                umask(prev_mask);
        }

        /*
         * Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present
         * the socket data.  The child continues as the authentication agent.
         */
        if (D_flag || d_flag) {
                log_init(__progname,
                    d_flag ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
                    SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
                if (socket_name[0] != '\0') {
                        format = c_flag ?
                            "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
                        printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
                            SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
                        printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)parent_pid);
                        fflush(stdout);
                }
                goto skip;
        }
        pid = fork();
        if (pid == -1) {
                perror("fork");
                cleanup_exit(1);
        }
        if (pid != 0) {         /* Parent - execute the given command. */
                close(sock);
                snprintf(pidstrbuf, sizeof pidstrbuf, "%ld", (long)pid);
                if (ac == 0) {
                        format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
                        printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
                            SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
                        printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf,
                            SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
                        printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)pid);
                        exit(0);
                }
                if (setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, 1) == -1 ||
                    setenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, 1) == -1) {
                        perror("setenv");
                        exit(1);
                }
                execvp(av[0], av);
                perror(av[0]);
                exit(1);
        }
        /* child */
        log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);

        if (setsid() == -1) {
                error("setsid: %s", strerror(errno));
                cleanup_exit(1);
        }

        (void)chdir("/");
        if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, 1) == -1)
                error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");

#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
        /* deny core dumps, since memory contains unencrypted private keys */
        rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0;
        if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) == -1) {
                error("setrlimit RLIMIT_CORE: %s", strerror(errno));
                cleanup_exit(1);
        }
#endif

skip:

        cleanup_pid = getpid();

#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
        pkcs11_init(0);
#endif
        new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock);
        if (ac > 0)
                parent_alive_interval = 10;
        idtab_init();
        ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
        ssh_signal(SIGINT, (d_flag | D_flag) ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN);
        ssh_signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler);
        ssh_signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler);
        ssh_signal(SIGUSR1, keydrop_handler);

        sigemptyset(&nsigset);
        sigaddset(&nsigset, SIGINT);
        sigaddset(&nsigset, SIGHUP);
        sigaddset(&nsigset, SIGTERM);
        sigaddset(&nsigset, SIGUSR1);

        if (pledge("stdio rpath cpath unix id proc exec", NULL) == -1)
                fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
        platform_pledge_agent();

        while (1) {
                sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nsigset, &osigset);
                if (signalled_exit != 0) {
                        logit("exiting on signal %d", (int)signalled_exit);
                        cleanup_exit(2);
                }
                if (signalled_keydrop) {
                        logit("signal %d received; removing all keys",
                            signalled_keydrop);
                        remove_all_identities();
                        signalled_keydrop = 0;
                }
                ptimeout_init(&timeout);
                prepare_poll(&pfd, &npfd, &timeout, maxfds);
                result = ppoll(pfd, npfd, ptimeout_get_tsp(&timeout), &osigset);
                sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &osigset, NULL);
                saved_errno = errno;
                if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
                        check_parent_exists();
                (void) reaper();        /* remove expired keys */
                if (result == -1) {
                        if (saved_errno == EINTR)
                                continue;
                        fatal("poll: %s", strerror(saved_errno));
                } else if (result > 0)
                        after_poll(pfd, npfd, maxfds);
        }
        /* NOTREACHED */
}