CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN
memzero_explicit(&con->v2.in_gcm_nonce, CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN);
memzero_explicit(&con->v2.out_gcm_nonce, CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN);
if (con_secret_len < CEPH_GCM_KEY_LEN + 2 * CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN) {
WARN_ON(crypto_aead_ivsize(con->v2.gcm_tfm) != CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN);
CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN);
con_secret + CEPH_GCM_KEY_LEN + CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN,
CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN);