CAP_BPF
return capable(CAP_BPF) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
if (bpf_jit_harden == 1 && bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF))
!bpf_token_capable(fp->aux->token, CAP_BPF))
if (!bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF))
if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF)) {
if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF))
if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF))
bpf_cap = bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF);
if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF)) {
if (!ns_capable(userns, CAP_BPF))
env->bpf_capable = is_priv = bpf_token_capable(env->prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF);
if (!bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF))
if (!bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF))
#ifdef CAP_BPF
if (CAP_IS_SUPPORTED(CAP_BPF))
#ifdef CAP_BPF
#ifdef CAP_BPF
capability(CAP_BPF),
if (perf_cap__capable(CAP_BPF, &used_root))
#ifndef CAP_BPF
#ifndef CAP_BPF
ret = cap_enable_effective(1ULL << CAP_BPF | 1ULL << CAP_NET_ADMIN, &caps);
return cap_disable_effective((1ULL << CAP_BPF) |
#define ALL_CAPS ((2ULL << CAP_BPF) - 1)
__caps_unpriv(CAP_BPF)
__caps_unpriv(CAP_BPF|CAP_NET_ADMIN)
__caps_unpriv(CAP_BPF)
__caps_unpriv(CAP_BPF)
1ULL << CAP_PERFMON | 1ULL << CAP_BPF);
1ULL << CAP_BPF)