/*
 * CDDL HEADER START
 *
 * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
 * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
 * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 *
 * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
 * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
 * and limitations under the License.
 *
 * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
 * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
 * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
 * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
 * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
 *
 * CDDL HEADER END
 */

/*
 * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
 * Use is subject to license terms.
 */

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/crypto/ioctl.h>
#include <security/cryptoki.h>
#include "kernelGlobal.h"
#include "kernelObject.h"
#include "kernelSession.h"
#include "kernelEmulate.h"

CK_RV
C_VerifyInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
{
        CK_RV rv;
        kernel_session_t *session_p;
        kernel_object_t *key_p;
        boolean_t ses_lock_held = B_FALSE;
        crypto_verify_init_t verify_init;
        crypto_mech_type_t k_mech_type;
        int r;

        if (!kernel_initialized)
                return (CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED);

        if (pMechanism == NULL) {
                return (CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD);
        }

        /* Get the kernel's internal mechanism number. */
        rv = kernel_mech(pMechanism->mechanism, &k_mech_type);
        if (rv != CKR_OK)
                return (rv);

        /* Obtain the session pointer. */
        rv = handle2session(hSession, &session_p);
        if (rv != CKR_OK)
                return (rv);

        /* Obtain the object pointer. */
        HANDLE2OBJECT(hKey, key_p, rv);
        if (rv != CKR_OK) {
                REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held);
                return (rv);
        }

        /* Check to see if key object supports verification. */
        if (key_p->is_lib_obj && !(key_p->bool_attr_mask & VERIFY_BOOL_ON)) {
                rv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
                goto clean_exit;
        }

        (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex);
        ses_lock_held = B_TRUE;

        /*
         * This active flag will remain ON until application calls either
         * C_Verify or C_VerifyFinal to verify a signature on data.
         */
        session_p->verify.flags = CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE;

        if (!key_p->is_lib_obj) {
                verify_init.vi_key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_REFERENCE;
                verify_init.vi_key.ck_obj_id = key_p->k_handle;
        } else {
                if (key_p->class == CKO_SECRET_KEY) {
                        verify_init.vi_key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW;
                        verify_init.vi_key.ck_data =
                            get_symmetric_key_value(key_p);
                        if (verify_init.vi_key.ck_data == NULL) {
                                rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
                                goto clean_exit;
                        }
                        verify_init.vi_key.ck_length =
                            OBJ_SEC(key_p)->sk_value_len << 3;

                } else if (key_p->key_type == CKK_RSA) {
                        if (get_rsa_public_key(key_p, &verify_init.vi_key) !=
                            CKR_OK) {
                                rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
                                goto clean_exit;
                        }
                } else if (key_p->key_type == CKK_DSA) {
                        if (get_dsa_public_key(key_p, &verify_init.vi_key) !=
                            CKR_OK) {
                                rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
                                goto clean_exit;
                        }
                } else if (key_p->key_type == CKK_EC) {
                        if (get_ec_public_key(key_p, &verify_init.vi_key) !=
                            CKR_OK) {
                                rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
                                goto clean_exit;
                        }
                } else {
                        rv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
                        goto clean_exit;
                }
        }

        verify_init.vi_session = session_p->k_session;
        (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);
        ses_lock_held = B_FALSE;
        verify_init.vi_mech.cm_type = k_mech_type;
        verify_init.vi_mech.cm_param = pMechanism->pParameter;
        verify_init.vi_mech.cm_param_len = pMechanism->ulParameterLen;

        while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_VERIFY_INIT, &verify_init)) < 0) {
                if (errno != EINTR)
                        break;
        }
        if (r < 0) {
                rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
        } else {
                rv = crypto2pkcs11_error_number(verify_init.vi_return_value);
        }

        if (rv == CKR_OK && SLOT_HAS_LIMITED_HMAC(session_p) &&
            is_hmac(pMechanism->mechanism)) {
                if (key_p->is_lib_obj && key_p->class == CKO_SECRET_KEY) {
                        (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex);
                        session_p->verify.flags |= CRYPTO_EMULATE;
                        (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);
                        rv = emulate_init(session_p, pMechanism,
                            &(verify_init.vi_key), OP_VERIFY);
                } else {
                        rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
                }
        }

        /* free the memory allocated for verify_init.vi_key */
        if (key_p->is_lib_obj) {
                if (key_p->class == CKO_SECRET_KEY) {
                        free(verify_init.vi_key.ck_data);
                } else {
                        free_key_attributes(&verify_init.vi_key);
                }
        }

        if (rv != CKR_OK) {
                (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex);
                session_p->verify.flags &= ~CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
                ses_lock_held = B_TRUE;
        }

clean_exit:
        OBJ_REFRELE(key_p);
        REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held);
        return (rv);
}


CK_RV
C_Verify(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen)
{

        CK_RV rv;
        kernel_session_t *session_p;
        boolean_t ses_lock_held = B_FALSE;
        crypto_verify_t verify;
        int r;

        if (!kernel_initialized)
                return (CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED);

        /* Obatin the session pointer */
        rv = handle2session(hSession, &session_p);
        if (rv != CKR_OK)
                return (rv);

        (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex);
        ses_lock_held = B_TRUE;

        /* Application must call C_VerifyInit before calling C_Verify. */
        if (!(session_p->verify.flags & CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE)) {
                REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held);
                return (CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED);
        }

        /*
         * C_Verify must be called without intervening C_VerifyUpdate
         * calls.
         */
        if (session_p->verify.flags & CRYPTO_OPERATION_UPDATE) {
                /*
                 * C_Verify can not be used to terminate a multi-part
                 * operation, so we'll leave the active verify operation
                 * flag on and let the application continue with the
                 * verify update operation.
                 */
                REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held);
                return (CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED);
        }

        if (session_p->verify.flags & CRYPTO_EMULATE) {
                if ((ulDataLen < SLOT_THRESHOLD(session_p)) ||
                    (ulDataLen > SLOT_HMAC_MAX_INDATA_LEN(session_p))) {
                        session_p->verify.flags |= CRYPTO_EMULATE_USING_SW;
                        (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);
                        ses_lock_held = B_FALSE;

                        rv = do_soft_hmac_verify(get_spp(&session_p->verify),
                            pData, ulDataLen,
                            pSignature, ulSignatureLen, OP_SINGLE);
                        goto clean_exit;
                } else {
                        free_soft_ctx(get_sp(&session_p->verify), OP_VERIFY);
                }
        }

        verify.cv_session = session_p->k_session;
        (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);
        ses_lock_held = B_FALSE;
        verify.cv_datalen = ulDataLen;
        verify.cv_databuf = (char *)pData;
        verify.cv_signlen = ulSignatureLen;
        verify.cv_signbuf = (char *)pSignature;

        while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_VERIFY, &verify)) < 0) {
                if (errno != EINTR)
                        break;
        }
        if (r < 0) {
                rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
        } else {
                rv = crypto2pkcs11_error_number(verify.cv_return_value);
        }

clean_exit:
        /*
         * Always terminate the active verify operation.
         * Application needs to call C_VerifyInit again for next
         * verify operation.
         */
        (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex);
        ses_lock_held = B_TRUE;

        REINIT_OPBUF(&session_p->verify);
        session_p->verify.flags = 0;
        REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held);

        return (rv);
}


CK_RV
C_VerifyUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
    CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
{

        CK_RV rv;
        kernel_session_t *session_p;
        boolean_t ses_lock_held = B_FALSE;
        crypto_verify_update_t verify_update;
        int r;

        if (!kernel_initialized)
                return (CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED);

        /* Obtain the session pointer */
        rv = handle2session(hSession, &session_p);
        if (rv != CKR_OK)
                return (rv);

        if (pPart == NULL) {
                rv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
                goto clean_exit;
        }

        (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex);
        ses_lock_held = B_TRUE;

        /*
         * Application must call C_VerifyInit before calling
         * C_VerifyUpdate.
         */
        if (!(session_p->verify.flags & CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE)) {
                REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held);
                return (CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED);
        }

        session_p->verify.flags |= CRYPTO_OPERATION_UPDATE;

        if (session_p->verify.flags & CRYPTO_EMULATE) {
                (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);
                ses_lock_held = B_FALSE;
                rv = emulate_update(session_p, pPart, ulPartLen, OP_VERIFY);
                goto done;
        }

        verify_update.vu_session = session_p->k_session;
        (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);
        ses_lock_held = B_FALSE;

        verify_update.vu_datalen = ulPartLen;
        verify_update.vu_databuf = (char *)pPart;

        while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_VERIFY_UPDATE,
            &verify_update)) < 0) {
                if (errno != EINTR)
                        break;
        }
        if (r < 0) {
                rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
        } else {
                rv = crypto2pkcs11_error_number(verify_update.vu_return_value);
        }

done:
        if (rv == CKR_OK) {
                REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held);
                return (rv);
        }

clean_exit:
        /*
         * After an error occurred, terminate the current verify
         * operation by resetting the active and update flags.
         */
        (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex);
        ses_lock_held = B_TRUE;
        REINIT_OPBUF(&session_p->verify);
        session_p->verify.flags = 0;
        REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held);

        return (rv);
}


CK_RV
C_VerifyFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
    CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen)
{

        CK_RV rv;
        kernel_session_t *session_p;
        boolean_t ses_lock_held = B_FALSE;
        crypto_verify_final_t verify_final;
        int r;

        if (!kernel_initialized)
                return (CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED);

        /* Obtain the session pointer */
        rv = handle2session(hSession, &session_p);
        if (rv != CKR_OK)
                return (rv);

        (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex);
        ses_lock_held = B_TRUE;

        /*
         * Application must call C_VerifyInit before calling
         * C_VerifyFinal.
         */
        if (!(session_p->verify.flags & CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE)) {
                REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held);
                return (CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED);
        }

        /* The order of checks is important here */
        if (session_p->verify.flags & CRYPTO_EMULATE_USING_SW) {
                if (session_p->verify.flags & CRYPTO_EMULATE_UPDATE_DONE) {
                        (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);
                        ses_lock_held = B_FALSE;
                        rv = do_soft_hmac_verify(get_spp(&session_p->verify),
                            NULL, 0, pSignature, ulSignatureLen,
                            OP_FINAL);
                } else {
                        /*
                         * We should not end up here even if an earlier
                         * C_VerifyFinal() call took the C_Verify() path as
                         * it never returns CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
                         */
                        (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);
                        ses_lock_held = B_FALSE;
                        rv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
                }
                goto clean_exit;
        } else if (session_p->verify.flags & CRYPTO_EMULATE) {
                digest_buf_t *bufp = session_p->verify.context;

                /*
                 * We are emulating a single-part operation now.
                 * So, clear the flag.
                 */
                session_p->verify.flags &= ~CRYPTO_OPERATION_UPDATE;
                if (bufp == NULL || bufp->buf == NULL) {
                        rv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
                        goto clean_exit;
                }
                REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held);
                rv = C_Verify(hSession, bufp->buf, bufp->indata_len,
                    pSignature, ulSignatureLen);
                return (rv);
        }

        verify_final.vf_session = session_p->k_session;
        (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);
        ses_lock_held = B_FALSE;

        verify_final.vf_signlen = ulSignatureLen;
        verify_final.vf_signbuf = (char *)pSignature;

        while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_VERIFY_FINAL, &verify_final)) < 0) {
                if (errno != EINTR)
                        break;
        }
        if (r < 0) {
                rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
        } else {
                rv = crypto2pkcs11_error_number(verify_final.vf_return_value);
        }

clean_exit:
        /* Always terminate the active verify operation */
        (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex);
        ses_lock_held = B_TRUE;
        REINIT_OPBUF(&session_p->verify);
        session_p->verify.flags = 0;
        REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held);

        return (rv);
}


CK_RV
C_VerifyRecoverInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
{

        CK_RV rv;
        kernel_session_t *session_p;
        kernel_object_t *key_p;
        boolean_t ses_lock_held = B_FALSE;
        crypto_verify_recover_init_t vr_init;
        crypto_mech_type_t k_mech_type;
        int r;

        if (!kernel_initialized)
                return (CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED);

        if (pMechanism == NULL) {
                return (CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD);
        }

        /* Get the kernel's internal mechanism number. */
        rv = kernel_mech(pMechanism->mechanism, &k_mech_type);
        if (rv != CKR_OK)
                return (rv);

        /* Obtain the session pointer. */
        rv = handle2session(hSession, &session_p);
        if (rv != CKR_OK)
                return (rv);

        /* Obtain the object pointer. */
        HANDLE2OBJECT(hKey, key_p, rv);
        if (rv != CKR_OK) {
                REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held);
                return (rv);
        }

        /*
         * Check to see if key object is a RSA key and if it supports
         * verify_recover.
         */
        if (key_p->is_lib_obj && !((key_p->key_type == CKK_RSA) &&
            (key_p->bool_attr_mask & VERIFY_RECOVER_BOOL_ON))) {
                rv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
                goto clean_exit;
        }

        (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex);
        ses_lock_held = B_TRUE;

        /*
         * This active flag will remain ON until application calls
         * C_VerifyRecover to verify a signature on data.
         */
        session_p->verify.flags = CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE;

        /* Set up the key data */
        if (!key_p->is_lib_obj) {
                vr_init.ri_key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_REFERENCE;
                vr_init.ri_key.ck_obj_id = key_p->k_handle;
        } else {
                if (key_p->key_type == CKK_RSA) {
                        if (get_rsa_public_key(key_p, &vr_init.ri_key) !=
                            CKR_OK) {
                                rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
                                goto clean_exit;
                        }
                } else {
                        rv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
                        goto clean_exit;
                }
        }

        vr_init.ri_session = session_p->k_session;
        (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);
        ses_lock_held = B_FALSE;
        vr_init.ri_mech.cm_type = k_mech_type;
        vr_init.ri_mech.cm_param = pMechanism->pParameter;
        vr_init.ri_mech.cm_param_len = pMechanism->ulParameterLen;

        while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT,
            &vr_init)) < 0) {
                if (errno != EINTR)
                        break;
        }
        if (r < 0) {
                rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
        } else {
                rv = crypto2pkcs11_error_number(vr_init.ri_return_value);
        }

        /* free the memory allocated for vr_init.ri_key */
        if (key_p->is_lib_obj) {
                free_key_attributes(&vr_init.ri_key);
        }

        if (rv != CKR_OK) {
                (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex);
                session_p->verify.flags &= ~CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
                ses_lock_held = B_TRUE;
        }

clean_exit:
        OBJ_REFRELE(key_p);
        REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held);
        return (rv);
}


CK_RV
C_VerifyRecover(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
    CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
{

        CK_RV rv;
        kernel_session_t *session_p;
        boolean_t ses_lock_held = B_FALSE;
        crypto_verify_recover_t verify_recover;
        int r;

        if (!kernel_initialized)
                return (CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED);

        /* Obtain the session pointer */
        rv = handle2session(hSession, &session_p);
        if (rv != CKR_OK)
                return (rv);

        if (pSignature == NULL || pulDataLen == NULL) {
                rv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
                goto clean_exit;
        }

        (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex);
        ses_lock_held = B_TRUE;

        /*
         * Application must call C_VerifyRecoverInit before calling
         * C_Verify.
         */
        if (!(session_p->verify.flags & CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE)) {
                REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held);
                return (CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED);
        }

        verify_recover.vr_session = session_p->k_session;
        (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);
        ses_lock_held = B_FALSE;
        verify_recover.vr_signlen = ulSignatureLen;
        verify_recover.vr_signbuf = (char *)pSignature;
        verify_recover.vr_datalen = *pulDataLen;
        verify_recover.vr_databuf = (char *)pData;

        while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_VERIFY_RECOVER,
            &verify_recover)) < 0) {
                if (errno != EINTR)
                        break;
        }
        if (r < 0) {
                rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
        } else {
                rv = crypto2pkcs11_error_number(
                    verify_recover.vr_return_value);
        }

        if (rv == CKR_OK || rv == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)
                *pulDataLen = verify_recover.vr_datalen;

        if ((rv == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) ||
            (rv == CKR_OK && pData == NULL)) {
                /*
                 * We will not terminate the active verify operation flag,
                 * when the application-supplied buffer is too small, or
                 * the application asks for the length of buffer to hold
                 * the recovered data.
                 */
                REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held);
                return (rv);
        }

clean_exit:
        /*
         * Always terminate the active verify operation.
         * Application needs to call C_VerifyInit again for next
         * verify operation.
         */
        (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex);
        session_p->verify.flags = 0;
        ses_lock_held = B_TRUE;
        REFRELE(session_p, ses_lock_held);

        return (rv);
}