root/usr/src/lib/pkcs11/pkcs11_softtoken/common/softVerifyUtil.c
/*
 * CDDL HEADER START
 *
 * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
 * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
 * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 *
 * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
 * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
 * and limitations under the License.
 *
 * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
 * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
 * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
 * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
 * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
 *
 * CDDL HEADER END
 */
/*
 * Copyright 2007 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
 * Use is subject to license terms.
 * Copyright 2014 Nexenta Systems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
 * Copyright 2018, Joyent, Inc.
 */

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <strings.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <security/cryptoki.h>
#include "softObject.h"
#include "softOps.h"
#include "softSession.h"
#include "softMAC.h"
#include "softRSA.h"
#include "softDSA.h"
#include "softEC.h"
#include "softCrypt.h"

/*
 * soft_verify_init()
 *
 * Arguments:
 *      session_p:      pointer to soft_session_t struct
 *      pMechanism:     pointer to CK_MECHANISM struct provided by application
 *      key_p:          pointer to key soft_object_t struct
 *
 * Description:
 *      called by C_VerifyInit(). This function calls the corresponding
 *      verify init routine based on the mechanism.
 *
 */
CK_RV
soft_verify_init(soft_session_t *session_p, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
    soft_object_t *key_p)
{

        switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {

        case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC:
        case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC:
        case CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_MD5_HMAC:
        case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
        case CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_SHA256_HMAC:
        case CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_SHA384_HMAC:
        case CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_SHA512_HMAC:

                return (soft_hmac_sign_verify_init_common(session_p,
                    pMechanism, key_p, B_FALSE));

        case CKM_RSA_X_509:
        case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
        case CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS:
        case CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS:
        case CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS:
        case CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS:
        case CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS:

                return (soft_rsa_sign_verify_init_common(session_p, pMechanism,
                    key_p, B_FALSE));

        case CKM_DSA:
        case CKM_DSA_SHA1:

                return (soft_dsa_sign_verify_init_common(session_p, pMechanism,
                    key_p, B_FALSE));

        case CKM_ECDSA:
        case CKM_ECDSA_SHA1:

                return (soft_ecc_sign_verify_init_common(session_p, pMechanism,
                    key_p, B_FALSE));

        case CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_DES_MAC:

                return (soft_des_sign_verify_init_common(session_p, pMechanism,
                    key_p, B_FALSE));

        case CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_AES_CMAC:
        case CKM_AES_GMAC:

                return (soft_aes_sign_verify_init_common(session_p, pMechanism,
                    key_p, B_FALSE));

        default:
                return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
        }

}


/*
 * soft_verify()
 *
 * Arguments:
 *      session_p:      pointer to soft_session_t struct
 *      pData:          pointer to the input data
 *      ulDataLen:      length of the input data
 *      pSignature:     pointer to the signature
 *      ulSignatureLen: length of the signature
 *
 * Description:
 *      called by C_Verify(). This function calls the corresponding
 *      verify routine based on the mechanism.
 *
 */
CK_RV
soft_verify(soft_session_t *session_p, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
    CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
    CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen)
{

        CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = session_p->verify.mech.mechanism;
        CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;

        switch (mechanism) {

        case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC:
        case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC:
        case CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_MD5_HMAC:
        case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
        case CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_SHA256_HMAC:
        case CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_SHA384_HMAC:
        case CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_SHA512_HMAC:
        {
                CK_ULONG len;
                CK_BYTE hmac[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* use the maximum size */
                soft_hmac_ctx_t *hmac_ctx;

                hmac_ctx = (soft_hmac_ctx_t *)session_p->verify.context;
                len = hmac_ctx->hmac_len;

                rv = soft_hmac_sign_verify_common(session_p, pData,
                    ulDataLen, hmac, &len, B_FALSE);

                if (rv == CKR_OK) {
                        if (len != ulSignatureLen) {
                                rv = CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE;
                        }

                        if (memcmp(hmac, pSignature, len) != 0) {
                                rv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
                        }
                }

                return (rv);
        }
        case CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_DES_MAC:
        {
                CK_ULONG len;
                CK_BYTE signature[DES_BLOCK_LEN]; /* use the maximum size */
                soft_des_ctx_t *des_ctx;

                des_ctx = (soft_des_ctx_t *)session_p->verify.context;
                len = des_ctx->mac_len;

                /* Pass local buffer to avoid overflow. */
                rv = soft_des_sign_verify_common(session_p, pData,
                    ulDataLen, signature, &len, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);

                if (rv == CKR_OK) {
                        if (len != ulSignatureLen) {
                                rv = CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE;
                        }

                        if (memcmp(signature, pSignature, len) != 0) {
                                rv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
                        }
                }

                return (rv);
        }
        case CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_AES_CMAC:
        case CKM_AES_GMAC:
        {
                CK_ULONG len;
                CK_BYTE signature[AES_BLOCK_LEN];
                aes_ctx_t *aes_ctx;

                aes_ctx = (aes_ctx_t *)session_p->verify.context;
                len = aes_ctx->ac_mac_len;

                /* Pass local buffer to avoid overflow. */
                rv = soft_aes_sign_verify_common(session_p, pData,
                    ulDataLen, signature, &len, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);

                if (rv == CKR_OK) {
                        if (len != ulSignatureLen) {
                                rv = CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE;
                        }

                        if (memcmp(signature, pSignature, len) != 0) {
                                rv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
                        }
                }

                return (rv);
        }
        case CKM_RSA_X_509:
        case CKM_RSA_PKCS:

                return (soft_rsa_verify_common(session_p, pData, ulDataLen,
                    pSignature, ulSignatureLen, mechanism));

        case CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS:
        case CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS:
        case CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS:
        case CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS:
        case CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS:

                return (soft_rsa_digest_verify_common(session_p, pData,
                    ulDataLen, pSignature, ulSignatureLen, mechanism, B_FALSE));

        case CKM_DSA:

                return (soft_dsa_verify(session_p, pData, ulDataLen,
                    pSignature, ulSignatureLen));

        case CKM_DSA_SHA1:

                return (soft_dsa_digest_verify_common(session_p, pData,
                    ulDataLen, pSignature, ulSignatureLen, B_FALSE));

        case CKM_ECDSA:

                return (soft_ecc_verify(session_p, pData, ulDataLen,
                    pSignature, ulSignatureLen));

        case CKM_ECDSA_SHA1:

                return (soft_ecc_digest_verify_common(session_p, pData,
                    ulDataLen, pSignature, ulSignatureLen, B_FALSE));

        default:
                return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
        }
}


/*
 * soft_verify_update()
 *
 * Arguments:
 *      session_p:      pointer to soft_session_t struct
 *      pPart:          pointer to the input data
 *      ulPartLen:      length of the input data
 *
 * Description:
 *      called by C_VerifyUpdate(). This function calls the corresponding
 *      verify update routine based on the mechanism.
 *
 */
CK_RV
soft_verify_update(soft_session_t *session_p, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
    CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
{
        CK_MECHANISM_TYPE       mechanism = session_p->verify.mech.mechanism;

        switch (mechanism) {

        case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC:
        case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC:
        case CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_MD5_HMAC:
        case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
        case CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_SHA256_HMAC:
        case CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_SHA384_HMAC:
        case CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_SHA512_HMAC:

                return (soft_hmac_sign_verify_update(session_p, pPart,
                    ulPartLen, B_FALSE));

        case CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_DES_MAC:

                return (soft_des_mac_sign_verify_update(session_p, pPart,
                    ulPartLen));

        case CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_AES_CMAC:
        case CKM_AES_GMAC:

                return (soft_aes_mac_sign_verify_update(session_p, pPart,
                    ulPartLen));

        case CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS:
        case CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS:
        case CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS:
        case CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS:
        case CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS:
                /*
                 * The MD5/SHA1 digest value is accumulated in the context
                 * of the multiple-part digesting operation. In the final
                 * operation, the digest is encoded and then perform RSA
                 * verification.
                 */
        case CKM_DSA_SHA1:
        case CKM_ECDSA_SHA1:

                return (soft_digest_update(session_p, pPart, ulPartLen));

        default:
                /* PKCS11: The mechanism only supports single-part operation. */
                return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
        }
}


/*
 * soft_verify_final()
 *
 * Arguments:
 *      session_p:      pointer to soft_session_t struct
 *      pSignature:     pointer to the signature
 *      ulSignatureLen: length of the signature
 *
 * Description:
 *      called by C_VerifyFinal().  This function calls the corresponding
 *      verify final routine based on the mechanism.
 *
 */
CK_RV
soft_verify_final(soft_session_t *session_p, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
    CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen)
{

        CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = session_p->verify.mech.mechanism;
        CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;

        switch (mechanism) {

        case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC:
        case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC:
        case CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_MD5_HMAC:
        case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
        case CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_SHA256_HMAC:
        case CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_SHA384_HMAC:
        case CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_SHA512_HMAC:
        {
                CK_ULONG len;
                CK_BYTE hmac[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
                soft_hmac_ctx_t *hmac_ctx;

                hmac_ctx = (soft_hmac_ctx_t *)session_p->verify.context;
                len = hmac_ctx->hmac_len;

                rv = soft_hmac_sign_verify_common(session_p, NULL, 0,
                    hmac, &len, B_FALSE);

                if (rv == CKR_OK) {
                        if (len != ulSignatureLen) {
                                rv = CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE;
                        }

                        if (memcmp(hmac, pSignature, len) != 0) {
                                rv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
                        }
                }

                return (rv);
        }
        case CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_DES_MAC:
        {
                CK_ULONG len;
                CK_BYTE signature[DES_BLOCK_LEN]; /* use the maximum size */
                soft_des_ctx_t *des_ctx;

                des_ctx = (soft_des_ctx_t *)session_p->verify.context;
                len = des_ctx->mac_len;

                /* Pass local buffer to avoid overflow. */
                rv = soft_des_sign_verify_common(session_p, NULL, 0,
                    signature, &len, B_FALSE, B_TRUE);

                if (rv == CKR_OK) {
                        if (len != ulSignatureLen) {
                                rv = CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE;
                        }

                        if (memcmp(signature, pSignature, len) != 0) {
                                rv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
                        }
                }

                return (rv);
        }
        case CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL:
        case CKM_AES_CMAC:
        case CKM_AES_GMAC:
        {
                CK_ULONG len;
                CK_BYTE signature[AES_BLOCK_LEN];
                aes_ctx_t *aes_ctx;

                aes_ctx = (aes_ctx_t *)session_p->verify.context;
                len = aes_ctx->ac_mac_len;

                /* Pass local buffer to avoid overflow. */
                rv = soft_aes_sign_verify_common(session_p, NULL, 0,
                    signature, &len, B_FALSE, B_TRUE);

                if (rv == CKR_OK) {
                        if (len != ulSignatureLen) {
                                rv = CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE;
                        }

                        if (memcmp(signature, pSignature, len) != 0) {
                                rv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
                        }
                }

                return (rv);
        }
        case CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS:
        case CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS:
        case CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS:
        case CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS:
        case CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS:

                return (soft_rsa_digest_verify_common(session_p, NULL, 0,
                    pSignature, ulSignatureLen, mechanism, B_TRUE));

        case CKM_DSA_SHA1:

                return (soft_dsa_digest_verify_common(session_p, NULL, 0,
                    pSignature, ulSignatureLen, B_TRUE));

        case CKM_ECDSA_SHA1:

                return (soft_ecc_digest_verify_common(session_p, NULL, 0,
                    pSignature, ulSignatureLen, B_TRUE));

        default:
                /* PKCS11: The mechanism only supports single-part operation. */
                return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);

        }
}


CK_RV
soft_verify_recover_init(soft_session_t *session_p, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
    soft_object_t *key_p)
{

        switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {

        case CKM_RSA_X_509:
        case CKM_RSA_PKCS:

                return (soft_rsa_sign_verify_init_common(session_p, pMechanism,
                    key_p, B_FALSE));

        default:
                return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
        }
}


CK_RV
soft_verify_recover(soft_session_t *session_p, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
    CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
{

        CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = session_p->verify.mech.mechanism;

        switch (mechanism) {

        case CKM_RSA_X_509:
        case CKM_RSA_PKCS:

                return (soft_rsa_verify_recover(session_p, pSignature,
                    ulSignatureLen, pData, pulDataLen));

        default:
                return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
        }
}