/*
 * The Initial Developer of the Original Code is International
 * Business Machines Corporation. Portions created by IBM
 * Corporation are Copyright (C) 2005 International Business
 * Machines Corporation. All Rights Reserved.
 *
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
 * it under the terms of the Common Public License as published by
 * IBM Corporation; either version 1 of the License, or (at your option)
 * any later version.
 *
 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
 * Common Public License for more details.
 *
 * You should have received a copy of the Common Public License
 * along with this program; if not, a copy can be viewed at
 * http://www.opensource.org/licenses/cpl1.0.php.
 */

/* (C) COPYRIGHT International Business Machines Corp. 2001, 2002, 2005 */
/*
 * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
 * Use is subject to license terms.
 */

#include "tpmtok_int.h"

CK_RV
verify_mgr_init(SESSION         * sess,
        SIGN_VERIFY_CONTEXT * ctx,
        CK_MECHANISM    * mech,
        CK_BBOOL                recover_mode,
        CK_OBJECT_HANDLE        key)
{
        OBJECT    * key_obj = NULL;
        CK_ATTRIBUTE    * attr    = NULL;
        CK_KEY_TYPE     keytype;
        CK_OBJECT_CLASS   class;
        CK_BBOOL          flag;
        CK_RV           rc;


        if (! sess || ! ctx) {
                return (CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED);
        }
        if (ctx->active != FALSE) {
                return (CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE);
        }

        // key usage restrictions
        //
        rc = object_mgr_find_in_map1(sess->hContext, key, &key_obj);
        if (rc != CKR_OK) {
                return (CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID);
        }
        // is key allowed to verify signatures?
        //
        rc = template_attribute_find(key_obj->template, CKA_VERIFY, &attr);
        if (rc == FALSE) {
                return (CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT);
        } else {
                flag = *(CK_BBOOL *)attr->pValue;
                if (flag != TRUE) {
                        return (CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED);
                }
        }

        switch (mech->mechanism) {
                case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
                {
                        rc = template_attribute_find(key_obj->template,
                            CKA_KEY_TYPE, &attr);
                        if (rc == FALSE) {
                                return (CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT);
                        } else {
                                keytype = *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)attr->pValue;
                                if (keytype != CKK_RSA) {
                                        return (CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT);
                                }
                        }

                        flag = template_attribute_find(key_obj->template,
                            CKA_CLASS, &attr);
                        if (flag == FALSE) {
                                return (CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED);
                        }
                        else
                                class = *(CK_OBJECT_CLASS *)attr->pValue;

                        if (class != CKO_PUBLIC_KEY) {
                                return (CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED);
                        }
                        // PKCS #11 doesn't allow multi - part RSA operations
                        ctx->context_len = 0;
                        ctx->context    = NULL;
                }
                break;

                case CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS:
                case CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS:
                {
                        rc = template_attribute_find(key_obj->template,
                            CKA_KEY_TYPE, &attr);
                        if (rc == FALSE) {
                                return (CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT);
                        } else {
                                keytype = *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)attr->pValue;
                                if (keytype != CKK_RSA) {
                                        return (CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT);
                                }
                        }

                        flag = template_attribute_find(key_obj->template,
                            CKA_CLASS, &attr);
                        if (flag == FALSE) {
                                return (CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED);
                        }
                        else
                                class = *(CK_OBJECT_CLASS *)attr->pValue;

                        if (class != CKO_PUBLIC_KEY) {
                                return (CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED);
                        }
                        ctx->context_len = sizeof (RSA_DIGEST_CONTEXT);
                        ctx->context = (CK_BYTE *)malloc(
                            sizeof (RSA_DIGEST_CONTEXT));
                        if (! ctx->context) {
                                return (CKR_HOST_MEMORY);
                        }
                        (void) memset(ctx->context, 0x0,
                            sizeof (RSA_DIGEST_CONTEXT));
                }
                break;

                case CKM_MD5_HMAC:
                case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
                {
                        rc = template_attribute_find(key_obj->template,
                            CKA_KEY_TYPE, &attr);
                        if (rc == FALSE) {
                                return (CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT);
                        } else {
                                keytype = *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)attr->pValue;
                                if (keytype != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET) {
                                        return (CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT);
                                }
                        }

                        // PKCS #11 doesn't allow multi - part HMAC operations
                        ctx->context_len = 0;
                        ctx->context    = NULL;
                }
                break;

                case CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL:
                case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL:
                {
                        CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *param =
                            (CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)mech->pParameter;

                        if (mech->ulParameterLen !=
                            sizeof (CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS)) {
                                return (CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
                        }
                        if ((mech->mechanism == CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL) &&
                            (*param > 16)) {
                                return (CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
                        }
                        if ((mech->mechanism == CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL) &&
                            (*param > 20)) {
                                return (CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
                        }
                        rc = template_attribute_find(key_obj->template,
                            CKA_KEY_TYPE, &attr);
                        if (rc == FALSE) {
                                return (CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT);
                        } else {
                                keytype = *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)attr->pValue;
                                if (keytype != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET) {
                                        return (CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT);
                                }
                        }

                        ctx->context_len = 0;
                        ctx->context    = NULL;
                }
                break;

                default:
                return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
        }


        ctx->key                 = key;
        ctx->mech.ulParameterLen = mech->ulParameterLen;
        ctx->mech.mechanism     = mech->mechanism;
        ctx->mech.pParameter    = mech->pParameter;
        ctx->multi              = FALSE;
        ctx->active             = TRUE;
        ctx->recover            = recover_mode;

        return (CKR_OK);
}

CK_RV
verify_mgr_cleanup(SIGN_VERIFY_CONTEXT *ctx)
{
        if (! ctx) {
                return (CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED);
        }
        ctx->key                 = 0;
        ctx->mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
        ctx->mech.mechanism     = 0;
        ctx->multi              = FALSE;
        ctx->active             = FALSE;
        ctx->recover            = FALSE;
        ctx->context_len         = 0;
        ctx->mech.pParameter = NULL;

        if (ctx->context) {
                free(ctx->context);
                ctx->context = NULL;
        }

        return (CKR_OK);
}

CK_RV
verify_mgr_verify(SESSION               * sess,
        SIGN_VERIFY_CONTEXT * ctx,
        CK_BYTE         * in_data,
        CK_ULONG                in_data_len,
        CK_BYTE         * signature,
        CK_ULONG                sig_len)
{
        if (! sess || ! ctx) {
                return (CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED);
        }
        if (ctx->active == FALSE) {
                return (CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED);
        }
        if (ctx->recover == TRUE) {
                return (CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED);
        }

        if (! in_data || ! signature) {
                return (CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED);
        }
        if (ctx->multi == TRUE) {
                return (CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE);
        }

        switch (ctx->mech.mechanism) {
                case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
                return (rsa_pkcs_verify(sess,   ctx,
                    in_data,   in_data_len,
                    signature, sig_len));
                case CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS:
                case CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS:
                        return (rsa_hash_pkcs_verify(sess,      ctx,
                            in_data,   in_data_len,
                            signature, sig_len));

                case CKM_MD5_HMAC:
                case CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL:
                        return (md5_hmac_verify(sess,   ctx,
                            in_data,   in_data_len,
                            signature, sig_len));
                case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
                case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL:
                        return (sha1_hmac_verify(sess,  ctx,
                            in_data,   in_data_len,
                            signature, sig_len));
                default:
                return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
        }
}

CK_RV
verify_mgr_verify_update(SESSION * sess,
        SIGN_VERIFY_CONTEXT * ctx,
        CK_BYTE         * in_data,
        CK_ULONG                in_data_len)
{
        if (! sess || ! ctx || ! in_data) {
                return (CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED);
        }
        if (ctx->active == FALSE) {
                return (CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED);
        }
        if (ctx->recover == TRUE) {
                return (CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED);
        }
        ctx->multi = TRUE;


        switch (ctx->mech.mechanism) {
                case CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS:
                case CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS:
                        return (rsa_hash_pkcs_verify_update(sess, ctx,
                            in_data, in_data_len));
                default:
                        return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
        }
}

CK_RV
verify_mgr_verify_final(SESSION         * sess,
        SIGN_VERIFY_CONTEXT * ctx,
        CK_BYTE         * signature,
        CK_ULONG                sig_len)
{
        if (! sess || ! ctx) {
                return (CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED);
        }
        if (ctx->active == FALSE) {
                return (CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED);
        }
        if (ctx->recover == TRUE) {
                return (CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED);
        }
        switch (ctx->mech.mechanism) {
                case CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS:
                case CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS:
                        return (rsa_hash_pkcs_verify_final(sess, ctx,
                            signature, sig_len));
                default:
                        return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
        }
}

CK_RV
verify_mgr_verify_recover(SESSION               * sess,
        CK_BBOOL                length_only,
        SIGN_VERIFY_CONTEXT * ctx,
        CK_BYTE         * signature,
        CK_ULONG                sig_len,
        CK_BYTE         * out_data,
        CK_ULONG            * out_len)
{
        if (! sess || ! ctx) {
                return (CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED);
        }
        if (ctx->active == FALSE) {
                return (CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED);
        }
        if (ctx->recover == FALSE) {
                return (CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED);
        }

        if (! signature || ! out_len) {
                return (CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED);
        }
        if (ctx->multi == TRUE) {
                return (CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE);
        }

        switch (ctx->mech.mechanism) {
                case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
                return (rsa_pkcs_verify_recover(sess,   length_only,
                    ctx, signature, sig_len, out_data,  out_len));
                default:
                        return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
        }
}