root/usr/src/lib/gss_mechs/mech_krb5/krb5/krb/sendauth.c
/*
 * Copyright 2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
 * Use is subject to license terms.
 * Copyright (c) 2016 by Delphix. All rights reserved.
 */


/*
 * lib/krb5/krb/sendauth.c
 *
 * Copyright 1991 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
 * All Rights Reserved.
 *
 * Export of this software from the United States of America may
 *   require a specific license from the United States Government.
 *   It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating
 *   export to obtain such a license before exporting.
 *
 * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
 * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
 * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
 * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and
 * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
 * the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
 * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
 * permission.  Furthermore if you modify this software you must label
 * your software as modified software and not distribute it in such a
 * fashion that it might be confused with the original M.I.T. software.
 * M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of
 * this software for any purpose.  It is provided "as is" without express
 * or implied warranty.
 *
 *
 * convenience sendauth/recvauth functions
 */


#include "k5-int.h"
#include "com_err.h"
#include "auth_con.h"
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

static const char sendauth_version[] = "KRB5_SENDAUTH_V1.0";

krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
krb5_sendauth(krb5_context context, krb5_auth_context *auth_context, krb5_pointer fd, char *appl_version, krb5_principal client, krb5_principal server, krb5_flags ap_req_options, krb5_data *in_data, krb5_creds *in_creds, krb5_ccache ccache, krb5_error **error, krb5_ap_rep_enc_part **rep_result, krb5_creds **out_creds)
{
        krb5_octet              result;
        krb5_creds              creds;
        krb5_creds               * credsp = NULL;
        krb5_creds               * credspout = NULL;
        krb5_error_code         retval = 0;
        krb5_data               inbuf, outbuf;
        int                     len;
        krb5_ccache             use_ccache = 0;

        if (error)
            *error = 0;

        /*
         * First, send over the length of the sendauth version string;
         * then, we send over the sendauth version.  Next, we send
         * over the length of the application version strings followed
         * by the string itself.
         */
        outbuf.length = strlen(sendauth_version) + 1;
        outbuf.data = (char *) sendauth_version;
        if ((retval = krb5_write_message(context, fd, &outbuf)))
                return(retval);
        outbuf.length = strlen(appl_version) + 1;
        outbuf.data = appl_version;
        if ((retval = krb5_write_message(context, fd, &outbuf)))
                return(retval);
        /*
         * Now, read back a byte: 0 means no error, 1 means bad sendauth
         * version, 2 means bad application version
         */
        len = krb5_net_read(context, *((int *) fd), (char *)&result, 1);
        if (len != 1)
                return((len < 0) ? errno : ECONNABORTED);
        if (result == 1)
                return(KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS);
        else if (result == 2)
                return(KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS);
        else if (result != 0)
                return(KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADRESPONSE);
        /*
         * We're finished with the initial negotiations; let's get and
         * send over the authentication header.  (The AP_REQ message)
         */

        /*
         * If no credentials were provided, try getting it from the
         * credentials cache.
         */
        memset((char *)&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));

        /*
         * See if we need to access the credentials cache
         */
        if (!in_creds || !in_creds->ticket.length) {
                if (ccache)
                        use_ccache = ccache;
                /* Solaris Kerberos */
                else if ((retval = krb5int_cc_default(context, &use_ccache)) != 0)
                        goto error_return;
        }
        if (!in_creds) {
                if ((retval = krb5_copy_principal(context, server,
                                                  &creds.server)))
                        goto error_return;
                if (client)
                        retval = krb5_copy_principal(context, client,
                                                     &creds.client);
                else
                        retval = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, use_ccache,
                                                       &creds.client);
                if (retval) {
                        krb5_free_principal(context, creds.server);
                        goto error_return;
                }
                /* creds.times.endtime = 0; -- memset 0 takes care of this
                                        zero means "as long as possible" */
                /* creds.keyblock.enctype = 0; -- as well as this.
                                        zero means no session enctype
                                        preference */
                in_creds = &creds;
        }
        if (!in_creds->ticket.length) {
                /* Solaris Kerberos */
            if ((retval = krb5_get_credentials(context, 0,
                                               use_ccache, in_creds, &credsp)) != 0)
                    goto error_return;
            credspout = credsp;
        } else {
            credsp = in_creds;
        }

        if (ap_req_options & AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY) {
            /* Provide some more fodder for random number code.
               This isn't strong cryptographically; the point here is
               not to guarantee randomness, but to make it less likely
               that multiple sessions could pick the same subkey.  */
            char rnd_data[1024];
            GETPEERNAME_ARG3_TYPE len2;
            krb5_data d;
            d.length = sizeof (rnd_data);
            d.data = rnd_data;
            len2 = sizeof (rnd_data);
            if (getpeername (*(int*)fd, (GETPEERNAME_ARG2_TYPE *) rnd_data,
                             &len2) == 0) {
                d.length = len2;
                /* Solaris Kerberos */
                (void) krb5_c_random_seed (context, &d);
            }
            len2 = sizeof (rnd_data);
            if (getsockname (*(int*)fd, (GETSOCKNAME_ARG2_TYPE *) rnd_data,
                             &len2) == 0) {
                d.length = len2;
                /* Solaris Kerberos */
                (void) krb5_c_random_seed (context, &d);
            }
        }

        /* Solaris Kerberos */
        if ((retval = krb5_mk_req_extended(context, auth_context,
                                           ap_req_options, in_data, credsp,
                                           &outbuf)) != 0)
            goto error_return;

        /*
         * First write the length of the AP_REQ message, then write
         * the message itself.
         */
        retval = krb5_write_message(context, fd, &outbuf);
        free(outbuf.data);
        if (retval)
            goto error_return;

        /*
         * Now, read back a message.  If it was a null message (the
         * length was zero) then there was no error.  If not, we the
         * authentication was rejected, and we need to return the
         * error structure.
         */
        /* Solaris Kerberos */
        if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)) != 0)
            goto error_return;

        if (inbuf.length) {
                if (error) {
                    /* Solaris Kerberos */
                    if ((retval = krb5_rd_error(context, &inbuf, error)) != 0) {
                        krb5_xfree(inbuf.data);
                        goto error_return;
                    }
                }
                retval = KRB5_SENDAUTH_REJECTED;
                krb5_xfree(inbuf.data);
                goto error_return;
        }

        /*
         * If we asked for mutual authentication, we should now get a
         * length field, followed by a AP_REP message
         */
        if ((ap_req_options & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED)) {
            krb5_ap_rep_enc_part        *repl = 0;
            /* Solaris Kerberos */
            if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)) != 0)
                goto error_return;

            /* Solaris Kerberos */
            if ((retval = krb5_rd_rep(context, *auth_context, &inbuf,
                                      &repl)) != 0) {
                if (repl)
                    krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part(context, repl);
                krb5_xfree(inbuf.data);
                goto error_return;
            }

            krb5_xfree(inbuf.data);
            /*
             * If the user wants to look at the AP_REP message,
             * copy it for them.
             */
            if (rep_result)
                *rep_result = repl;
            else
                krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part(context, repl);
        }
        retval = 0;             /* Normal return */
        if (out_creds) {
            *out_creds = credsp;
            credspout = NULL;
        }

error_return:
    krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds);
    if (credspout != NULL)
        krb5_free_creds(context, credspout);
    /* Solaris Kerberos */
    if (!ccache && use_ccache)
        (void) krb5_cc_close(context, use_ccache);
    return(retval);
}